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The fourteenth-century scholar ‘Abd al-Rahmān Ibn Muhammad ibn Khaldun 
proclaims in his Muqaddima the establishment of a new science called the science of 
culture (‘ilm al-‘umrān). The primary subject of investigation of this science is aspects of 
human social organization. The ostensible purpose of this science is to provide historians 
with new analytical tools to verify historical reports.  
This dissertation provides a critical analysis of Ibn Khaldun’s original 
introduction to his Kitāb al-‘Ibar. Though my primary focus will be on the original 
introduction, my analysis will be informed and supported by the main text of the 
Muqaddima. The purpose of this analysis is to point out the political aspects of Ibn 
Khaldun’s science of culture and hence to explain the political objectives behind his 
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 Since this dissertation provides an examination of Ibn Khaldun’s famous book, 
the Muqaddima (Arabic for Introduction)—which is part of a larger work entitled Kitāb 
al-‘Ibar1—and provides a critical analysis of the introduction to this work, a statement 
about the character of each of these texts is in order. 
 Kitāb al-‘Ibar (or the Book of ‘Ibar) is a seven-volume work by Ibn Khaldun 
which includes, according to his own plan, “an introduction (muqaddima) and three 
books” (I.6: 9).2 Volume I contains the Introduction and the First Book, Volumes II-V 
contain the Second Book, and Volumes VI-VII contain the Third Book. 
The title of the Introduction—which contains an invocation and a preface—is 
“On the virtue of knowing history, verifying its approaches, and outlining the errors and 
fancies that befall the historians, as well as mentioning some of the reasons for these 
[errors and fancies]” (I.6: 9-10). The title of the First Book is “On culture (‘umrān), and 
mentioning what essential accidents happen in it: of kingship, authority, income, 
livelihood, arts, sciences, and their reasons and causes thereof” (I.6: 10-13). The title of 
the Second Book is “On the [historical] reports of the Arabs, their generations, and their 
dynasties, from the beginning of creation, to this time, and in it reference will be made to 
some of [the Arab’s] contemporaries from among the famous nations and their dynasties, 
                                                 
1 In the second chapter I will provide a translation of this difficult title. It is important to note here, 
however, that Kitāb al-‘Ibar, or the book of ‘Ibar, is the conventional shortened version of an otherwise 
long title. The full title reads: Kitāb al-‘Ibar wa dīwān al-mubtada’ wa al-khabar fī ayyām al-‘arab wa al-
‘ajam wa al-barbar wa man ‘āsarahum min dhawī al-sultān al-akbar.  
2 Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn, Prolégomènes d’Ebn-Khaldoun, Texte Arabe Publié, D’Après les 
Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Impériale, ed., M. Quatremère (Paris: Benjamin Duprat, 1858; reprint: 
Beirut: Maktaba Lubnān, 1970). All references are to the Quatremère edition. I indicate the volume by an 
upper-case Roman numeral; then, after a period, and Arabic numeral indicates the page; finally, following a 
colon, the lines are indicated by Arabic numerals. Thus, the reference here means vol. 1, p. 6, line 9 
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for example, the Nabataeans, the Syrians, the Persians, the Israelites, the Copts, the 
Greeks, the Turks, and the Rūm [i.e., the Byzantines]” (I.6: 13-16). The title of the Third 
Book is “On the reports of the Berbers…and mentioning their origins and their 
generations, and of what was [under] their [possession] in the habitats of the Maghrib; in 
Particular of kingships and dynasties” (I.6: 16-18). 
 Both the second and the third books have been given the common title History 
(Tārīkh) by scholars. This conventional designation was coined during Ibn Khaldun’s 
time.3 Considering the fact that both of these books contain mainly historical reports, the 
common title for them seems accurate.  
It is in the first book that Ibn Khaldun presents a new science called ‘ilm al-
‘umrān (the science of culture).4 The Introduction, as Ibn Khaldun’s description 
indicates, provides a theoretical treatment of history as well as a critique of the works of 
previous historians. Traditionally, both the Introduction and Book One have been given 
the common title Muqaddima. Since this First Book, through its formulation of the 
science of culture, ostensibly presents the analytical tools by which scholars can 
authenticate historical reports, it seems reasonable to set it apart from—and to consider it 
as part of an extended introduction to—the remaining two books, known as History, 
which provide actual historical reports. Combining the Introduction and the First Book 
under the common title Muqaddima is also helpful since the First Book has not been 
provided with a proper title by Ibn Khaldun. The scholarly convention of combining the 
first two major parts of Kitāb al-‘Ibar under one title originated with Ibn Khaldun 
                                                 
3 See, for example, ‘Abd al-Rahmān Badawī, Mu’alafāt ibn Khaldūn (Cairo: al-Majlis al-A‘lā li-al-
Thaqāfa, 2006). pp. 271 and 284. 
4 For an explanation of why I translate ‘ilm al-‘umrān as “science of culture,” see blow, Chapter 1. 
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himself. As Franz Rosenthal maintains, 
[D]uring its author’s lifetime the original introduction and the first book became an 
independent work known under the title of Muqaddimah. In the 1394 edition of his 
Autobiography, Ibn Khaldun speaks of the first book of his History in this way. At the 
same time, the table of contents prefixed to our oldest manuscripts of the Muqaddimah 
states that “this first book went by the name of the Muqaddimah until (that name) came to 
be a characteristic proper name for it.” Thus, it is not surprising that, in a late addition to 
the Muqaddimah itself, Ibn Khaldun refers to it as the Muqaddimah and that he gave 
lectures exclusively devoted to it. To all later ages, Muqaddimah was the title almost 
universally used.5 
 
In keeping with this convention, I use in this dissertation the title Muqaddima to 
designate the first two parts of Kitāb al-‘Ibar, i.e., the Introduction and the First Book. 
Moreover, I use the term “original introduction” to refer to the very first part of the 
Muqaddima and thus of Kitāb al-‘Ibar; and I use the term History when referring to the 
last two parts of Kitāb al-‘Ibar, i.e., the Second Book and the Third Book. 
 An additional point of clarification is needed here regarding the “part” of the 
Muqaddima that is the First Book. Ibn Khaldun organizes this First Book into six 
sections, each one of which is given the designation fasl, an Arabic term that may be 
understood to mean either “chapter” or “section.” Most Western authors writing on Ibn 
Khaldun refer to these six divisions as “chapters.” But things become more complicated 
as Ibn Khaldun goes on to divide each of these six chapters into smaller parts or sections. 
The first chapter is divided into six parts called muqaddima or “introduction.” Now since 
muqaddima can also mean, as Rosenthal suggests, “prefatory discussion,” this is the 
designation I use for these sub-divisions of Chapter One. In Chapters Two through Six, 
Ibn Khaldun uses the term fas l, i.e., “chapter” or “section,” for the further divisions he 
introduces in each chapter. To avoid confusion, I will use the designation “section” to 
indicate each of the divisions within these five chapters. 
                                                 
5 Franz Rosenthal, “Translator’s Introduction” in The Muqaddimah: an Introduction to History, translated 
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The fourteenth-century statesman, scholar, and judge ‘Abd al-Rah mān ibn 
Muh ammad ibn Khaldūn (henceforth Ibn Khaldun) proclaims in his Muqaddima the 
establishment of a new science called the science of culture (‘ilm al-‘umrān). The 
primary subject of investigation of this science is aspects of human social organization. 
The ostensible purpose of this science is to provide historians with new analytical tools to 
verify historical reports.  
This dissertation provides a critical analysis of Ibn Khaldun’s original 
introduction to his Kitāb al-‘Ibar. Though my primary focus will be on the original 
introduction, my analysis will be informed and supported by the main text of the 
Muqaddima. The purpose of this analysis is to point out the political aspects of Ibn 
Khaldun’s science of culture and hence to explain the political objectives behind his 
concern with the study of history. 
Following Ibn Khaldun’s own method of study—which he lays bare in his 
original introduction—my interpretation looks not only at the surface (al-zāhir) of Ibn 
Khaldun’s argument, but also penetrates deeply into the hidden part (al-bātin) that 
reveals the intention (al-maqs id) behind, or gives the meaning (al-ma‘nā) of, the surface 
of this argument. 
Here at least two questions arise. Why should one focus on this part of the book? 




Why the Focus on the Original Introduction?  
This dissertation focuses on the original introduction because this part, which is 
mostly neglected by Ibn Khaldun scholars, provides the best explanation of the overall 
political objective of Kitāb al-‘Ibar. In this I follow Ibn Khaldun’s conception of the 
relationship between human thought and human action. Indeed, in the Muqaddima, 
Chapter Six, section 2, Ibn Khaldun gives an illustration of this relationship. Through this 
illustration we glean a hint as to the importance that he attaches to the introduction of his 
own work: 
If a [man] thinks of bringing to existence (ījād) a roof that would shelter 
him, he will mentally move [from this roof] to the wall that will support 
the roof, then to the base (al-asās) on which the wall will stand. Now this 
is the last [part] of the thinking process. And this is the meaning of their 
saying “the first of the work is the end of thought, and the first of the 
thought is the end of the work.” For no external action of a human being 
would be complete except by thinking of these different ranks (martabāt), 
because each one depends on the other. Then, [once the thought is 
complete], he would commence acting upon it. And the first of this 
thought is the last cause (musabib), and it is the last with regard to the 
work, [while] what is first with regard to the work is the first cause 
(musabib), and it is last with regard to thought. (II.366: 11-20).1 
 
In seeking to understand a product of human action, Ibn Khaldun looks not only at the 
declared or explicit purpose for which the thing was produced but also at the relationship 
each distinct part has to the other parts of the work and, as such, to the role that part plays 
with respect to the larger purpose of the work. The base or foundation of a building, 
which represents the first part of the work, represents the culmination of the thinking 
process. The beginning of the work—i.e., the foundation—if it is to be done well, has to 
be commensurate with the larger purpose of the work. 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of the Muqaddima are my own. 
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 However, because it is hidden from view, even though its existence is easily 
acknowledged, the importance of the foundation in serving the purpose of the building is 
largely overlooked. After all, the outward appearance of the building seems sufficient 
enough to supply observers with all they need to know about the building’s purpose. A 
cottage, by its outward appearance, suggests that its main purpose is to offer shelter from 
the elements and from predatory animals. A mansion’s outward appearance suggests that 
its purpose is not only to offer shelter, but also to provide the conditions for commodious 
living. The imposing size of a castle’s walls suggests that its larger goal is to provide 
even greater ease of living as well, perhaps, as protection to the beleaguered inhabitants 
from those who might wish them harm. And the even more imposing size of city’s walls 
suggest that their purpose reaches beyond commodious living to the protection of the 
political community from external enemies. 
But since the foundation is the culmination of the thought process upon which the 
whole edifice is built, an understanding of the depth of its structure and the solidity of its 
material not only indicate the strength, stability, and durability of the edifice—and hence 
provide greater appreciation of its overall purpose—but also inform about the 
intelligence, experience, and skill of its designer (insofar as the ultimate purpose is 
concerned). 
The same can be said about the intellectual edifice that is Kitāb al-‘Ibar. Most 
commentators, impressed by its majestic appearance, neglect a careful examination of its 
original introduction, despite the fact that it is the foundation upon which the entire work 
is grounded. Yet this foundation is, to borrow Alexis de Tocqueville’s description of his 
 3
 
own book, Democracy in America, the “mother thought that so to speak links all its 
parts.”2 
 
Why the Analytical, Critical Focus on the Style of Writing?  
Ibn Khaldun’s eloquent style of writing is acknowledged by almost all medieval 
and modern commentators on his work.3  The unique literary quality of Kitāb al-‘Ibar, 
which proved to be long lasting, is something that Ibn Khaldun proudly celebrated when, 
in the course of describing his book, he maintained in the preface: “In the division and 
organization of it, I followed a strange path, and from among the various ways, I invented 
for [this book] a wondrous approach, and an innovative method and style” (I.6: 3-4). But 
almost as soon as Kitāb al-‘Ibar became the subject of scholarly debate, the relationship 
between Ibn Khaldun’s style of writing and the substance of his thought became a matter 
of controversy. For example, the great Egyptian historian Taqī al-Dīn al-Maqrīzī (d. 
1442) was impressed by both the style and substance of Ibn Khaldun’s work. He is 
reported to have said about his friend: 
Anything similar to his Muqaddima has never been accomplished, and it is hard 
for any striver [for knowledge] (mujtahid) to attain what it has achieved; for it is 
the cream of cognition and learning, and the end-result of sound intellect and 
understanding. It [allows one to] behold the way things are. It provides awareness 
of (tu‘arrif) the truth of occurrences and reports. It gives expression to the 
condition of being and conveys the root of every existent with utterances more 
brilliant than well arranged pearls and finer than water fanned by the zephyr.4 
 
                                                 
2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated, edited, and with an introduction by Harvey C. 
Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2000). p. 14. 
3 Miriam Cooke, “Ibn Khaldun and Language: From Linguistic Habit to Philological Craft,” in Ibn Khaldun 
and Islamic Ideology, edited by Bruce B. Lawrence (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984). pp. 27-28. 
4 Badawī, op. cit., p. 284. 
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But Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalānī (d. 1449), another important Egyptian historian, was not 
impressed by the substance of his former teacher’s work. Recalling al-Maqrīzī’s praise of 
the Muqaddima, Ibn Hajar retorts: 
As for his description of [the Muqaddima] regarding its eloquent style and play 
with words in the Jāh izian way, this is incontestable. But as for his praise of [Ibn 
Khaldun] beyond that, the case is not as he said—except in some things and not 
in others. The eloquent style, however, beautifies with its ornaments so that it 
makes what is not comely appear to be so.5 
In these two statements we observe an agreement among significant scholars in 
Ibn Khaldun’s own time regarding the excellence of the Muqaddima’s literary style. But 
we also observe a disagreement regarding the relationship between the Muqaddima’s 
literary style and its substance. Are Ibn Khaldun “utterances” in this text, which 
apparently are “more brilliant than well-arranged pearls and finer than water fanned by 
the zephyr,” the result of a sound intellect and understanding, or do they simply beautify 
with their ornaments, so as to make “what is not comely appear to be so”? 
I answer this question in relation to the dominant political thought that governs 
the substance of Ibn Khaldun’s Kitāb al-‘Ibar. In other words, I show how Ibn Khaldun’s 
concern with the study of history—which is presented as the ostensible concern of Kitāb 
al-‘Ibar—is designed to encourage the rational examination of political reality in a 
politically salutary way, and explain how Ibn Khaldun’s style of writing reflects the 
politically sensitive nature of this project as well as illustrates Ibn Khaldun’s pedagogical 
method. 
This dissertation is inspired by the work of Muhsin Mahdi’s very important Ibn 
Khaldun’s Philosophy of History: A Study in the Philosophic Foundation of the Science 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 284. 
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of Culture.6  Mahdi is arguably the first modern scholar to address seriously Ibn 
Khaldun’s Muqaddima on its own terms. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he resisted 
the all too powerful temptation of viewing Ibn Khaldun’s work through purely modern 
lenses. An unfortunate consequence of this approach, to which Mahdi is an opponent, is 
that the value of Ibn Khaldun’s work is reduced to what it contained of ideas supposedly 
anticipating modern ones—ideas the Muqaddima never intended to shape or influence. In 
his book, as well as in two later articles,7  Mahdi puts in relief the philosophical context 
against which Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddima is given coherence. And for that, his work 
gained much acclaim and also much critique.8 
My approach to the study of Ibn Khaldun differs from that of Mahdi in two 
important respects. First, while Mahdi brings the history of Islamic philosophy to bear on 
the understanding of Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddima, I devote my analysis to the text itself. 
And so, as I address the central idea in Kitāb al-‘Ibar in general, and the Muqaddima in 
particular, I allow the reader to judge for himself the subtlety and coherence in Ibn 
Khaldun’s argument. Second, I address the fundamental part of Kitāb al-‘Ibar, i.e., the 
original introduction—something that, according to my research, all Ibn Khaldun 
scholars overlook, including Mahdi.  
By seeing how Ibn Khaldun presents the unifying thought of his work in the 
introduction, the reader is better able to deal with those instances in the Muqaddima 
                                                 
6 Muhsin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun’s Philosophy of History: A Study in the Philosophic Foundation of the 
Science of Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964). 
7 The two articles, each entitled “Ibn Khaldun,” by Muhsin Mahdi are in A History of Muslim Philosophy, 
ed. M. M. Sharif (Wiesbaden: O. Harassowitz, 1963), pp. 888-904 and 961-984.  
8 For an example of qualified praise, see W. Montgomery Watt’ review in The Philosophical Quarterly, 
Vol. 9, No. 34 (Jan., 1959), 84-85. For a glowing praise, see Walter J. Fischel’s review in Journal of Near 
Easter Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Oct. 1959), 285-286. For a weak, but typical, critique of Mahdi’s 
“philosophic foundation” thesis, see Fuad Baali, Society, State, and Urbanism: Ibn Khaldun’s Sociological 
Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988) p. 7.  
 6
 
where he appears to contradict himself with respect to fundamental questions. For 
example, how can Ibn Khaldun be a serious student of philosophy—as Mahdi rightly 
shows—and then write, near the end of his Muqaddima what appears to be a scathing 
critique of philosophy (III.209-220: 17-15).9  A satisfactory answer to this question has to 
address first whether these contradictions with respect to the fundamental aspects of Ibn 
Khaldun’s thought are real or apparent, and if real whether they are by design or the 
product of careless thought. In other words, the answer to this question can only be 
reached by exploring the possibility that Ibn Khaldun’s writing communicates on 
multiple levels, by examining his competence to do so, by explaining the reasons behind 
any apparent paradoxical communication, and by demonstrating its actuality, i.e., that the 
communication is only apparently contradictory. All of these steps have to be shown first 
in Ibn Khaldun’s introductory arguments—for it is there that he is expected to make his 
first and most important impression on his careful reader—and then flesh out the rest of 
the Muqaddima from this initial interpretation. 
 Having explained the reasons why I focus on Ibn Khaldun’s original introduction 
and my analytical method, I now turn back to my general thesis: that Ibn Khaldun’s 
science of culture, which is ostensibly about the verification of historical reports, is 
intended to encourage the rational examination of political reality in a politically salutary 
way, i.e., in a manner that would not openly challenge the fundamental beliefs of the 
political community.10  I will address this in two steps. First, I will explain the 
appropriateness of using the term “culture” to translate Ibn Khaldun’s ‘umrān. Second, I 
                                                 
9 For an interesting critique related to this point, see Muhamed Mzoughi, “Ibn Khaldūn and Philosophy: A 
Critical Approach,” in Studies on Ibn Khaldun, Edited by Massimo Campanini (Milan: International 
Scientific Publisher, 2005) pp. 145-179. 




will evaluate the relationship between the study of culture and the study of history as 
presented by Ibn Khaldun. The purpose of this evaluation is to point out the limits 
Khaldun places upon the science of culture with respect to historical investigations. 
Through the examination of these limits, I point out how the ostensible purpose of this 
new science of culture is meant to be understood as only provisional. In exchange, I 
advance an argument that shows Ibn Khaldun’s emphasis on the political over the 
historical, which provides a new outlook on the larger objective of the Muqaddima. 
 
‘Umrān as “Culture” 
As stated, the main subject explored in the Muqaddima is the science (‘ilm) of 
‘umrān (cf. I.6: 9-10, I.56: 3-4, I.61: 14-17, I.66: 15-17, I.67-8: 18-11, III.433: 14-16). 
The length of the Muqaddima (which is about 1200 pages) reflects the importance Ibn 
Khaldun attaches to the knowledge of ‘umrān as a precursor to the study of history. The 
length of the Muqaddima also reflects the fact that ‘ilm al-‘umrān is a new science, 
which, apparently, no one before Ibn Khaldun attempted to organize and establish (I.61-
62: 16-15, I.66: 10-15). The two most common translations of ‘umrān are “culture” and 
“civilization.” My main argument will show how “culture,” despite certain limitations, is 
the term that best captures the meaning of ‘umrān.  
But this argument is not about translations simply. Rather, I will attempt to show 
how the literal meaning of ‘umrān holds the key for those who wish to understand the 
Muqaddima on its own terms, i.e., in terms free from modern scholarly prejudices. With 
this purpose in mind, my cursory treatment of the scholarly culture-civilization debate 
will focus on that part of the discussion which bears on the literal understanding of the 
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word ‘umrān. In other words, I will not deal with the different arguments from the 
Muqaddima that scholars use to support their particular choice of a translation. The fact 
that the culture-civilization debate is long-standing is indication enough that both 
translations can be supported by the Muqaddima. 
The word “culture” is derived from the Latin cultura meaning “cultivation” or 
“tending” and refers primarily to the cultivation or tending of soil. Culture as such is 
contrary to waste.  It is about improving on something that would otherwise remain stale. 
Thus the literal meaning of “cultivation,” as listed by the Oxford English Dictionary, is 
“to bestow labour and attention upon (land) in order to the raising of crops; to till; to 
improve and render fertile by husbandry.” In addition to the “tilling of land, tillage, [and] 
husbandry,” cultivation also means “improvement (of land); increased fertility.”11  As we 
will see shortly, it is in the literal meaning of culture, as the cultivation of the soil, that 
this word finds its strongest association with the Arabic ‘umrān. 
But the word “culture,” especially as it is used in modern and contemporary 
western scholarship, has figurative meanings that cannot be easily captured by ‘umrān. 
One of the oldest and most persistent figurative meanings of culture is the one which 
makes an analogy between the cultivation of the soil and the cultivation of the human 
soul, i.e., which understands culture as “the culture of the mind” or “education.” Hence 
“to cultivate” is an act which figuratively means to “improve and develop by education or 
training (a person, his mind, manners, faculties); to refine, to culture”; and to “promote 
the growth of, devote oneself to the advancement or development of (an art, science, 
sentiment, etc.); to foster.” It also means to “devote one’s attention to, to prosecute, 
follow, practice, cherish (any art, science; sentiment, habit, or pursuit, esp. with the object 
                                                 
11 OED, cultivation [OED = Oxford English Dictionary] 
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of acquiring it, or improving oneself in it).”12  An extension of the figurative meaning of 
culture as the culture of the mind sees culture as the sum total of significant socio-
political factors—such as language, religion, fine-arts, and social customs—which form 
and inform the collective identity of a social group or a people. This is an understanding 
of culture which allows discussions of the uniqueness of Christian, Muslim, or Hindu 
culture for example. It also permits scholars to speak of the Arab or Muslim mind as 
opposed to the European or Christian mind. Those familiar with Ibn Khaldun’s 
Muqaddima are aware that such a “comparative” approach to cultures, with its 
overemphasis on intellectual factors in forming group identity, has little to share with the 
science of ‘umrān. The prevalent use of culture—in western academics as well as in the 
media—as an explanatory variable for the “uneven development” of different nations (of 
certain peoples’ “inability” to cope with modernity) is arguably one of the reasons that 
encourage a number of Ibn Khaldun scholars to reject the rendering of ‘umrān as culture. 
However, there is another more forceful objection to this, which sees its figurative 
emphasis on the intellectual development of human beings as too limiting to capture the 
totality of Ibn Khaldun’s treatment of ‘umrān. Johann P. Arnason and George Stauth, in 
their article Civilization and State Formation in the Islamic Context: Re-Reading Ibn 
Khaldūn, make the general case for civilization as a comprehensive term that captures Ibn 
Khaldun’s “scientific” treatment of ‘umrān: 
[A] closer look at Ibn Khaldūn’s analysis of ‘umran will show that the use of the 
term “civilization” is justified by thematic affinities with the main currents of 
contemporary civilizational analysis. At the most elementary level, the emphasis 
on an integrated and unfolding totality of human life and activity is reminiscent 
                                                 
12 OED, cultivation 
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of theorists who have proposed a broad civilizational perspective as an antidote 
to inbuilt reductionism of separate social sciences.13 
 
The fact that the literal meaning of civilization shares little if anything with ‘umrān is a 
problem that does not concern Arnason and Stauth. To the objection that the literal 
meaning of civilization “suggests a demarcation from barbarism or savagery,” Arnason 
and Stauth respond: 
It is true that such dichotomies are alien to Ibn Khaldūn’s thought, but they are 
not taken for granted by modern civilizational analysts. Rather, the debate on 
their validity is internal to the tradition of the field, and some of its major 
figures… have applied the concept of civilization to primitive societies. 
 A further…indication of affinity is the central role which Ibn Khaldūn 
attributes to the dynamics of state formation…. Finally, the interpretation of 
‘umran as a discontinuous but unending development of human abilities—set out 
in detailed analyses of arts, crafts and sciences in the concluding books of the 
Muqaddimah—lends itself to comparison with Durkheim’s conception of the 
human being as a product of civilization (which was also his explicit reason for 
accepting Comte’s definition of sociology as a “science of civilization”).14 
 
 As we see in this brief outline of the culture-civilization debate, the main problem 
that arises in trying to translate ‘umrān is one common to all scholarly attempts at 
translations of key words or terms. The scholar needs to translate the foreign word in a 
way that will make understandable the literal as well as the important figurative meanings 
(or scientific concepts) of that word. Of course, this is the ideal translation, but when—as 
is often the case in translations—both the literal and the important figurative meanings of 
a word cannot be fully captured, the scholar has to make a choice between the two (i.e., 
to privilege either the literal or figurative meaning of the foreign word). Those scholars 
who render ‘umrān as civilization do not dispute the strong association between the 
                                                 
13 Johann P. Arnason and George Stauth, “Civilization and State Formation in the Islamic Context: Re-
Reading Ibn Khaldun,” in Thesis Eleven, Number 76, February 2004: 29-47, SAGE Publication (London, 
Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi). p. 3. 
14 Ibid., p. 32. 
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literal meaning of ‘umrān and the literal meaning of culture. Indeed, that association is so 
strong it cannot be disputed. What these scholars do dispute, however, is the 
appropriateness of using culture to capture the meaning of ‘umrān as a subject of 
scientific inquiry by Ibn Khaldun. The ways in which culture is used in scholarly 
communities today has little to do with the way Ibn Khaldun used the word ‘umrān. 
Since, for scholars such as Arnason and Stauth, sociology is the “science of civilization,” 
and since Ibn Khaldun’s usage of the term ‘umrān portrays “thematic affinities with the 
main currents of contemporary civilizational analysis,” then it is more appropriate to 
translate ‘umrān as civilization than to translate it as culture. 
 If the main purpose of studying the Muqaddima is to compare modern sociology 
with Ibn Khaldun’s “sociology,” then rendering ‘umrān as civilization might very well be 
the proper choice. But this argument cannot stand uncontested, if in reading the 
Muqaddima we seek to understand Ibn Khaldun’s teaching on its own terms, i.e., in terms 
that are as free as possible from modern scholarly prejudices. It is indeed exceedingly 
difficult, if not impossible, to free oneself completely from modern scientific concepts 
and ways of viewing and understanding the world. However, a defining quality of liberal 
education is the ability to question one’s own most cherished opinions, whether we 
regard them as “scientific” or otherwise. The liberal quality of this education is 
diminished when, in reading the works of past thinkers, we seek to identify what we 
believe is the historical progress of our own ideas. Such an historical approach to the 
reading of old books assumes the superiority of present thought to that of the past. It is an 
approach which denies the possibility that the thought of the past can challenge or truly 
inform our contemporary thought. 
 12
 
 I do not mean to single out scholars who use civilization for ‘umrān, or to suggest 
that their translation choices are motivated only by the desire to expose in Ibn Khaldun 
what is relevant to modern scholarship. Clearly not all those who render ‘umrān as 
civilization wish to provide modern interpretations of Ibn Khaldun’s teaching, and not all 
those who render ‘umrān as culture wish to address Ibn Khaldun on his own terms. The 
critique of using “civilization” for ‘umrān that follows is limited to focusing on the 
importance of the literal translation of this term. 
 The argument for translating ‘umrān according to its literal meaning gains new 
urgency when we take into consideration the novelty of the primary subject matter of the 
Muqaddima. As Ibn Khaldun informs us, no scholar before him ever attempted to give a 
treatment of the science of ‘umrān. As such, the Muqaddima is our first source for 
understanding the science of ‘umrān. Considering the fact that the Muqaddima is set forth 
as an introduction to history, a proper understanding of this science requires a 
comprehension of the relationship between the subject matter of this science, i.e., ‘umrān, 
and history. To put it differently, understanding the science of ‘umrān requires a 
comprehension of the core ideas, implicit in the literal meaning of ‘umrān, which make 
this term suitable for the study of history. 
 The word ‘umrān comes from the Arabic verb-root ‘-m-r, which literally means 
“he aged,” “he grew old,” “he lived,” or “continued in life.”15 According to one of the 
most authoritative Arabic lexica, Lisān al-‘Arab, the substantives of ‘-m-r (i.e., al-‘amr, 
al-‘umur, and al-‘umr) all signify one thing, namely, life (al-hayāt).16  But, as we will 
                                                 
15 Lane, ‘-m-r [Lane = Edward William Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, 8 vols. (New York: Frederick 
Ungar, 1958) (London, 1863).] 




soon discover, the most decisive idea contained in the verb-root, and animating most (if 
not all) of this root’s derivatives, is the idea of growing up or of getting old. Substantives 
such as al-‘umur (i.e., age) signify not only life but also the concept of advancing in 
years. The older one gets (‘amira), the more aware one becomes of one’s age, of one’s 
inescapable mortality. Such “awareness” of mortality is reflected in the expression 
‘ammara nafsahu, meaning “He determined for himself, or assigned to himself, a limited 
life.”17  These “determinations” of one’s limited life is based, in part, on one’s 
observations of what the “normal” span of life—madā al-h ayāt as Ibn Khaldun calls it 
(I.71: 1)—is for human beings. For those rare individuals who live beyond the normal 
expectations of human life, the verb-root ‘-m-r supplies us with the word mu‘ammir, 
meaning “he lived (‘āsha) and remained (baqā) for a very long time.”18  Of course, the 
Quran informs us that, despite all of our calculations, “Nor is a man long-lived granted 
length of days, nor is a part cut off from his life, but is in a Book (ordained)” (wa mā 
yu‘ammaru min mu‘ammarin wa lā yunqas u min ‘umurihi illā fī kitāb; Q.35: 11).19 
 Still, one need not be a Muslim, or even a monotheist, to come to the realization 
that one has little control over one’s moment of death, barring suicide. One can only 
speculate about that moment. This speculation itself can open the door to spiritual 
reflection regarding the meaning of life and death. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
verb-root ‘-m-r—which literally means “he aged” or “grew old”—has an added spiritual 
dimension when it is equated with the divine, as in ‘amara rabbahu, i.e., “He served, or 
worshipped, his Lord…he prayed and fasted.”20 We have already seen how the word 
                                                 
17 Lane, ‘-m-r, p. 2154. 
18 Lisān, ‘-m-r, p. 602. 
19 Lane, ‘-m-r, p. 2154. 
20 Lane, ‘-m-r, p. 2154. 
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‘ammara indicates a subject (the third person singular masculine ‘he’) who is thinking or 
speculating about the life-span of an object. When that object is the thinking subject 
himself, i.e., when one is said to ‘ammara nafsahu, this means that “He determined for 
himself, or assigned to himself, a limited life.” However, when the object of the thinking 
is the immortal Being Himself, i.e., when one is said to ‘ammara Allah, this means that 
he “acknowledged the everlasting existence of God.”21  As a further indication of the 
spiritual aspect to the idea of growing old, Lisān al-‘Arab informs us, on the authority of 
Arabic grammarians, that the often used oath, li-‘amruka, which literally means “by your 
life,” also means “by your religion (li-dīnika).”22 
 But in what way does the literal and “spiritual” components of the verb-root ‘-m-r 
infuse ‘umrān with meaning and how does this meaning relate to the English word 
“culture”? To address these questions we have to start from the beginning, from the 
everyday understanding of this word, as opposed to its “scientific” conception. If we ask 
contemporary native Arabic speakers what the word ‘umrān means the answer most 
always is something like “building” or perhaps “a place flourishing with human activity.” 
Classical Arabic lexical works support this contemporary understanding and expand on it 
as “a land, or house, inhabited, peopled, well peopled, well stocked with people and the 
like, in a flourishing state, in a state the contrary of desolate or waste or ruined; a land 
colonized, cultivated, or well cultivated; a house in a state of good repair.”23 Like 
culture, ‘umrān is a state that is contrary to waste (al-kharāb). When one is said to 
                                                 
21 Lane, ‘-m-r, p. 2154. 
22 Lisān, ‘-m-r, p. 601. It is interesting to note here that the word for religion, dīn, comes from the verb root 
d-y-n the infinitive of which is dāna which means “to borrow” as to get a loan, or to be in debt. According 
to Muslim theology dīn, religion, is a word signifying that which we owe God. Since God is the ultimate 
life giver, it is perhaps easy to see how one’s ‘amr (life-span or age) is itself equivalent to dīn (that which 
one owes). 
23 Lane, ‘-m-r, p. 2155. 
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‘ammara al-kharab it means that “He made the ruin, or waste, or the like, to become in a 
state of good repair, in a state the contrary of ruined or waste or desolate.”24  It is 
important to note here that when we think of ‘umrān versus kharāb (or culture vs. waste), 
the frame of reference is that which promotes the life and prosperity of human beings. 
Thus when one is said to ‘ammara al-arda (the earth), this means “he peopled the land; 
stocked it well with people and camels and the like; colonized it, cultivated it, or 
cultivated it well; rendered it in a flourishing state, or in a state the contrary of waste.”25 
All of these actions are essential for human survival and human flourishing. 
                                                
 The literal meaning of ‘umrān establishes a link between the individual’s 
awareness of his own mortality, his dependence on forces greater than himself, and the 
need to make the most out of his brief life. Thus the verb ‘ammara, when applied to 
oneself or to the divine, signifies thought of mortality and worship, and when applied to 
an inanimate object signifies the act of cultivation for the purpose of making one’s life 
livable. The link between the act of worship and the secular act of cultivation, which we 
can recognize at the root of ‘umrān, can also be discerned (with certain limits) in the root 
of the English word “culture.” After all, culture, which comes from the Latin root for 
“cult,” used to mean “worship [or] reverential homage”26  (though now this meaning is 
considered obsolete). Since interpretation of the significance of this relationship between 
the sacred and secular in the usage of the word “culture” may vary, we need not 
exaggerate the significance of the correspondence between the meaning of “culture” and 
 
24 Lane, ‘-m-r, p. 2154. 
25 Lane, ‘-m-r, p. 2154 
26 OED, culture 
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‘umrān.27  The important point here is that we can see enough correspondence between 
the literal meanings of these two words that justifies the translation of the one by means 
of the other. 
 Because ‘umrān denotes human grouping, human flourishing, as well as an 
organizing standard that makes such flourishing possible, Ibn Khaldun at times uses this 
term as an equivalent to human society or human social organization (al-ijtimā‘ al-insānī; 
I.56: 6-7, I.61: 9, 17-18, I.68: 14-16). But in choosing ‘umrān rather than the more 
abstract term al-ijtimā‘ al-insānī (human social organization), or the more politically 
substantial term, madīna (polity or city), as the subject of his new science, it is clear that 
Ibn Khaldun wishes to put the emphasis on certain aspects of this social phenomena—
aspects which, only through the literal meaning of ‘umrān, is it possible for us to 
appreciate. 
 In the opening lines of his first chapter of the Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldun makes the 
case that the life of an individual human being is not possible without society (I.68-70: 
14-16). He also argues that ‘umrān, which is the result of human cooperation, is what 
makes it possible for an individual human being to live his natural life-span (madā al-
                                                 
27 See, for example, Thomas Hobbes’ discussion in his Leviathan (Part II, Chapter 31) of the meaning of 
the word “culture.” His interpretation of that word seems too utilitarian to allow for the spiritual aspect 
which I maintain is present in the word ‘umrān. Hobbes argues: “Honor consists in the inward thought and 
opinion of the power and goodness of another; and therefore to honor God is to think as highly of his power 
and goodness as is possible. And of that opinion, the external signs appearing in the words and actions of 
men are called worship, which is one part of that which the Latins understand by the word cultus. For 
cultus signifies properly and constantly that labor which a man bestows on anything with a purpose to make 
benefit by it. Now those things whereof we make benefit are either subject to us, and the profit they yield 
follows the labor we bestow upon them as a natural effect, or they are not subject to us, but answer our 
labor according to their own wills. In the first sense the labor bestowed on the earth is called culture; and 
the education of children, a culture of their minds. In the second sense, where men’s wills are to be 
wrought to our purpose, not by force but by complaisance, it signifies as much as courting—that is, a 
winning of favor by good offices, as by praises, by acknowledging their power, and by whatsoever is 
pleasing to them from whom we look for any benefit. And this is properly worship, in which sense 
Publicola [Lit., a friend of the people] is understood for a worshiper of the people, and cultus Dei for the 
worship of God.”  
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hayat; I.71: 1). But religion and history teach us that ‘umrān, however long it lasts, will 
eventually pass away. For ‘umrān, like the life (‘umur) of an individual human being, has 
a beginning point and an ending point. This process of growth, maturity, and the eventual 
decline of human societies is the primary subject of Ibn Khaldun’s science of ‘umrān. 
 Understanding the nature of ‘umrān, and hence understanding the nature of 
human-living in societies, is the prerequisite for judging the truth and falsehood of 
historical reports. This is the explicit purpose which defines Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddima. 
In the first chapter of this book, Ibn Khaldun informs us that the science of culture is 
intended to provide “a sound gauge by which historians can make out the way of 
truthfulness and correctness with respect to that which they transmit” (I.61: 15-16). By 
looking at the stated purpose of the Muqaddima, it is possible to expose what is 
problematic about the translation of ‘umrān as civilization without even the need for a 
linguistic analysis of the meaning of ‘umrān. For in the quest for this “sound gauge,” Ibn 
Khaldun prepares himself to investigate a wide range of human cultural activities—as 
well as the explicit and the implicit motivations of these—that span societies as small and 
primitive as a nomadic tribe and as large and complex as a great dynastic metropolis. 
Although we can speak of the highest form of civilized culture (‘umrān hadarī) in terms 
of civilization (hadāra), it is clearly a mistake to reduce the totality of social activities, 
which the science of ‘umrān studies, to that of civilization. This objection, of course, is 
based on the original meaning of civilization, which in its literal meaning makes a 
distinction between primitive and advanced cultures, and hence does not apply to 
primitive cultures, such as a nomadic tribe or a small village.28  But since “major figures” 
among “modern civilization analysts,” as Arnason and Stauth note, apply the “concept of 
                                                 
28 Mahdi (1964), op.cit., p. 184. 
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civilization to primitive society”—and hence collapse this linguistic distinction—it is 
essential to recover the literal meaning of ‘umrān, which plays an important part in Ibn 
Khaldun’s choice of this term as the subject of his new science. With this I turn to my 
next point, namely, the relationship between the science of culture and history as 
presented by Ibn Khaldun. 
 
 
‘Ilm al-‘umrān and the Writing of History 
 Although there is much in the Muqaddima that is a matter of dispute among Ibn 
Khaldun scholars, there is at least sufficient agreement among them regarding the 
ostensible relationship between the Muqaddima and the History as seen through (an 
apparently) central goal of Kitāb al-‘Ibar: the encouragement of the rational investigation 
of history. According to this view, Ibn Khaldun wishes to establish in the Muqaddima the 
principles of ‘ilm al-‘umrān, a science whose primary end is to allow scholars to 
distinguish what is correct from what is false in historical reports. In the History, on the 
other hand, he presents the “fruits” of this science in the form of a detailed account of the 
history of the Arabs and Berbers in Northwest Africa as well as a general account of 
other historical nations. Whether or not Ibn Khaldun is ultimately successful regarding 
this apparent goal of Kitāb al-‘Ibar is not an issue here, nor is whether or not either part 
accomplishes this goal an immediate issue. What is at issue here is that, according to this 
view, ‘ilm al-‘umrān, the science of culture, is seen as an auxiliary science for history—
that knowledge of ‘umrān is primarily sought for the sake of history. Before discussing 
the wider implication of this problematic view, I need to explore the general grounds 
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upon which it is based. I will focus on two such grounds: the structure of Kitāb al-‘Ibar 
and the statements by Ibn Khaldun himself that lend credence to this view. 
 
Evidence Suggesting that ‘ilm al-‘umrān is an Auxiliary Science to History 
 The overall structure of Kitāb al-‘Ibar leaves a powerful impression on the reader 
that, for Ibn Khaldun, the knowledge of culture is secondary to the knowledge of history. 
As has already been noted, Ibn Khaldun’s original outline points out that this work will 
consist of an introduction and three books. The final outcome of this outline, as the 
fifteenth-century historian Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī (d. 1497) observes, is a work 
containing “a valuable Introduction (Muqaddimah) and consists of seven big volumes.”29 
This is the exact number of volumes of the first full modern publication of Kitāb al-‘Ibar, 
produced in 1868 in Bulāq, Egypt.30  Volume I contains the original introduction—which 
provides a brief discussion regarding the virtue of learning history and an overview of 
major errors committed by past historians—and the “first book” of Kitāb al-‘Ibar—
containing the working out of the new science of culture; Volumes II-V contain pre-
Islamic history as well as the history of Muslim nations in the East (with the major focus 
on the Arabs); Volumes VI-VII deal with Muslim history in the West (with the major 
focus on the Berbers). Thus the Muqaddima, the first draft of which Ibn Khaldun himself 
reported to have finished in a period of five months (ending in November 1377),31 
constitutes only 1/7th of the overall text of Kitāb al-‘Ibar. To put it differently, whereas 
according to the outline of Kitāb al-‘Ibar, the original introduction and Book One 
                                                 
29 Al-Sakhāwī, “As-Sahâwî’s I‘lân” translated in History of Islamic Historiography, (Franz Rosenthal, A 
History of Muslim Historiography, 2nd  revised ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968). p. 497.) 
30 See Walter J. Fischel, Ibn Khaldūn and Tamerlane (Berkley and Los Angles: University of California 
Press, 1952) 5. 
31 Rosenthal (1967), op.cit., p. cv. 
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constitute half of the work, in the final product they constitute about 14% of the work. 
Thus, the majority of Kitāb al-‘Ibar (about 86% of the book) is concerned with the study 
of history as opposed to the systematic study of culture. It is not surprising, therefore, to 
find some scholars occasionally referring to the entirety of Ibn Khaldun’s Kitāb al-‘Ibar 
with the alternative appellation, Ibn Khaldun’s History.32 
The second argument for considering the science of culture as an auxiliary to 
history is statements to that effect by Ibn Khaldun in his Muqaddima. We see this in the 
preface, for example, where Ibn Khaldun asserts that through knowledge of the nature of 
culture (al-‘umrān), one can verify for oneself past historical reports (I.4:1-2). In the 
original introduction, he argues that knowledge of the nature of culture is an important 
factor in safeguarding the student of history from being morally led astray by historical 
reports (I.8-9). Also, in the introduction to Book One in the Muqaddima, he seems to 
affirm the same conclusion (I.57). But by far the clearest statement Ibn Khaldun makes 
regarding this relationship between the science of culture and history is found near the 
middle of the preface to Book One. There he informs us that if we carefully observe what 
is possible, impossible, essential, and accidental regarding the nature of culture: 
Then this would be a rule (qānūn) through which we can distinguish in a 
demonstrative way, free from doubt, truth from falsehood, and truthfulness 
[from] lying with respect to [historical] reports. Then, if we hear about some 
particular condition occurring in culture, we would know (‘alimnā) what ought to 
be judged acceptable and what ought to be judged spurious. This, then, would be 
a sound gauge through which historians can make-out the way of truthfulness 
and correctness with respect to that which they transmit. And this is the goal of 
this first book of our composition. (I.61: 11-17; emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
32 For modern scholars see, for example, Rosenthal, Ibid., p. lxviii; and Aziz Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn: An 
Essay in Reinterpretation, (London and Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1982). p. 10; the Arnold Toynbee 
statement, quoted in Róbert Simon’s Ibn Khaldūn: History as Science and the Patrimonial Empire, trans. 
By Klára Pogátsa (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2002) p. 14. For medieval scholars see, for example, 
Badawī, op. cit., p. 284. 
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Not only the structure of Kitāb al-‘Ibar but also explicit statements by our author seem to  
support the view that historical knowledge is Ibn Khaldun’s primary interest, and that 
knowledge of culture is only sought for the sake of history.  
 
The Implications of This Reading for the Study of the Muqaddima 
This view has serious implications regarding the study of the Muqaddima and the 
study of its primary subject, the science of culture. Aziz al-Azmeh, for example, argues 
that both the Muqaddima and the History treat the same subject, namely history, differing 
only in the manner in which they address it: the Muqaddima does so discursively, while 
the other part does so narratively. Indeed, al-Azmeh sees no fundamental difference 
between the science of culture (he translates ‘umrān as “organized habitation”) and 
history—a fact that might explain why he consistently refers to the entirety of Kitāb al-
‘Ibar as the History. According to al-Azmeh,  
The identity of content between the two major textual components of the History 
is located precisely here: that they possess the same subject-matter, this being 
organized habitation, in two distinct modes. And since the Muqaddima…stands 
in a thematically subordinate position with respect to historical narrative, in that 
it serves to sharpen the investigative capacities of the historian by providing a 
gauge against which historical reports are measured—in view of this, the 
prolegomenon to history is really its instrument.33 
 
Al-Azmeh’s conclusion that the Muqaddima stands in a “thematically subordinate 
position” with respect to the History, is supported by the aforementioned, commonly 
accepted view regarding the relationship between culture and history. Ibn Khaldun does 
seem to assign history and its study a higher dignity than culture and its study. For history 
is what apparently justifies the study of culture and as such defines its scope and limits 
                                                 
33 Al-Azmeh, op.cit., pp.10-11.  
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(I.63: 1-8). And yet, there is something strange about viewing his science of culture as a 
fundamentally instrumental science. Note that this is the science which Ibn Khaldun 
celebrates as “new,” of “great benefit,” and sees most likely as unprecedented (I.62-63). 
But the strange character of this view begins to really manifest itself when we consider 
Ibn Khaldun’s evaluation of instrumental sciences in general. 
 
Problems with the View that ‘ilm al-‘umrān is an Auxiliary to History 
In Chapter 6, section 37, of the Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldun discusses the difference 
between two kinds of science: sciences sought as ends (e.g., physics, metaphysics, as well 
as religious sciences) and sciences sought as auxiliary to something else (e.g., logic for 
philosophy, and grammar for the religious sciences). With respect to the latter kind of 
sciences, Ibn Khaldun observes: 
As for the sciences that are instruments to other things—for example, the 
sciences of Arabic, logic, and the like—they ought not to be a subject of 
speculation except inasmuch as they are instruments to these things only. No 
expanded discussions and derivative questions are to be allowed with respect to 
them, because this would be a departure from what is intended; for what is 
intended by them is nothing more than to be that to which they are instruments; 
whenever they depart from this, they depart from what is intended, and the 
preoccupation becomes senseless-talk (laghwan)—[to say nothing of] the 
difficulty of attaining its aptitude being long-winded and of many derivatives. 
This might even be a hindrance to the attainment of those sciences sought as ends 
(al-maqsūda bi-al-dhāt)—the means to which being long-winded, even though 
the ends are more important. A lifetime is too short to attain everything in this 
[thorough] form, so that such preoccupation with these instrumental sciences 
becomes life-wasting, a preoccupation with what is of no benefit. (III.258-259: 8-
8) 
 
Of course, this statement by itself does not challenge the view that the science of culture 
is an instrumental science. Clearly, auxiliary sciences have an indispensable role in the 
advancement of learning, as Ibn Khaldun readily admits. The fact that the science of 
culture might be an auxiliary science does not mean that it is not important. However, its 
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status as an auxiliary must necessarily restrict the scope of what it investigates. Put 
differently, with respect to each subject that the science of culture investigates, we have 
to begin with a question that can be formulated as follows: in what way is this particular 
subject beneficial to the study of history? And it is here that the characterization of the 
science of culture as an auxiliary becomes problematic. Glancing at the wide-range of 
subjects that the Muqaddima deals with, it is not immediately obvious how certain topics 
treated in detail—e.g., prophecy, dream interpretation, soothsaying, midwifery, magic, 
alchemy, and astrology—advance the study of history. Although failure to see the 
immediate relevance of these subjects to the study of history might in fact be a failure of 
imagination on our part, it does at least invite us to re-examine the ostensible relationship 
between the science of culture and history. And such re-examination indicates that this 
relationship is not as clear as widely presumed. 
 As noted, there are four places in the Muqaddima where Ibn Khaldun explicitly 
discusses the relationship between the science of culture and history: (i) in the preface, 
where he merely asserts that the knowledge of culture allows a scholar the ability to 
verify historical reports (I.4: 1-2); (ii) in the original introduction, where he maintains 
that the knowledge of culture safeguards the student of history from being morally led 
astray by historical reports (I.8-9); (iii) in the introductory part of the preface to Book 
One, where he re-affirms the moral benefit that the knowledge of culture brings to the 
study of history; and (iv) in the middle of the preface to Book One (I.61: 11-17). The 
clearest statement is the fourth one, in which he sets as the goal of the Muqaddima the 
establishment of “a sound gauge by which historians can make out the way of 
truthfulness and correctness with respect to that which they transmit” (I.61: 15-16). This 
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sound gauge, as Ibn Khaldun argues, is something we reach through the careful study of 
the nature of culture. Here, an objection can be made that making out the way of 
truthfulness and correctness with respect to transmitted historical reports is not the same 
as saying that these historical reports are true and correct. For example, the possibility 
that a particular event could happen does not mean that the report of its happening is 
necessarily true (I.18-20). Alternatively, a report that has been rejected as unlikely to 
have happened—on moral and religious grounds, for example—still might indeed have 
occurred as reported (cf. I.24 with I.19 and I. 29).34 
 Ibn Khaldun’s definitive statement regarding the explicit relationship between the 
science of culture and history—and by implication the relationship between the 
Muqaddima and the History—is obviously an ambitious one. Taken at face value, it will 
ultimately frustrate the diligent reader of Ibn Khaldun’s History, for it turns out that this 
History does not measure up to the scientific standard demanded in the Muqaddima. 
Now, Ibn Khaldun is indeed a competent historian; his work on the history of the 
Berbers, for example, is considered as an authority on the subject. Yet, taken as a whole, 
Ibn Khaldun’s History largely fails to live up to the promise of “methodological rigor” 
laid out in his Muqaddima, and this not only by modern judgment, but also by the 
judgment of significant historians who were contemporaries and near contemporaries of 
Ibn Khaldun.35   
                                                 
34 As I will demonstrate in Chapters Two and Three, Ibn Khaldun is well aware of such preliminary 
observations. Suffice it to note here that in the preface to Book One, Ibn Khaldun lists seven reasons that 
explain the necessity of the fact that “the [historical] report, by its nature, is much frequented by lying” 
(I.56: 13). 
35 The disagreement, cited above between al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Hajjar, bears witness to this fact. Ibn Hajjar, 
was outspoken critic of Ibn Khaldun’s historical work, especially with respect to the history of Mashriq (or 
the Orient). His judgment with respect to the weak substance of Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddima was affected by 
his critical view of Ibn Khaldun’s History. 
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There is little doubt that Ibn Khaldun has actively presented himself to the reader 
of Kitāb al-‘Ibar as a scholar who wishes to write the Muqaddima as a manual for the 
correct reading and writing of history—that his History provides the complete framework 
through which future historical works will be based (I.52-53). If we take this presentation 
at face value, and then judge the “manual,” i.e., the Muqaddima, on the basis of its final 
product, i.e., the History, we are likely to be tempted to conclude that the project of Kitāb 
al-‘Ibar is ultimately a failure.36 
However, the fact that there is much that is truly unique and valuable in Kitāb al-
‘Ibar in general, and the Muqaddima in particular, obliges us—we modern devotees of 
Ibn Khaldun’s work—to reject this bleak conclusion. Perhaps this might explain why 
many scholars, who acknowledge that Ibn Khaldun has failed regarding his ultimate 
objective, implicitly decouple the Muqaddima and the History from any unifying 
objective. In effect, they treat the two parts of Kitāb al-‘Ibar as two separate books—i.e., 
Ibn Khaldun’s reflections on culture (and how it should affect our understanding of 
history) and his actual recording of history. 
An important contention of my thesis is that one cannot fully grasp Ibn Khaldun’s 
teaching in the Muqaddima without full appreciation of its contribution to the overall 
goal of Kitāb al-‘Ibar. But in acknowledging the importance of understanding the overall 
goal of this work, I challenge the view that Ibn Khaldun’s science of culture is intended 
to be subordinate to history, and as such I do not take his statement regarding culture and 
history at face value. For, considering the larger argument of the Muqaddima, Ibn 
Khaldun does not view the writing and correction of historical reports as an end in itself. 
                                                 
36 Muhammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī, Nahnu wa al-Turāth: Qirā’āt Mu‘āsira fī Turāthinā al-falsafī, ( 2nd Edition, 
Casablanca: al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-‘Arabī, 1982). p. 409 
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In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I will have occasion to provide support for this argument, its 
basis, and its implications. Here, however, a few preliminary remarks will have to suffice. 
 
The Political in the Science of Culture 
As suggested above, the extent to which Ibn Khaldun’s teaching in Kitāb al-‘Ibar 
is in harmony with, or in opposition to, the “tradition” of Islamic philosophy in general, 
and political philosophy in particular, is a matter of great debate among scholars. 
However, it is clear that this work of his is sufficiently informed by this tradition of 
Islamic philosophy to allow us to use it (i.e., the tradition) as the backdrop against which 
to put in relief Ibn Khaldun’s teaching. Ibn Khaldun’s starting point and guiding principle 
for establishing his new science of culture is firmly rooted in a scientific framework 
advanced by the Muslim philosophers, who, in turn, openly acknowledged their debt to 
al-qudamā’ (the ancients)—i.e., the Greek philosophers headed by Aristotle, “the first 
teacher,” as the Muslim philosophers called him.  
Of course, the expression “philosophic tradition” should be understood as loosely 
as possible—for the philosophic activity in medieval Islam was very dynamic and 
lively—but there are certain points that major figures of Islamic philosophy seem to have 
agreed on. One such point of apparent agreement is that history is neither a science nor a 
subject worthy of systematic scientific inquiry. This position was argued by the first 
teacher Aristotle, who maintained that, when it comes to advancing our rational 
understanding of all things human, “poiêsis is more philosophic and of more stature than 
history. For poetry speaks rather of the general things while history speaks of the 
particular things. The general, that it falls to a certain sort of man to say or do certain 
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sorts of thing according to the likely or the necessary, is what poetry aims at in attaching 
names. But the particular is what Alcibiades did [epraxen] or what he suffered.”37  As 
Muhsin Mahdi explains:  
History is concerned with individual events taking place in particular times and 
places, and as such it is the very opposite of science; for according to Aristotle’s 
theory of science, there is science only when a universal judgment is formed 
explaining the nature and causes of a class of objects. History is not theoretical 
science because its subject matter is mutable and changing.38 
 
Ibn Khaldun is well aware of this position. In his reflection on the uniqueness (and the 
possible revolutionary character) of his new science of culture, and why past 
philosophers—whom Ibn Khaldun calls “the Sages” (al-h ukamā’)—did not concern 
themselves with it, he states: 
If every intellected truth has a nature that is proper to investigate what accidents 
happen to it, then it becomes necessary, in considering each comprehensible and 
truth, that there be a certain science that is particular to it. But the sages, perhaps 
because they held in regard a concern for the fruits of such [investigations], and 
as you have seen, the fruit of this [science of culture]—through its questions are 
in themselves and with respect to their domains noble—is only concerned with 
[historical] reports and with the correction of [historical] reports, which is a weak 
fruit, and that is why they abandoned it. God knows best, “and you were given 
but little knowledge” [Qur’ān, 17: 85]. (I.63: 2-9) 
 
Ibn Khaldun does not provide here an explicit response to this (possible) attitude of the 
philosophers toward the science of culture. This is strange, considering the fact that, less 
than two pages before, he set as the goal for his first book of Kitāb al-‘Ibar—the book in 
which he presents to us his new science of culture—the establishment of a “sound gauge” 
for the verification of historical reports. Here, Ibn Khaldun suddenly switches the 
argument by discussing common subjects between the craft of history and other sciences, 
                                                 
37 Aristotle, On Poetics, (1451a37-1451b12); Translation by Seth Benardete and Michael Davis (South 
Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2002). p. 27. 
38 Mahdi, op.cit., (1964)  p. 139. 
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stating that, “We find in this craft, which we were pressed to speculate on, questions that 
turn-up accidentally for the people of the sciences in the demonstration of their sciences” 
(I.63: 9-11; emphasis mine). He goes on to provide a lengthy list of learned men: 
philosophers, jurists, religious authorities, wise men, judges, etc. What is interesting and 
telling about this list is that all the “sciences” which these learned men seek to 
demonstrate are political in nature: demonstrating prophecy (I.63: 11-13), demonstrating 
the necessity of rulers for human associations (I.63: 13-16), justifying religious rule for 
the good of the community (I.63-64: 16-4), the nature and importance of acting justly 
(I.64: 4-16), the essence of prudent political actions (I.64-65: 16-10), and so forth. As 
such, Ibn Khaldun substitutes a response to the philosophers’ possible critique of the 
science of culture with a strong reminder of the politically beneficial aspects to the study 
of history. 
 It is important to note in this context that when the philosophers rejected history 
as a theoretical science, they did not necessarily reject the possibility that a benefit can be 
derived from historical accounts of particular events.39  What they rejected is the 
possibility that based on the study of individual events, universal rules can be derived. 
History can offer us instances of just and courageous individuals, for example, but it does 
not provide us with the principles of justice and courage. Most importantly, history can 
teach us about the different customs and ideas of other nations that would compel us to 
think about the validity of our own customs and ideas, but it does not provide the 
standard upon which to judge those customs and ideas. So to the extent that the 
philosophers were interested in history, this interest can only be seen as instrumental. 
                                                 
39 Ibid., pp. 138-140. 
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 Like the philosophers, Ibn Khaldun’s interest in history is instrumental: he is not 
interested in history for its own sake, but for the sake of what it can provide as an aid to 
politics. But Ibn Khaldun’s estimate of the benefit of this aid is greater than the estimate 
of any previous philosopher of weight (I.2: 17-19). 
 That history is part of an education in politics—and especially important in 
furthering one’s understanding of the rise and fall of dynasties—is the chief reason 
emphasized by Ibn Khaldun for reading historical reports (I.4-5: 13-16). He again 
reminds us of the politically beneficial role of history in the original introduction (I.8: 11-
15) as well as in the prefatory discussion of the science of culture (I.56: 6-13). 
Ibn Khaldun’s interest in politics is focused on understanding the conditions that 
make for strong and stable political regimes—a theme that runs through chapters two, 
three, and four of the Muqaddima. He is also keen on presenting the reader with the end 
product—both good and bad—of such regimes. Ibn Khaldun’s focus on the moral decline 
that necessarily comes with hadāra—the highest form of culture achieved by a dynasty 
(II.255: 5)—as well as on the inevitable decline of all sorts of regimes, does not mean 
that he is indifferent to regimes and their good cultural products—that he presents a 
“value-free” social science. On the contrary, his account provides both a description of 
the health and disease of culture as well as a prescription for healing its illnesses. This is 
evident in his enthusiastic presentation, in chapters 5 and 6 of the Muqaddima, of the 
kinds of arts and sciences that a dynasty’s hadāra produces. Ibn Khaldun is clear to note 
that the decline and inevitable collapse of a dynasty, though it does affect a decline in 
culture, does not necessarily lead to the collapse of culture. The outcome, however, 
depends on the strength of the foundations the culture has in cities (II. 207-8, 235-9, 250-
 30
 
5), and on the new rulers’ ability to appreciate its benefit (I. 270-3). Ibn Khaldun, in 
acknowledgement that one cannot control the character of foreign rulers—at least not 
initially—focuses his attention in Kitāb al-‘Ibar on how to make possible the 
strengthening of the foundations of culture. This is the primary intention of Kitab al-
‘Ibar. 
To begin to see how the study of history fits into this purpose, we need to 
consider the intended audience of Kitāb al-‘Ibar. In the preface to this book Ibn Khaldun 
informs us that his primary addressees are the “learned and the elite” (I.6: 2-3). Judging 
by the wide range of subjects that the Muqaddima discusses, the category of “the learned 
and the elite” is potentially a broad one that presumably includes not only potential 
historians, but also religious scholars, educators, as well as potential rulers. Perhaps what 
is common among all of these “the learned and the elite” is that they all have an interest 
in understanding the nature of the political (I.6: 5-9, cf. I.63-65); this, regardless whether 
what they seek is of an immediate political concern. What Ibn Khaldun offers in the 
Muqaddima for his addressees is an examination of political life by means of the rational 
sciences. In this, he shares something of the objective of the philosophers, who bring 
logic, physics, metaphysics, and political science to bear on the understanding of political 
life; but for reasons that I shall discuss in Chapter Three and Four, he is careful to impose 
certain limits on such examination (cf. III.209-220). Precisely because of the similarity of 
objective between his approach and that of the philosophers, Ibn Khaldun is well aware 
of the considerable risk of guilt by association. 
By tying his new science of culture to the mostly (but not completely) innocuous 
craft of history, Ibn Khaldun aims to lessen this risk; and this at the same time that he 
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encourages the readers to use some of the ways of the philosophers—especially logic, 
physics, and political science—to understand the nature of political life. Ibn Khaldun’s 
critique of past historians leads him to introduce new requirements for the historian of the 
future: 
Therefore, the companion of this fine-art requires knowledge of the foundations 
of politics, the natures of beings, and the difference among nations, regions, and 
epochs with respect to the ways of life, morals, customs, sects, schools, as well as 
the rest of [these] conditions; to encompass what is present in these and to show 
the agreement in likeness between it and that which is absent, or to clarify what is 
different between them, and to explain the causes for the agreement and the 
difference in this; as well as to uphold the roots of dynasties, religions, the 
principles of their manifestation, the reasons for their occurrence, the motives for 
their coming to be, the conditions and reports of those who sustain them, so that 
he would comprehend the reasons for each occurrence and would behold the root 
of each report. (I.43: 10-13) 
 
The study of history, seen through the lens of the science of culture, forces the serious 
student to focus on the rational examination of the here and now, even as he is looking at 
the past. For, as Ibn Khaldun argues, the biggest error committed by past historians is 
their inability to appreciate change from one generation to another (I.44-45: 7-10).  
It is perhaps clear by now why Ibn Khaldun intentionally gives the impression 
that the science of culture is subordinate to history: the success of Ibn Khaldun’s 
objective of encouraging the rational examination of political life is contingent on the 
student’s initial belief that it is possible to achieve certainty with respect to historical 
truths. 
 What we have discussed thus far should not be interpreted to mean that Ibn 
Khaldun sees no true value in studying history; or that his interest in history is nothing 
more than to set it forth as a decoy for an ulterior motive. This introductory chapter 
provides a preliminary argument for the salient political character of the science of 
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culture, an argument that challenges the prevailing view that sees the verification of 
historical reports as the primary object of Kitāb al-‘Ibar. More than any philosopher 
before him, Ibn Khaldun valued the political role that history plays in the political 
community. In the Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldun provides examples of how history is used as 
a weapon among political adversaries (I.29-34, 34-38, and 40-42); how it promotes 
fantastical and absurd accounts of political life (I.9-13, 13-16, 58-60); as well as how it 
encourages morally reprehensible actions (I.19-29). Subjecting history to rational 
inquiry—by means of the science of culture, which determines the scope and limits of 
such inquiry—can lessen what is politically harmful and promote what is politically 
salutary. 
 
Chapter Divisions of This Dissertation 
 Along with the introduction, this dissertation is divided into four chapters. In what 
follows, I provide a summary of the three chapters that constitute the body of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2, “Ibn Khaldun’s Invitation to the Reader: An Analysis of the Title and 
Invocation of Kitāb al-‘Ibar.”  
The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how Ibn Khaldun’s emphasis on the 
political over the historical is not as inconspicuous as might first appear. Through a new 
translation and analysis of the title and invocation I explore in this chapter the important 
first clues Ibn Khaldun provides to his readers regarding the nature of his work.  
A book’s title, ideally conceived, is a condensed statement that expresses what the 
work is about and to whom it is addressed. However, Ibn Khaldun’s twenty-one word 
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title, written in rhyme-prose, says different things to different people, which partly 
explains the wide disagreement among scholars regarding its translation. Disagreement 
regarding what the title says leads to disagreement regarding what the book as a whole is 
intended to be. By providing a discussion that explains my translation of the title, I aim to 
explore the different interpretive possibilities the title presents as well as to identify the 
significance of key words and terms used to define the nature of Ibn Khaldun’s work. 
The invocation, at times, can be used by an author to express more than simply a 
public profession of faith. As Rosenthal maintains, in his translation of the Muqaddima, 
the “purpose of the khutbah ‘invocation’ of Arabic works is to summarize the main theme 
of the work.”40  My translation and analysis of this short invocation aims not only to show 
what this part of Kitāb al-‘Ibar says about the theme(s) of the work, but also to show the 
way Ibn Khaldun presents himself to his reader (both as a writer and as a man of faith). 
With this analysis, I begin to display important elements of Ibn Khaldun’s writing style—
a task that will be completed in the third chapter. 
Understanding the nature of Ibn Khaldun’s writing style is part and parcel of 
understanding the deeper purpose behind his Kitāb al-‘Ibar. As my examination of the 
later parts of the Muqaddima will show, the politically sensitive subjects that Ibn 
Khaldun deals with necessitates that he write esoterically, i.e., in a way that invites the 
critical examination of established political opinion, while at the same time what appears 
unobjectionable to those in authority. In order to establish the character of Ibn Khaldun’s 
teaching, we need to begin by understanding the way in which he presents this teaching, 
namely, to establish that he does indeed write esoterically and to identify the way in 
which this esotericism can be understood. 
                                                 
40 Rosenthal (1967), op.cit., pp 3-4, footnote #3. 
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Chapter 3, “An Ambiguous Beginning: al-zāhir wa al-bātin in Ibn Khaldun’s 
Preface to Kitāb al-‘Ibar.” 
Having explored, in Chapter 2, the clues Ibn Khaldun provides in his title and 
invocation regarding the nature of his Kitāb al-‘Ibar, and having identified the major 
elements of his writing style, Chapter 3 expands on and completes the interpretive 
analysis of Ibn Khaldun’s writing. Through a translation and analysis of the preface to 
Kitāb al-‘Ibar, the reader will be able to experience the complete first argument Ibn 
Khaldun makes for his work as well as be able to judge for him/herself the strengths of 
my own approach. 
In this chapter, I expose the studied ambiguity in Ibn Khaldun’s text and will 
illustrate how he uses such ambiguity to force the reader to consider and reconsider the 
apparent sense of his argument. Through this approach, the reader discovers how Ibn 
Khaldun puts much more emphasis on the political consequences of the study of history 
than he does on the truth of historical reporting. 
 
Chapter 4, “The Science of Culture and the Limitations of the Fine-Art of 
History.”  
Having examined Ibn Khaldun’s style of writing in Chapters 2 and 3, I focus in 
Chapter 4 on the substance of Ibn Khaldun’s teaching. I begin with a detailed outline of 
the work that puts in relief the overall argument of the original introduction. I then 
proceed to examine Ibn Khaldun’s opening statement in this introduction. Though brief, 
the opening statement provides the most explicit argument Ibn Khaldun makes with 




discussion of this statement we are able to judge how Ibn Khaldun intends, through the 
science of culture, to transform the fine-art of history. 
With this background understanding, I turn to the introduction’s longest part, in 
which Ibn Khaldun discusses errors committed by previous historians. Through the 
examination of this part we see how Ibn Khaldun’s encourages the rational examination 
of history. We also see how concern for the moral and political welfare of the community 
compels Ibn Khaldun to limit the scope his rational examination.  
I conclude the chapter with Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of a “deeply hidden 
ailment” in the study of history: the inability of people to understand how time changes 
the conditions and customs of nations and generations. As I demonstrate, it is this ailment 





Ibn Khaldun’s Invitation to the Reader: An Analysis of the Title and the Invocation 
of Kitāb al-‘Ibar 
 
This chapter and the next provide a translation and interpretation of the title, the 
invocation, and the preface of Ibn Khaldun’s Kitāb al-‘Ibar. There are two reasons that 
call for such in-depth interpretation. The first is central to the importance of these parts of 
the book as introductory materials to the work as a whole, i.e., to the two main 
components that constitute Kitāb al-‘Ibar: the Muqaddima and the History. The title, the 
invocation, and the preface constitute Ibn Khaldun’s critical invitation for reading his 
massive work. They provide important clues regarding the character of Kitāb al-‘Ibar by 
outlining its subject matter, by identifying its primary addressees, and by setting the 
limits for the type of questions the work as whole investigates. With these clues Ibn 
Khaldun enables his reader to establish the proper relationship between the Muqaddima 
and the History and, hence, to judge the distinctive scholarly approaches each of these 
two parts requires by way of study.  
The purpose of chapter 2 and 3, therefore, is to establish the what and the how of 
Ibn Khaldun’s teaching. Chapter 2, which discusses the title and the invocation, focuses 
on the initial argument which Ibn Khaldun presents as an invitation for the careful 
reading of his text. Chapter 3, which discusses the preface, focuses on the basic outline of 
Ibn Khaldun’s teaching.  
A careful examination of these parts of Kitāb al-‘Ibar will reveal that there is 
more to this book, and especially to the main theme of the Muqaddima, than the 
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ostensible goal as an introduction to the correct writing of history. In the title and the 
invocation—the parts of the book discussed in this chapter—Ibn Khaldun provides 
unmistakable clues which indicate that, for him, the study of history is not an end in 
itself. Since the rational investigation of historical reports, as Ibn Khaldun envisions it, is 
part and parcel of the rational investigation of present social and political reality, the 
study of history becomes, for him, the means to encourage sound philosophical reflection 
on the present and establishes the principles upon which prudential planning for the 
future is based.  
As further investigation of the Muqaddima will reveal, Kitāb al-‘Ibar is first and 
foremost a political book, which means that it concerns itself with what is good for the 
political community—it encourages sound philosophical reflection and prudent political 
action for the benefit of understanding and promoting such a good. The study of history is 
placed in a secondary, or subservient, role to this overall goal. There is a prominent place 
for the giving of factual accounts of history in Ibn Khaldun’s book, but there is also a 
limit to what should be investigated in history. Sacred opinion, for example, must not be 
openly questioned. The study of history is intended to serve the good of the political 
community by reviving interest in the rational examination of political life, while 
preserving the foundations that make this common life possible. 
As for the analysis of Ibn Khaldun’s style of writing, my working premise is that 
he has chosen his words carefully and deliberately, and that my task is to explain—as 
well as is humanly possible—these deliberate choices, to observe what problems they 
raise, and to reflect on questions they open for further consideration. Key to this approach 
is to avoid the danger—ever present in these types of analyses—of relating foreign ideas 
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to the author, i.e., Ibn Khaldun. The danger can be alleviated by keeping to a close 
reading of the text so that any interpretation that cannot be supported by textual evidence 
will have to be considered as tentative. 
As will soon become evident, the success of this interpretive analysis will depend, 
in no small part, on careful attention to Ibn Khaldun’s subtle use of language. We will 
occasionally encounter an intentional use of words, terms, and sentences that can be open 
to a variety of interpretations. To better navigate through these different meanings and 
hence assess their hermeneutical implications, I will generally abide by the following 
rules. First, I will outline the conventional meaning of these words or scholarly terms as 
defined by classical Arabic lexicons, especially, but not limited to, Lisān al-‘Arab 
(compiled by Muhammad Ibn Mukarram Ibn Manzūr, who was born in North Africa a 
century before Ibn Khaldun). In this same context, Quranic usage of important words and 
terms will often be consulted by virtue of the place this sacred text has in the Muslim 
community. Second, the conventional understanding of these words or scholarly terms 
will be compared, where appropriate, with Ibn Khaldun’s own multiple usage of these 
words and terms in the rest of the Muqaddima. It is always a possibility—which needs to 
be covered—that a competent scholar might find it important to use a conventional word 
in a wholly innovative way, and hence alter its traditional meaning. Third, my discussion 
of Ibn Khaldun’s arguments will occasionally make reference to external texts—e.g., 
other studies on Ibn Khaldun, books that deals with Islamic history, literary studies on 
language—all of these are intended to complement, and not to supplement, my textual 
interpretation of the Muqaddima. 
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This chapter will be divided into two parts. In the first part, I discuss the title and 
explore the major ideas it promises the reader of the book. In the second part, I offer an 
examination of the opening invocation of Kitāb al-‘Ibar. Besides using the invocation as 
an introduction to Ibn Khaldun’s writing style, I explore how this invocation speaks to 
the two main themes of Kitāb al-‘Ibar, history and culture, as well as discuss the manner 
and implication of the way Ibn Khaldun presents himself as a man of faith. 
 
I. The Title 
 A title is perhaps the most imaginative and challenging part of a book. The author 
is expected to capture the substance of his work in one word, a phrase, or—as 
occasionally is the case with medieval Arabic authors—a sentence. A well constructed 
title supposedly informs the passerby what the book is about and why it should be read. 
Such titles could be straightforward in their announcement—clearly stating their subject 
and to whom the book is primarily addressed—or they could be intriguing or mysterious 
enough to attract the curiosity of general and particular readers. An example of the first 
kind of title is al-Farabi’s The Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the Two Sages: 
Plato the Divine, and Aristotle. Though intriguing, this title seems straightforward 
enough. It is especially inviting to those who are philosophically inclined, and who, 
moreover, possess enough learning regarding the work of Plato and Aristotle to conclude 
that these “two sages” are not completely in “harmony.” Al-Farabi seems to promise 
these readers a different conclusion. Al-Ghazali’s The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 
on the other hand, seems to be aimed at a wider audience: not only those readers who are 
philosophically inclined, but also those suspicious of philosophy. The book could also be 
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attractive to religious scholars, who are looking for arguments to refute the philosophers. 
Ibn Rushd’s Incoherence of the “Incoherence” is more or less interested in the same 
audience as that of al-Ghazali, and presumably those who have read the Incoherence of 
the Philosophers, and who would be open to hear a counter argument to al-Ghazali’s. Of 
course, not all titles are as straightforward as these, other titles can heighten the curiosity 
of the readers through the usage of rich metaphorical or allegorical images. An example 
of this kind is Abū al-Hasan al-Mas‘ūdī’s title, The Meadows of Gold and Mines of 
Gems, which adorns a book that deals, among other things, with the history of various 
cultures and religious communities.1 
 How does Ibn Khaldun’s long title, kitāb al-‘ibar wa dīwān al-mubtada’ wa al-
khabar fī ayyām al-‘arab wa al-‘ajam wa al-barbar wa man ‘āsarahum min dhawī al- 
s ultān al-akbar, inform its potential reader about the book’s subject matter and why it 
should be read? To answer this question we need to have as accurate a translation of the 
title as possible. Since there is no clear agreement among Ibn Khaldun scholars regarding 
a satisfactory translation, I will begin this task with three different translations of the title 
by three scholars, Franz Rosenthal, Muhsin Mahdi, and Nathaniel Schmidt. From these 
translations, we will point out three ‘curious’ features about this title, discuss the possible 
literary significance of these features, and attempt to provide, based on that discussion, an 
acceptable English translation of the title.  
 Rosenthal translates the title in the following way: “Book of Lessons [kitāb al-
‘ibar] and Archive of Early and subsequent History [dīwān al-mubtada’ wa al-khabar], 
Dealing with the Political Events [ayyām] concerning the Arabs, Non-Arabs [al-‛ajam], 
                                                 
1 For a brief discussion of the title of this book by al-Mas‘ūdī, see Tarif Khalidi, Islamic Historiography: 
The Histories of al-Mas‘ūdī, note #2, p. 2. 
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and Berbers, and the Supreme Rulers [dhawī al-sult ān al-akbar] Who Were 
Contemporary with Them.”2 Mahdi offers an alternative translation: “The Book of the 
‘Ibar [kitāb al-‘ibar], the Record of the Origins and Events [dīwān al-mubtada’ wa al-
khabar] of the Days [ayyām] of the Arabs, Persians [al-‛ajam] and Berbers, and of those 
of their Contemporaries who were Possessors of Great Power [dhawī al-sultān al-
akbar].”3 A third alternative translation is advanced by Nathaniel Schmidt: “A book of 
instructive examples [kitāb al-‘ibar] and a collection relating to the subject and the 
attribute [dīwān al-mubtada’ wa al-khabar] in the Days [ayyām] of the Arabs, Persians 
[al-‘ajam] and the Berbers, and the great rulers [dhawī al-sultān al-akbar] who were their 
contemporaries.”4 
 The different translations we have of this title should not be surprising. Ibn 
Khaldun’s writing is notoriously difficult to translate. This is partly because he often uses 
rich vocabulary and a complex writing style, which is characteristic of authors who 
possess an extraordinary command of their own language. But there is more to this 
problem than the usual challenges faced by translators of works with high literary value. 
As my examination will show, those passages in the text that are especially difficult to 
translate, usually reflect a studied ambiguity in the original, which makes them (or should 
make them) resistant to cursory readings. Textual ambiguity is a literary device used by 
Ibn Khaldun to lull the careless reader who would be satisfied with the gist of Ibn 
Khaldun’s argument, and to awaken the curiosity of the critical reader. We see evidence 
of this in the very first sentence of Kitab al-‘Ibar, namely, the title. 
                                                 
2 Rosenthal, op.cit., (1967) p. 13; all transliterated words in square brackets are mine. 
3 Mahdi, op.cit., p. 63; all transliterated words in square brackets are mine. 
4 Nathaniel Schmidt, Ibn Khaldun: Historian, Sociologist, and Philosopher, (NY: AMS Press, Inc., 1967) 
p. 10; all transliterated words in square brackets are mine. 
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 There are three curious things about Ibn Khaldun’s title, two of which are 
immediately present for the first time reader while the third becomes obvious as we get 
more familiar with the book as a whole. First, Ibn Khaldun refers to his work as not only 
a kitāb, i.e., a book, but also as a dīwān, i.e., as a register, an archive, or a collection. This 
seems to suggest a dual function for the book of ‘Ibar, but it is unclear what these 
functions might be. As we will see shortly, the division of the book into a kitāb and a 
dīwān is all the more curious when one reflects on the contrast between ‘ibar as the 
defining quality of the kitāb and al-mubtada’ wa al-khabar as the defining quality of the 
dīwān. 
Second, Ibn Khaldun informs us in the title that both the kitāb and the dīwān 
derive their material from ayyām al-‛arab wa al-‛ajam wa al-barbar wa man ‛ās arahum 
min dhawī al-sultān al-akbar. Since the word ‘ajam literally means non-Arabs, there 
seems to be a redundancy in paring the word ‘ajam with barbar. If we translate ‘ajam 
according to its conventional meaning, i.e., Persians, we discover that this is only a 
temporary solution.5 For quickly we find out in the preface that Ibn Khaldun singles out 
only the Arabs and Berbers for comprehensive treatment in Kitāb al-‘Ibar, whereas the 
Persians along with other nations are given secondary treatment. We should also note that 
Ibn Khaldun could have easily chosen for Persians the precise Arabic word furs, had he 
intended their explicit mention in the title.  
                                                 
5 The word ‘ajam is primarily a collective noun that means ‘non-Arabs.’ Here, the basis of the distinction 
between Arabs and non-Arabs is a linguistic one, i.e., a non-Arab is someone who cannot speak Arabic, or 
whose native tongue is not Arabic; for example, the Berbers, the Greeks, the Jews, the Persians, the 
Romans, and the Turks, among others. Perhaps for reasons of geographic and cultural proximity to Arabia, 
however, the paradigmatic example of the non-Arab has traditionally been understood as the Persian. This 
is why both Mahdi and Schmidt—in an attempt to avoid the apparent redundancy in the title—choose this 
alternative translation for the word ‘ajam. 
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The third curious thing about the title is that Ibn Khaldun does not make an 
explicit mention of that subject matter with which his book came to be identified, namely 
history. Is this intentional or accidental? This is the problem I will start with first. 
 
Instead of history Ibn Khaldun uses ayyām. Used in conjunction with the word 
“Arabs”—i.e., ayyām al-‛arab—the expression immediately calls attention to a certain 
kind of ‘historical’ literature, which largely predates Islam, called the “Battle Days of the 
Arabs.” According to conventional usage, the term is limited in its historical coverage 
and partial regarding its ethnic affiliation.6 Since Ibn Khaldun does not limit the 
application of the term ayyām to the Arabs, but also extends it to include the ‘ajam as 
well as the barbar, then it is clear that—while calling attention to its literary character—
he is not using this term according to its strict conventional usage. In order to understand 
the significance of the ayyām’s literary character—and thus understand something about 
the material Ibn Khaldun’s work examines—we need to recall this word’s literal 
meaning, from which ayyām as a term derives its figurative significance. 
Ayyām is the plural of yawm, which means “day.” As in English, the word yawm 
can either refer to the time of sunlight (i.e., the time between sunrise and sunset), or it 
could also refer to the time it takes the sun—in keeping with medieval astronomy—to 
                                                 
6 As ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Dūrī observes: “The Arabs of … North [Arabia] had oral accounts about their social 
affairs and their great exploits. The principal part of these accounts is concerned with raiding expeditions 
and battles (ayyām) and their genealogies. These accounts are intimately related to the organization, views, 
and customs of society, as is reflected most prominently by the ideas of muruwwa, the totality of the 
Bedouin virtues, of nasab, noble family origin, and the hasab, the distinction of great deeds and exploits, 
since individuals were expected to know their ancestors and the noble deeds which they had performed. As 
the ayyām were thus the subject of special concern in tribal society, the tribes had tales and narratives of 
their past deeds. These accounts circulated both orally and in the form of prose.” Abd al-Azīz al-Dūrī. 
Bahth fī nash’at ‘ilm al-t’rīkh ‘inda al-‘arab (Beirut: Al-Matba‘a al-Kāthūlīkīya, 1960). Part I trans. 
Lawrence I. Conrad, The Rise of Historical Writing among the Arabs (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1983) p. 18. 
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complete one revolution around the earth (i.e., a solar day). Whether we understand 
yawm in the first or second sense is perhaps not as significant as the fact that this word 
immediately conjures in our minds a contrast between day and night, light and darkness. 
The contrast between day and night is significant. The light of the sun, as that 
which makes things visible, is an apt metaphor for those momentous events in history 
that are supposedly most visible in the memory of individuals and/or in the collective 
memory of a people. It is then easy to understand how, for the pre-Islamic Arabs, their 
most visible moments of the past, their most celebrated days, are their battles or whatever 
events are of comparable value. The historian ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Durī, in the context of 
explaining the origin of the “Battle-day” literature of the pre-Islamic Arabs, notes: 
“Tribal life is characterized by its adherence to tradition, and has only a confused and 
limited notion of time. This is because time, from the tribal point of view, is punctuated 
by great events, which tribesmen customarily take as starting points for dating events or 
fixing matters of chronology. When an important event occurs, whatever preceded it is 
disregarded and subsequent events are dated according to it.”7 Thus understood, the term 
is problematic, especially concerning its value for sound historical investigations. For as 
there are days, there must be nights, i.e., dark moments in the past that are never 
recollected—to say nothing here of the veracity of that which is indeed recollected. Does 
it not then seem a bad word choice that Ibn Khaldun would use the term ayyām—with its 
attendant association with “confused and limited notion of time” to quote al-Durī again—
as a term that describes the material upon which the work as a whole is based? There are 
two interconnected reasons here that guard against such hasty conclusions. 
                                                 
7 Al-Dūrī, op.cit., 20 
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First, the observation that the character of ayyām is “confused,” and by 
implication suspect, is not something that necessarily escapes Ibn Khaldun’s attention. 
This is at least apparent in the placement of the ayyām as the material for both the “book” 
and the “register”. The fact that it is seen as material points at once to its importance—as 
a starting point for the investigation—as well as to its deficiency—as something which is 
in need of inquiry. This perhaps begins to explain why Ibn Khaldun found it appropriate 
to choose this word instead of history: history itself is supposed to be a final account. 
Second, the fact that we need to maintain a certain level of healthy skepticism 
regarding the veracity of the ayyām, does not mean that we should be dismissive 
regarding their possible value. The “confused and limited notion of time”, which al-Dūrī 
sees as so characteristic of the pre-Islamic Arabs and exhibited in their ayyām, is not 
something that is necessarily limited to them or their times. Though arguably unschooled, 
it represents, to a certain extent, a natural human way of taking stock of what is 
historically relevant. Until perhaps recently, a people’s account of their past consisted in 
what for them were significant moments that either affirmed the nobility of their 
character (especially for those who have what we moderns call an ahistorical view of life) 
or explained the development of this noble character (especially for those who take a 
more progressive view of history). Such accounts are potentially valuable, if for no other 
reason than the most obvious one, that it tells us how a group of people estimates itself. 
Through such accounts, one can discern a representation of a people’s highest ideals. 
This, at least, suggests that the ayyām—which we will here occasionally refer to as 
‘people’s accounts of their past’ or simply ‘narratives’—are not a flawed starting point. 
But rather than emphasize the final product of his investigation, Ibn Khaldun has chosen 
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in his title to emphasize the type of material upon which his search is based. The 
significance of this move will become clear as we investigate the preface, in which Ibn 
Khaldun provides a brief discussion of the title.  
 
I turn now to the second ‘curious’ point about this title, namely, the word ‛ajam. I 
have already pointed out the apparent problem with the translation of this word as “non-
Arabs” as well as with its alternative translation as “Persians.” 
I suggest here a third, though admittedly unconventional, translation of this word. 
Since ‛ajam is a collective noun designating that which is unfamiliar for a people, 
primarily on linguistic grounds, then a suitable alternative to it could be the word 
‘foreigners’. Thus the phrase, fī ayyām al-‛arab wa al-‛ajam wa al-barbar could read as 
“Regarding the Days of the Arabs, the Foreigners, and the Berbers.”   
Understanding (and thus translating) the word ‘ajam as foreigners not only avoids 
the apparent redundancy in the title but also shows, in two different ways, how this title 
communicates important aspects of Kitāb al-‘Ibar. First, it anticipates major features of 
the overall plan of this book. As Ibn Khaldun informs us in the preface, Kitāb al-‘Ibar is 
divided into an introduction and three books. The second book is going to focus on the 
history of the Arabs (i.e., the first group explicitly mentioned in the title), and the third 
book is going to focus on the history of the Berbers (i.e., the second group explicitly 
mentioned in the title). The history of other nations (what Ibn Khaldun refers to in the 
title as ‘ajam)—such as the Greeks, the Israelites, the Persians, and the Turks—will be 




Second, it is clear from both the title and the preface that Ibn Khaldun treats the 
Berbers as a distinct group of people whose accounts of their own past, ayyām, are given 
equal treatment in Kitāb al-‘Ibar to that given of the Arabs. However, the usage of the 
word ‘ajam, understood as foreigners, suggests certain affinity between the Arabs and the 
Berbers. In other words, the word “foreign” here is not understood in contradistinction to 
the Arabs only, but also to the Berbers. The preface informs us that the Arabs and the 
Berbers do indeed share something in common: since time that appears immemorial, the 
Arabs and the Berbers inhabited northwest Africa. And it is to this history of that region 
of the world that Ibn Khaldun is most attentive. As Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddima argues, 
there is more to the distinctive character of a people than linguistic difference. There is 
something more natural, and as such more basic, that plays an important part in forming 
the peculiar character of the social organization of a people, and that is their physical 
environment. 
But our problem with this phrase, fī ayyām al-‛arab wa al-‛ajam wa al-barbar, 
wa man ‛ās arahum min dhawī al-s ultān al-akbar, does not end here. If the phrase ayyām 
al-‛arab wa al-‛ajam wa al-barbar represents the narratives of all the peoples of the 
world, then we have to ask who are “their contemporaries who possessed the greater 
authority.” 
Many scholars implicitly or explicitly assume—relying on Ibn Khaldun’s partial 
explanation of this title in the preface—that the expression “their contemporaries” refers 
back to all those groups of people who are neither Arab nor Berber and who possessed 
great dynasties throughout the long history of the Arabs and the Berbers. And yet, as we 
have already seen, the term ‛ajam has already anticipated Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of 
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groups other than the Arabs and the Berbers. Moreover, Ibn Khaldun uses the plural form 
‛āsarahum rather than the dual form ‛āsarahumā, which would have been necessary had 
Ibn Khaldun intended the contemporaries to be understood in contradistinction to the 
Arabs and the Berbers only. 
The distinction intended here is not between the Arabs and Berbers on the one 
hand, and every other ethnic group on the other; rather it is between groups of people 
who, while ethnically distinct, share something fundamentally common—especially in 
the way they interact with their natural and social environment—and groups from among 
these different ethnicities that manage to achieve the ultimate political power: the 
kingship that each group-feeling (or asabiyā) naturally seeks but few successfully 
accomplish. 
I now turn to the last ‘curious’ point about Ibn Khaldun’s title, that which deals 
with the dual aspects of his book, namely the kitāb and the dīwān. 
As Ibn Khaldun illustrates, the word dīwān has a noteworthy history. In the 
course of his discussion of various governmental offices, Ibn Khaldun recounts two 
different stories that deal with the first known usage of this word (cf. II.15-17). It seems 
that the understanding of this word, as it first came to be used in the Arabic language, 
was so revolutionary that its most likely etymological origin, dawana (root d.w.n, 
bringing (something) near, collecting it, compiling it, as well as writing it down, 
registering it, etc.) apparently fails to explain its most elementary meaning. This, perhaps 
more than the disagreement among Arab grammarians regarding problems with its 
etymological roots, drove many to believe that the word is of Persian origin, supposedly 
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from the Persian word dev for “mad.”8 According to Ibn Khaldun, the word dīwān was 
first used by the Arabs to indicate a governmental register. 
The original governmental dīwān was viewed as an impartial record that keeps in 
check the administrators of the dynasty and is, when the need arises, a means to 
adjudicate disputes. The decline, defeat, or collapse of the dynasty, however, did not 
necessarily mean that its dīwāns would cease to be useful.9 Indeed, many such dīwāns 
continued, under new conditions, as means to adjudicate disputes, but for entirely 
different reasons. Due to the great amount of documented information included in 
governmental registers, the dīwān became a trustworthy historical record (I.12, 29). 
Through such records, claims could be checked and verified concerning, among other 
things, the lineage of noble persons, the outcome of important battles, or the details of 
significant events.10 And for those particularly observant historians, a great amount of 
information can be discerned regarding the nature of a once great regime (II.296). By 
extension, therefore, the word dīwān came to partially designate a type of collected 
material that can lend itself to different kinds of treatment at different times. When it is 
applied to scientific works, the word dīwān would then mean a reservoir of knowledge 
that is open to different kinds of scholarly interest in the present as well as the future. 
                                                 
8 See Lisān al-‘arab, as well as Lane’s entry dawana 
9 As Ibn Khaldun argues, the governmental dīwān of a defeated empire contained administrative 
information that is of use to the new victorious party (II.18). 
10 Al-Dūrī observes: “Genealogical studies rendered service to historical writing in both content and 
compositional format. Interest in genealogies revived in Islam, and establishment of the dīwān system 
introduced a new incentive for interest in them. The Umayyads, beginning with Mu‘āwiya, encouraged 
such studies as these, and it is reported that Walid II (d. 126/744) commanded that a complete register of 
the genealogies of the tribes be made. Administrative exigencies, such as the organization of a system for 
paying stipends (‘atā’) and the allotment of residential quarters and lands to the tribes in the amsār, further 
contributed to the recording of genealogical registers and intensified interest in them. Added to this were 
tribal disputes, the effect of political circumstances on the status of the tribes, the appearance of a new 
aristocracy in Islam, and various social factors, all of which spurred the study of tribal genealogies. Finally, 
disputations with the Shu‘ūbīya and the attacks by partisans of the movement on Arab genealogies led to a 
new Arab emphasis on genealogical studies” (Dūrī, op.cit., p. 50). 
 50
 
In addition to referencing governmental registers, the word dīwān is widely 
applied to special collections of material that are of scientific and/or literary character. 
These can either designate actual registers, ones that exist in book form, or figurative 
ones (either designating a tradition thought to be unified or a list of separate works 
thought to have a common theme/character). But whether scientific or literary, figurative 
or literal, the dīwān almost always refers to a comprehensive type of collected material. 
This comprehensiveness can be understood as a complete list of something important, 
e.g., a large collection of a poet’s work or a great display of historical information; as an 
in depth treatment of a particular subject/topic; and/or as an enumeration of a group of 
subjects/topics that share something in common. 
An argument can be made here that the dīwān Ibn Khaldun intends is a register of 
historical information. This is strongly implied by the type of material this register treats: 
the “days of the Arabs, the foreigners, and the Berbers, and those of their contemporaries 
who possessed the greatest authority.” Ibn Khaldun further specifies the character of this 
register by indicating that it is the dīwān of al-mubtada’ and al-khabar. Mubtada’ is a 
word that could mean, among other things: an origin, a beginning, a first, or a premise. 
Khabar is a word that could mean, among other things: an end, a conclusion, a report, or 
an attribute. What the mubtada’ and khabar seem to specify in this context, therefore, is a 
register that is concerned with a sequential, a chronological, or an orderly narration of 
history. Consistent with the spirit of this reading is the translation of the end of this 
phrase by Rosenthal—who renders al-mubtada’ and al-khabar as “early and subsequent 
history,” and Mahdi—who translates these words as “the origins and events.” This 
reading is also consistent with both Ibn Khaldun’s plan for Kitāb al-‘Ibar—a major part 
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of which gives a chronological account of history—as well as his own discussion of the 
title in the preface (I.7).  
Be that as it may, the words al-mubatada’ and al-khabar permit at least a second 
reading of the character of this dīwān. Placed next to each other these words would 
immediately call to mind—at least to an Arabic speaker with basic knowledge of Arabic 
grammar—the ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ of a nominal sentence. A nominal sentence 
usually begins with a noun, namely the subject, and is said to be completed when a report 
or khabar (i.e., the predicate) is given about this subject. The subject and predicate are, 
therefore, the essential components of a complete sentence. But translating these two 
words according to their grammatical expression seems to scholars—with few notable 
exceptions like Schmidt—an awkward translation. A choice which, moreover, appears 
unnecessary when considering the availability of alternative translations—like the above 
mentioned ones—that are consonant with how historical information is arranged in Ibn 
Khaldun’s book. 
On the other hand, thinking of al-mubtada’ and al-khabar as the subject and 
predicate of a sentence—strange sounding as it may be—does not violate the sense of 
sequential arrangement of historical material in the dīwān. Moreover, such a translation 
of these two words seems to offer a deeper meaning to their dīwān. One could safely 
presume that, like the function of the subject and predicate in a sentence, al-mubtada’ and 
al-khabar give in the register a meaningful account of history. Indeed, from what has 
been discussed so far about the title, Ibn Khaldun seems to provide a hint as to what a 
meaningful account of history consists of. 
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  As noted, there are two groupings of ayyām (“days-literature”) that Ibn Khaldun’s 
work examines/documents: the general history of peoples and the history of those who 
were able to achieve great political power. I have further argued that, as indicated by the 
wording of the prepositional phrase, Ibn Khaldun is mainly interested in the general 
history of the Arabs and Berbers, as well as in the particular history of those, from among 
them, who were able to achieve, at different times, great political power. A meaningful 
account of these ayyām, therefore, would be one that is capable of articulating both their 
subject, people’s accounts of their past, and their predicate, those who achieved great 
power, into one coherent account. 
  
We reach here the most important word in the title, ‘ibar from which Ibn 
Khaldun’s magnum opus has come to be identified. ‘Ibar is the plural of ‘ibra, the verb-
root of which is ‘.b.r meaning “he crossed.” When a man is said to have ‘abara, this 
means that he ‘crossed it, went across it, passed over or through it.’ The basic idea here is 
the movement from one point, station, or side to another by crossing a certain barrier 
(most often understood as a natural barrier) such as a river, a valley, a chasm, or a gap. 
‘Abara also means he died, as if to say he moved or crossed over from the world of the 
living to that of the dead. The word thus symbolizes the journey one takes in life. It is 
here, as a metaphor for life, that the manner of crossing (i.e., ‘ubūr) becomes of 
fundamental importance. 
 Note the Arab saying or rather invocation “Allāhuma ij‘alnā min man ya‘bar al-
dunyā wa lā ya‘burhā,” (“O God! Make us from among those who learns from the world 
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and not from among those who pass over it”).11 It conveys two ways in which such a life-
journey (‘ubūr) is taken. The first by learning, considering, or being admonished (the 
sense in which ya‘bar is used). The second by passing by or through life (the sense in 
which ya‘burhā is used). The word can then convey either a passive or active 
engagement with life. We all cross (na‘bur) this world, but some of us are more aware of 
this journey or crossing (‘ubūr) than others. 
The basic sense in which people can become aware or considerate of this journey 
is by learning from the example of others. Indeed learning by example is the most 
common of extended meanings for the word ‘ibra. Thus it is often translated as 
instruction, lesson, admonition, warning, reprimand, etc. Understanding what is involved 
in attaining such awareness is, of course, no small matter. For Muslims, the choice seems 
obvious: one becomes best equipped for this life journey by accepting, heart and soul, 
God’s revealed message to His Prophet Muhammad—“The Truth is from thy Lord so be 
not of those who doubt” (Quran, 3: 60). But for those who might be plagued with doubt, 
the Quran provides, among other types of instruction, a teaching that we may call 
teaching by ‘ibra. There are at least two kinds of ‘ibra-teaching in the Quran. The first 
kind is one through which the Quran calls on human beings to reflect on the example of 
other human beings; and the second kind is one through which the Quran calls on human 
beings to reflect on nature, i.e., the miracle of creation. The second kind of teaching is 
one that can be loosely characterized as positive ‘ibar, for by this kind of instruction the 
Quran enjoins people to contemplate the world in which they live and by so doing they 
are supposed to see the infinite examples of God’s grace toward human beings. The first 
kind of teaching is one that can be characterized as “negative” ‘ibar, for by these ‘ibar 
                                                 
11 Lane, ‘-b-r, p. 1937. 
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the emphasis is on what people should not do. What they should not do is follow the 
example of those who had been made an example of. Hence, the saying, “The fortunate is 
he who takes warning (i‘tibara) by others, and the unfortunate is he by whom others take 
warning (i‘tabara bi-hi ghayyrahu).”12 
Considering this understanding of the word ‘ibra, it is not surprising that the usual 
way of translating Kitāb al-‘Ibar is “Book of Lessons” or “Book of Instructive 
Examples.” But, as we will soon see, these translations capture only a part of the 
conventional sense, i.e., the sense of everyday speech, in which the word ‘ibra is 
understood. As conventionally understood, an ‘ibra is a lesson that is of a unique kind 
regarding both the object and the subject of its lesson. The object of the lesson is 
primarily understood in moral and religious terms. The subject of the lesson is usually 
taken from, or can easily be related to, everyday experience. A defining quality of the 
‘ibra is that it is supposed to create a powerful mental image in the listener or the 
observer so that the meaning of the lesson is never hard to understand, and not easily 
forgotten. History, insofar as it relates to us the details and consequences of the deeds 
(both good and bad) of important individuals and nations, is a particularly rich source of 
‘ibar. As Chase F. Robinson asserts, “so many historians presented their work as a record 
of human choices, from which their readers were to draw the appropriate lessons. History 
taught these lessons (or ‘admonitions’, Ar. ‘ibra, pl. ‘ibar), a word that appears 
frequently in titles, such as those of Usāma b. Munqidh, Ibn Khaldun and al-Dhahabī, and 
an idea that appears even more frequently in introductions to historical works.”13 Insofar 
as the conventional understanding of the word ‘ibar is concerned, translating the title 
                                                 
12 Lane, ‘-b-r, p. 1937. 
13 Chase F. Robinson, Islamic Historiography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). p. 130. 
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Kitāb al-‘Ibar as “Book of Instructive Examples” would be, though not sufficiently 
nuanced, an appropriate choice. 
This conventional understanding, however, seems to reduce Ibn Khaldun’s 
massive work on culture and history to an essentially ahistorical moralization. What we 
learn from the days of the Arabs, foreigners, and Berbers is qualitatively no different 
from what past generations learned from those who preceded them. Though as I will 
show, the conventional understanding of the word ‘ibra as lesson will prove inadequate 
in communicating the meaning Ibn Khaldun intends by his usage, we must admit the 
possibility that the title (considered in isolation of the rest of the work) might lead the 
first time reader to conclude that Kitāb al-‘Ibar is nothing more than a large collection of 
moral lessons. And this can in fact be considered a major selling point for the book, for 
those who are “morally-certain” never tire from hearing accounts that essentially remind 
them of why they are morally-certain. 
Yet, even when considered in isolation of the larger context of the book, the word 
‘ibar can allow for different interpretations and deeper expression.14 Indeed the words 
interpretation (‘ibāra) and expression (ta‘bīr), like ‘ibar, comes from ‘ibra and indicate 
                                                 
14 As Mahdi observes: “The ambivalence, inherent in the manifest meanings of the word ‘ibra rendered it 
of great use for writers of popular-wisdom literature, philosophy, mysticism and history. Muslim 
philosophers found the word, with its many conventional usages and its suggestion of what is beyond 
convention, of particular use when writing for the initiates. They employed it as a rhetorical tool to attract 
the potential philosopher to their ‘way’: to lead him toward reflecting upon the external events of the 
universe of nature and the acts of man, and upon the equivocal expressions of the Koran, and to guide him 
to the knowledge of the rational principles beyond them. Mystics made a similar use of the word. ‘Ibra, like 
the rest of their technical terms was gradually transformed from its traditional meanings to become a tool in 
their inner journey. In fact, they used ‘ibra to describe the spiritual function of all other mystical terms, i.e., 
to awaken and lead the disciple through the conventional and external world of ‘words’ to the world 
beyond. All significant writings and deeds, the Koran and Tradition included, are ‘ibar or compressed 
allusions. The mystic does not, like the legist, stop at the apparent, conventional and rational meanings, but 
penetrates beyond them. Without this, these writings and deeds remain mere expressions severed from the 
veiled truth behind them. In adopting ‘ibra as a technical term, mystics concentrated on deepening and 
exploring the already subtle associations of the word in relation to the ineffable world which they sought in 
their practice and meditations, and relating it to another technical term, internality or inwardness (bātin), 
which they contrasted with outwardness (zāhir).” (Mahdi, op.cit., pp. 66-7). 
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bridging the gap between what is known and what is unknown: “He took, or regarded, 
what he witnesses, or saw, or beheld, as an indication, or evidence, of what was 
concealed from him…. [He] compared what was unapparent with what was apparent…. 
[Or] he considered the essential properties of things, and their modes of indication, in 
order that, by the consideration thereof, another thing, of their kind, might become 
known.”15 When someone is said to ‘abara al-kitāb it means “he meditated upon, 
endeavoring to understand it, or he considered, examined, or studied, or he read mentally, 
the book, or writing, not raising his voice in doing so, i.e., in reading it.”16  
 There is a basic idea that runs through the various ways in which the word ‘ibra 
can be understood: an ‘ibra is supposed to provide guidance regarding the way one ought 
to lead one’s life. Ibn Khaldun informs us in the title that the source of his ‘ibar will be 
accounts regarding groups of peoples, chiefly the Arabs and the Berbers, with particular 
emphasis on their great political accomplishments. The usage of the word ‘ibar—
however it is understood—is the first important indication that Ibn Khaldun’s study of 
history is not born of antiquarian interest, but rather it is intended to provide practical 
guidance, most likely regarding political things. 
 The issue of finding an appropriate translation for the word ‘ibar becomes more 
urgent as we try to determine the manner in which this practical guidance is to be 
approached or attained. We are confronted with two basic understandings; the 
conventional sense, in which the ‘ibra is seen as a straightforward example that intends to 
warn, admonish, or remind; and the more considered understanding which treats the ‘ibra 
as an outward manifestation of something deeply significant. The difference is between 
                                                 
15 Lane, ‘-b-r, p. 1937. 
16 Lane, ‘-b-r, p. 1936. 
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an example, especially one that is related to human beings that can be used as a pattern of 
life that ought to be imitated or avoided, and an allusion that needs to be studied and 
reflected upon. The allusion requires the active participation of the student in order to 
understand to what the lesson truly alludes; to make a connection, a bridge (‘ibra) 
between how one ought to live and the principles that give this ought meaning. 
 The contrast between the “Book” and the “Register”—as the two characteristic 
elements of Ibn Khaldun’s magnum opus—and correspondingly between the ‘ibar and 
the al-mubtada’ wa al-khabar—as the defining qualities of these two elements—provide 
clear hints regarding the general sense Ibn Khaldun intends the word ‘ibar to mean. On 
the one hand, the “Book” looks for the glory days of the Arabs and the Berbers as a 
source of lessons from which one can find guidance, most likely, regarding political 
things. The “Register,” on the other hand, looks to make an orderly collection of these 
same Days, and by so doing, create a document that attempts to solve disputes regarding 
them. This orderly collection, according to one translation of the al-mubtada’ wa al-
khabar, is likened to a grammatically correct, i.e., complete and meaningful, sentence. It 
is as if Ibn Khaldun here is contrasting the hidden wisdom—a wisdom that is perhaps 
ineffable—that is implicit in the more considered understanding of the word ‘ibar, with 
the explicit statement that is needed for the dīwān to fulfill its primary goal as an arbiter 
of disputes. Understanding the lessons that the kitāb presents in terms of allusions, i.e., in 
terms of something that needs to be reflected upon and considered, stands in stark 
contrast to the explicit statement—complete with its subject and predicate—that other 
elements of Ibn Khaldun’s work, i.e., the dīwān, seeks to present. 
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With this discussion of the title I am able to provide a literal, though admittedly 
awkward, English translation of the title: Book of Allusions and Register of the Subject 
and Predicate Regarding the Days of the Arabs, the Foreigners, and the Berbers, and 
those of Their Contemporaries who Possessed the Greatest Authority. This translation 
preserves some of what I believe to be the important elements of the title as a first 
invitation to read it. It describes a work that has two primary functions: a book that 
promises to provide guidance and impact on how one lives and a register that intends to 
make an orderly presentation of historical materials. The primary subject of the book and 
the register are accounts of the glory days of the Arabs and Berbers along with certain 
unidentified groups, with a special interest regarding matters relating to political 
authority. 
 
II. The Invocation 
One of the most striking things about both the invocation and the preface to Ibn 
Khaldun’s Kitāb al-‘Ibar is the beautiful rhymed prose in which these two parts are 
composed. It is true that there is nothing unusual about the use of this style. Many 
medieval Arabic authors utilized it, but it is equally true that very few mastered it. If this 
style is done correctly—if the words used are carefully weighed and measured, as Ibn 
Khaldun does—then a text is transformed into an evocative poem, full of intriguing 
imagery and metaphors. And just like a poem, a well-crafted rhymed composition is open 
to multilayered interpretations. No wonder, then, that rhymed prose was the preferred 
mode of speech for soothsayers (I.182-3: 11-16). Of course, the level of difficulty in 
interpreting a text of this style depends on the frequency and intensity of the images used. 
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With respect to this point, there is a difference between the style of the invocation and 
that of the preface. The images in the former, appropriately enough, are more ornate than 
they are in the latter. Thus the general meaning of the preface seems more accessible than 
that of the invocation. 
Another appealing aspect about a carefully thought-out text in rhymed prose is the 
fact that this style can be used to demarcate the structure of an argument. In this case, 
each group of sentences, unified by a single rhyme, will communicate a general idea that 
links all these sentences together. With respect to the text in hand, this single rhyme 
capturing a general idea is more apparent in the invocation (which thus appears to be 
more structured) than it is in the preface. 
The following translation and general overview of Ibn Khaldun’s invocation is 
intended to give an idea of how he opens his “book of allusions.” Through brief analysis 
of the structure of this preliminary part, this overview will uncover some of the themes 
and ideas which Ibn Khaldun foreshadows for subsequent treatment in his book. Limited 
by this purpose, I will not offer a detailed analysis of the style and substance of the 
invocation. With this caveat in mind, we turn to Ibn Khaldun’s opening remarks. 
After the familiar appeal to God—the Merciful, the Compassionate—and the 
customary offering of prayer for prophet Muhammad, as well as his family and 
companions, Ibn Khaldun—in an open display of humility and gratitude—declares (in the 
third-person singular): 
The Servant—who is in need of his Lord’s mercy, [but] rich with his Lord’s 
kindness—‘Abd al-Rah mān Ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldūn al-Hadramī, may God 
grant him success, says: Praise be to God, He is the One who has glory and 
invincibility, in His hand is the kingdom and the dominion, and to Him are the 
Noble Names and Attributes; the Knower, for nothing of what confidential-
speech makes apparent, or of what silence conceals, slips [His Knowledge]; the 
Able-One, for nothing in heaven and earth incapacitates or escapes Him. Out of 
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the earth, He engendered us as a breath of air; He made us settle it as groups and 
nations; and out of it He facilitated for us sustenance and assigned portions. 
Wombs and houses shelter us, sustenance and nourishments maintain us, days 
and moments afflict us, and the destined-terms—whose timed book is set on us—
expose us. To Him is everlastingness and immutability, and He is the Living that 
does not die. And prayer and peace be upon our master Muh ammad, the Arab 
prophet who is written about and described in the Torah and the Gospels, and to 
whose weaning the universe gave birth before the Sundays followed the 
Saturdays and before Saturn and Behemoth became distinct, and to whose 
truthfulness doves and spiders gave witness. And [prayer and peace] on the 
prophet’s family and companions, who, in loving and following him had 
acquired the widest effect and renown, and, in backing him, acquired total union 
while their enemies [acquired] utter disunity. God’s prayer and manifold peace 
be on him and them for as long as the serious fortune of Islam continues and the 
frayed rope of unbelief remains cut. (I.1-2: 3-9) 
 
The invocation can be divided into six parts that correspond with six groups of 
rhymed sentences. The first part begins with Ibn Khaldun’s profession of gratitude to 
God who is: the Great and Mighty, the Ruler of heaven and earth, and the possessor of 
the noble names and the attributes. Of God’s attributes, two are singled out by Ibn 
Khaldun: the Knower, for nothing escapes His knowledge, and the Able-One, for nothing 
is beyond His might. In the second part, Ibn Khaldun lists instances of God’s grace 
towards mankind: our creation, our settlement of the earth, and our sustenance. And yet 
something seems missing in this life, for, in the third part, Ibn Khaldun chooses to 
emphasize the helplessness of human beings. It seems that a human being in his house is 
no more in command of his destiny, than a fetus in its mother’s womb: no matter how 
much we try, the days and years will wear us out, and in an assigned time we will die. It 
is only God, the everlasting, who never changes. Having accentuated the wretched 
condition of human beings, Ibn Khaldun opens the fourth part by offering a prayer to 
God’s messenger, the Arab prophet Muhammad: The Torah and the Gospels talk about 
him; for his coming, the world was prepared before time and space; and for his 
truthfulness, signs (by way of miracles) were given. In the fifth part, Ibn Khaldun offers a 
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second prayer. This time it is for the family and the companions of the prophet, especially 
those who, in loving and following him, left the deepest mark and gained the greatest 
fame. In supporting him, the family and companions of the prophet found unity, while 
their enemies found dispersion. In the sixth part, Ibn Khaldun offers a concluding prayer 
to the prophet, his family, his companions, and for Islam to remain glorious. 
As seen through this division, there is a logical sequence to the invocation. The 
first sections is dedicated, appropriately enough, to praising God as the ultimate King 
(lahu al-mulk), the Possessor of the dominion (al-malakūt), the Knower (al-‘ālim), as 
well as the Able-One (al-qādir). The second section moves to recount instances of God’s 
omniscience, omnipotence, and benevolence with respect to human beings. The third 
section picks on the theme of humanity by making reflections on the human condition. 
But with this section—which marks the end of the first half of the invocation—we 
encounter a problem in whose solution we see (more easily) the flow of ideas from the 
third to the fourth section—which marks the beginning of the second half of the 
invocation.  
The third section’s emphasis on the life of the human being as short and toilsome 
seems to strike a discordant note with the preceding section’s emphasis on God’s free 
gifts to humanity. We should note, however, that Ibn Khaldun’s word-choice, which on 
one level seems to echo despair, appears to offer, on another level, a glimmer of hope. 
Take for example the word buyūt, which is translated, according to its literal meaning, as 
houses. This word can also be used as a euphemism for graves, as in ‘the houses of the 
dead’ (buyūt al-amwāt). At first look, this metaphorical expression of buyūt seems to 
reinforce the futility of human life; for the grave, as the place in which a lifeless body is 
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‘housed,’ can correctly be viewed as the antithesis of the womb, the place in which a new 
life is formed. Accordingly, this seems as a simple reiteration of the fact that human 
beings are never in control of their own destiny. And yet, the parallelism, which Ibn 
Khaldun establishes in likening the grave’s “sheltering”/“embracing” (takanufu) the 
corps with the womb’s “sheltering”/“embracing” the fetus, seems to hold the key for a 
hopeful destiny. The word rahim (Arabic for womb, pl. arh ām) has the verb-root r.h .m 
(lit. he was merciful) from which two of God’s Noble Names are derived: the Merciful 
(al-rahmān) and the Compassionate (al-rahīm). In sheltering, protecting, and/or 
embracing the unborn, the womb (al-rahim) can be seen then as a place of mercy and 
compassion (rahma). Could the grave’s ‘embracing’ of the corpse offer the promise of a 
new life in the other world, as the womb’s embracing of the fetus holds the promise of a 
new life in this world? Ibn Khaldun has already reminded us that God is “the Able-One, 
for nothing in heaven and earth incapacitates or escapes Him.” He “engendered us out of 
the earth” by breathing in us life, and He surely can do the same in the future. It is here 
that the fourth section comes in logical sequence to the theme of the third section. 
The prayer offered in the fourth section is for the man who came as an offer of 
hope to all human beings. The Arab prophet Muhammad, as Ibn Khaldun alludes, is part 
of the immutable divine plan for all of humanity. A plan that was set long before the 
miraculous act of creation. A plan whose unfolding was witnessed in the works of God’s 
other prophets and messengers, and which finally culminated in the Seal of the prophets 
and messengers, Muhammad ras ūl Allāh (the Messenger of God). And though God’s 
Message does not release human beings from a life of toil and trouble, it redirects their 
gaze to something higher, giving purpose to existence. And so, Ibn Khaldun offers, in the 
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fifth section, a second prayer for the family and companions of the prophet, who “in 
loving and following him,” accomplished great deeds and acquired well-deserved honor. 
Their selflessness serves as an example around which the community of Islam is unified. 
The concluding prayer, which comes in the sixth and final section, carries within it a 
gentle admonition: the promise of God’s Message, symbolized in the invocation of 
blessing on the prophet, his family, and companions, is incumbent on the believers’ 
willingness to work in accordance with it. So Ibn Khaldun concludes with reminding his 
readers of the pious view that correct worship is enforced by correct deeds. 
We see in this brief invocation an expression of faith that is true to the essential 
elements of the Islamic account of what is sacred. What is sacred is God, the Creator; 
then, by way of analogy, His prophet, who delivered His Word to humanity; and then the 
prophet’s family and companions who rallied behind the Word of God.17 And we see in 
the author of this invocation a man who is in command of his language, a masterful 
weaver of words, and someone who is in tune with his Islamic articles of faith. But this, 
in and of itself, does not provide us grounds to ascertain how Ibn Khaldun’s faith affects 
his questioning—and as such his teaching—of matters relating to religious dogma. 
Certainly, the question of the faith of a philosopher is not an insignificant issue 
for the student of philosophy. But this is a question of the philosopher’s faith and not a 
test of his faith. In other words, this is not a matter of a student combing a text for 
evidence that would determine for him if the author is truly a philosopher or not. Such a 
                                                 
17 Various forms of the conventional appeal “In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate/ And 
God’s prayer on our master Muhammad, his family and his companions”—which almost always used by 
traditional Muslim authors to preface their written compositions—are different ways of invoking these 
three articles of Muslim faith. We could see in Ibn Khaldun’s invocation an unpacking of what this 
conventional appeal encapsulates: the individual seeking refuge in God (which takes half of Ibn Khaldun’s 




student has already found his answer. Nor is the serious student of philosophy the one 
who looks to this question in order to find a comforting answer in what he perceives the 
philosopher to be. The recognition that the philosopher’s faith is a question, ultimately 
means, for a certain student of philosophy, the recognition of, and engagement with, his 
own faith. It is the recognition, on the part of such a student, of the limitation of his 
reason in finding the truth about God, miracles, prophecy, and immortality (subjects 
raised in this invocation). Unaided human reason, as Ibn Khaldun will later indicate, can 
question, even refute, accounts about these things, but it cannot not refute the existence of 
these things (cf. I.12-13: 13-10). 
The subjects recalled in the invocation, i.e., God, miracles, prophecy, and 
immortality, are all fundamental questions; for the extent to which one reflects on these 
questions affects the way-of-life one leads. Ibn Khaldun’s creative engagement with these 
theological/philosophical themes can be seen as an invitation to reflect on the questions 
they pose. However, limited by the common function of the invocation as an affirmation 
of faith, we are compelled, for now, to think of these themes in less theoretical terms. 
Looking beyond their literary function as expressions of faith, we examine next how 
these themes prepare the reader for the main subjects Ibn Khaldun raises in his preface. 
As I have already discussed in the previous chapter, and as Ibn Khaldun will 
make clear in the preface, there are two main subjects for his Kitāb al-‘Ibar: history and 
culture. History is not explicitly mentioned in the invocation. As for culture, the closest 
we come to a reference is in Ibn Khaldun’s usage of the term ista‘amarnā to describe 
human settlement of the Earth. The word ista‘amarnā—which can mean either “we 
settled,” or “we were settled”—comes from the same verb-root as the word “culture” 
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(‘umrān, v.r. ‘.m.r), so that the act of cultivation (ta‘mīr) is always implicit in the act of 
settlement (isti‘mār).18 Settling the earth “as groups and nations” is noted by Ibn Khaldun 
as the first significant act done by us human beings. Concerning this account, and its 
place in the invocation, we need to emphasize two important points. First, Ibn Khaldun 
enumerates the act of settling/cultivating the Earth among God’s gifts to humanity. As 
such he does not conceive of the settlement/cultivation of the Earth as a punishment; as 
the wages of an original sin.19 Second, while settlement/cultivation is an act of grace, its 
precondition is communal unity in the form of groups (ajyālan) and/or nations (umaman). 
From the first point, we see how, in thinking of the Divine, the understanding of the 
human condition is transformed. We saw this before with respect to human mortality, and 
we see this here with respect to human settlement/cultivation of the earth. The same also 
applies when thinking about the basis of communal unity in relation to God’s grace. 
What unifies people into communities—according to the religiously oriented 
invocation—is not natural necessity, but a work that partakes in the divine act of creation. 
This is clearly seen in the image which Ibn Khaldun gives in the second section of his 
invocation: in creating us, God breathed life in the inanimate substance that is earth; and 
through our collective actions of settlement/cultivation we, in turn, breathe renewed life 
                                                 
18 In modern Arabic usage, the word isti‘mār—used to translated the concept ‘colonization’—has clear 
negative connotations that were not present in Medieval times. 
19 Ibn Khaldun’s interpretation here is consistent with the Qu’ānic account of the fall of man. For according 
to this account, God forgave Adam his disobedience, and He gave him a second chance: “But his Lord 
chose him (for His Grace): He turned to him, and gave him guidance. / He said: ‘Get ye down, both of you, 
all together, from the Garden, with enmity one to another: but if, as is sure, there comes to you guidance 
from Me, whosoever follows My guidance, will not lose his way, nor fall into misery. / But whosoever 
turns away from My Message, verily for him is a life narrowed down, and We shall raise him up blind on 
the Day of Judgment.’” (Quran, 20: 122-124). The Biblical story of the fall of man, by contrast, conceives 
of human settlement of the Earth as a long-lasting punishment:  “Unto the woman he said, I will greatly 
multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children…. And unto Adam he 
said, Because thou hast harkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree of which I 
commanded thee, saying, Thou shalt not eat of it: cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat 
of it all the days of thy life…. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; 
for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return” (Genesis 3: 16-19). 
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in this same substance (out of which we receive God’s bounty). But what informs Ibn 
Khaldun’s poetic image of the relationship among creation, settlement/cultivation, and 
communal unity? 
The entirety of the invocation is obviously informed by a cosmology, or a 
theological worldview, which places the individual human being within a group, and the 
group within a religion established by a prophet sent by God—the Benevolent and 
Merciful Being who provides for His creatures—as part of an immutable divine plan. The 
invocation limits the sources of this religious worldview to what has been sanctioned by 
the Islamic tradition. The Islamic tradition is based, first and foremost, on the Quran and 
the Sunna (the Prophets’ sayings and deeds). But this tradition allows, within limits, for 
inquiry that goes beyond the texts of the Quran and the Sunna—e.g., the Torah, the 
Gospels, or even tales by the storytellers (qus s ās)20—in order to clarify, explain, or 
complete some ambiguous report or reference mentioned in these two revered sources of 
Islamic theology. The individual reports scattered throughout these external sources are 
called akhbār (sing. khabar, historical report). Of course, the akhbār are not used 
exclusively as material supplementary to reports mentioned in the Quran and the 
prophetic tradition, but also cover material not included in these two sources—e.g., 
historical details relating to the life of the Arabs before Islam, peculiar events in the life 
of the Prophet, as well as what came after the death of the prophet. So historical reports 
play an important role in giving a more detailed picture of what came before Islam, of the 
                                                 
20 For example, when the Quran speaks of the account of creation, the first human household, or earlier 
religious communities, it does so in terms that general and aphoristic in character. If the prophet’s Sunna, 
as often is the case, does not provide more information to the narrative of the Quranic account, then 
external sources derived from the Torah, the Gospels, or the tales of storytellers can be consulted. On the 
work of the ‘storytellers,’ their Biblical sources, and their relation to the early Muslim historians see al-
Dūrī, op.cit., 30-52.  
 67
 
establishment of Islam, and—since the Islamic history did not stop with the prophet’s 
family and companions—how this religion spread throughout the world. For the larger 
Muslim community, as opposed to the religious scholars, history serves as witness to the 
truth of the primordial message of Islam; and it also serves to provide instructive 
allusions, ‘ibar, for how Muslims, as individuals and as a group, should act in accordance 
with this message. Though history is not explicitly mentioned in the invocation, we 
cannot avoid thinking about it when considering the sources that help shape the Muslims’ 
worldview, and that serve as important ground for their unity. It is not a surprise, 
therefore, that this is the subject with which Ibn Khaldun opens his preface to the Book of 
Allusions. 
 
As seen, the purpose of translating and interpreting Kitāb al-‘Ibar’s title and 
invocation was to explore the ways in which Ibn Khaldun announces or alludes to the 
relationship between the two main subjects of his book, i.e., history and culture. Though 
the title and the invocation introduce important terms and ideas that are associated with 
history and culture, neither part makes any explicit mention of these two subjects. Of 
course, the title implies the theme of history through usage of terms that has, among other 
meanings, strong historical content, e.g., ‘ibar (allusions or instructive lessons), dīwān 
(register or historical record), mubtada’ (principle or beginning), khabar (historical 
report), and ayyām (days or ‘battle days’). Instead of culture, the title focuses our 
attention on specific groups or nations (Arabs and Berbers, among others) whose ayyām 
are of special interest. The link between culture on the one hand, and human association 




invocation. It is as “groups and nations” that we apparently settle/cultivate the Earth. By 
contrast, while the invocation touches on the theme of ‘umrān, history is absent from this 
part of the book. And yet, by thinking about the sources Ibn Khaldun draws upon to 
construct his meaningful invocation, we are led to think back on history as an important 
element in forming a people’s idea of themselves. But beyond mere hints and allusions, 
one thing is clear in the title and invocation to Kitāb al-‘Ibar: neither history nor culture 
is given prominence over the other in these preliminary parts of the book. To explore the 
relationship between these two subjects, we turn next to the preface. 
 
CHAPTER 3 
An Ambiguous Beginning: al- zāhir wa al-bātin in Ibn Khaldun’s Preface 
 
It was argued in Chapter One that Ibn Khaldun’s science of culture, far from 
being an auxiliary to historical studies, is intended (in part) to define and limit the scope 
of history and historical studies. It has also been maintained that this argument, going as 
it does against some explicit statements to the contrary by Ibn Khaldun, is in need of 
rigorous defense. The focus of this defense is Ibn Khaldun’s style of writing, and its aim 
is to reveal the multilayered aspects of his teaching, to explain the necessity of such 
teaching, and hence to ground interpretive claims regarding Kitāb al-‘Ibar’s essential 
teachings. For to make claims of an author’s less obvious (or “esoteric”) teachings it is 
not only necessary to show evidence that the author writes on more than one level, but 
also to provide textual evidence that shows the necessity of this writing style with respect 
to the main subjects addressed. It was also stated in Chapter One that the most obvious 
place to explore possible “hidden” teachings is in the introductory parts of an author’s 
work, for these are the places in which the author is expected to make the case for reading 
his work. Chapter Two began this interpretive task with a translation and an analysis of 
Kitāb al-‘Ibar’s title and invocation. Through a translation and analysis of this book’s 
preface, the current chapter will complete this interpretive task. 
A literal translation of the preface is needed to facilitate the readers’ evaluation of 
the soundness of my analysis. Moreover, since the translation will be of the preface as a 
whole, the reader will also experience Ibn Khaldun’s first and most complete argument 
regarding the intended purpose of his Kitāb al-‘Ibar. The close analysis of Ibn Khaldun’s 
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preface will draw on many terms and themes that have been explored in the analysis of 
the title and the invocation; but since the preface deals directly with the main subjects of 
Kitāb al-‘Ibar (history and culture) the analysis of this part will prove more substantial 
and will have greater support from the text of the Muqaddima than the one presented in 
Chapter Two. 
In order to better manage the discussion of the preface, I will divide its text into 
three main parts (each part in turn subdivided into a number of paragraphs): Ibn 
Khaldun’s general introduction (I.2-3: 9-10), his overview of previous works on history 
(I.3-5: 10-12), and his outline of the purpose and content of his Kitāb al-‘Ibar (I.5-8: 12-
9). It goes without saying that this three-part division of the text is not Ibn Khaldun’s. 
Indeed the text of the preface, as is typical of all ancient and medieval manuscripts, reads 
as one undivided and unpunctuated argument. However, there is one explicit transition, 
marked by the declarative hādhā (“this,” meaning ‘having said this’), separating what I 
describe as the general introduction (I.2-3: 9-10) from the rest of the preface (I.3-8: 10-9). 
We will soon learn that this apparent transition in the argument is no mere accident; for 
the content of this brief part sets the tone for the rest of the discussion in the preface, 
hence justifying its treatment as a general introduction. 
 
I. The General Introduction (I.2-3: 9-10)  
The general introduction to the preface will be divided into two paragraphs. In the 
first paragraph (I.2: 9-19), Ibn Khaldun raises the relationship between history and 
wisdom as a question that will turn out to be the general question for his Kitāb al-‘Ibar. 
As for the second paragraph (I.2-3: 19-10), Ibn Khaldun will define the problem that 
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encapsulates his general question by suggesting how the study of history influences the 
pursuit of truth. I begin by examining the first paragraph. 
 
I. i. The Relationship of History and Wisdom 
After concluding his invocation, Ibn Khaldun marks out the beginning of the 
preface by declaring, “As for that which is next” (ammā ba‘d; I.2: 9). What comes next is 
a discussion of history. He opens this discussion by making five observations regarding 
the “fine-art” of history, he offers an explanation for these observations, and then 
suggests a new way of looking at this subject (I.2: 9-19). Ibn Khaldun begins: 
The fine-art of history is one of those fine-arts that are in constant-circulation 
among nations and generations; caravans and [individual] travelers set toward it; 
the vulgar and the dim-witted aspire to its cognizance; kings and lords compete 
after it; and the knowledgeable and the ignorant are equal in their understanding 
of it. For on its surface, it is no more than reports on days1 and dynasties, and on 
what came to pass in the early centuries. Elegant speeches are made for these 
reports; through them proverbs are exchanged; and by means of them the 
gatherings of celebrants are enlivened; and they bring down to us the [entire] 
affair of the created: how their conditions have been altered, how through these 
[altered conditions] dynasties expanded, and how they cultivated the earth until 
they were called for their departing-journey, and the coming forth of their 
moment of extinction. And in its inner [aspect] there is precise reflection, 
verification, and explanation-of-causes for things-that-come-to-be and their 
principles; and deep knowledge of the how of events and their reasons. Thus it is 
a venerable root in wisdom, and it deserves, and is worthy, of being counted 
among its sciences. (I.2: 9-19) 
 
 In his opening remarks, Ibn Khaldun characterizes the historical discipline, or the 
art of writing history, as a “fine-art” (fann). But if his observations about this fann are 
intended as praise, the actual image they draw is one of mixed blessings. On the one 
hand, this is a fine-art that is widely popular, for it is in “constant circulation among 
nations and generations” (I.2: 9-10); and it is a subject that is in high demand, for which 
                                                 
1 As noted in Chapter Two above, the word ayyam can either refer to “days,” “times,” or bean expression 
that refers to the “battle days of the Arabs” (ayyam al-‘arab). 
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“caravans and [individual] travelers set toward it” (I.2: 10). On the other hand, this fine-
art is something which inspires the “vulgar and dim-witted” (I.2: 10-11)—as opposed, 
perhaps, to “the learned and the elite” (I.6: 2-3); it is a cause for competition, rather than 
harmony, among “kings and lords” (I.2: 11); and, when it comes to the understanding of 
what this fine-art produces, there is equality among the “knowledgeable and the ignorant” 
(I.2: 11-12). Ibn Khaldun explains these observations by referring to the “outward part,” 
the “external aspect,” or the “surface” (al-zāhir) of history. Or, perhaps more accurately 
put, of history as a product of art. 
 The surface of history consists of “no more than reports” (akhbār) about 
particular events, battles, or dynasties that occurred, happened, or existed in the past. 
Individually, these ‘elegantly’ packaged reports serve as sources for enduring lessons in 
the form of proverbs (amthāl) and as sources for entertainment at public gatherings (al-
andiya). Collectively, however, these surface reports bring to us the “affair of the 
created” (sha’na al-khalīqa; I.2: 14-15). They supposedly explain change in human 
conditions, the rise and fall of dynasties, as well as the means by which human beings 
“cultivated the earth” (‘amarū al-ard a; I.2: 16). But since this general account of the 
“affair of the created” is based ‘only’ on surface reports that inspire the “vulgar and dim-
witted,” and are equally accessible to the “knowledgeable and the ignorant,” then we 
might be tempted to conclude that the fine-art of history is of doubtful value. At this 
point, however, Ibn Khaldun introduces the “internal part,” the “hidden facet,” or the 
“inner aspect” (al-bātin) to history. 
 Apparently, the true value of history is something which is hidden deep within its 
own recesses. By means of its bātin, the fine-art of history supposedly occupies a rightful 
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place among the other sciences of wisdom (i.e., among the philosophical sciences; cf. 
II.385: 5). However, in following Ibn Khaldun’s description, we note two points that 
communicate a vast gap between the internal and external aspects to history. First, while 
the external aspect to history provides “no more” than surface reports of an event, battle, 
or dynasty, its internal aspect seeks precise “reflection” on, “verification” of, and 
“explanation-of-causes” for “things that come-to-be” (al-kā’ināt) and “their principles” 
(mabādi’ihā). Second, whereas the external aspect of history, through the collective 
surface reports, “bring down to us (tu’addī ilayynā) the [entire] affair of the created,” the 
internal aspect of history has “deep knowledge of the events and their reasons” (I.2: 17-
18). The existence of this gap between the external and internal aspects to history 
suggests that history’s bātin cannot elucidate the near-universal appeal of the fine-art of 
history. Unlike the description of history’s zāhir, the statement of history’s bātin explains 
little, if anything, regarding Ibn Khaldun’s five opening observations about this fine-art. 
If this is clearly so, then what is the purpose of this somewhat abrupt statement regarding 
the internal aspect to history? 
A partial answer to this question has already been suggested: Ibn Khaldun’s 
statement regarding history’s bātin is intended to assure certain segments of his readers 
that, literally, there is more to history than meets the eye. It is perhaps easy to see how 
knowledge that could be grasped equally by the learned and the ignorant has little to 
recommend beyond its surface, and as such is most likely super-ficial. The particular 
reports which history brings to the surface are so clear and obvious, Ibn Khaldun 
suggests, that they can with great ease entertain and inform large numbers of people. This 
explains the persistent near-universal appeal of this fine-art, but, in and of itself, does not 
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make this appeal universal. While observing that the “learned and ignorant” are equal in 
their understanding of history, Ibn Khaldun notes only the “vulgar and dim-witted” as the 
type of people who “aspire to its cognizance” (tasmū ilā ma‘rifatihi; I.2: 10-12). By 
proposing a two-part division of the fine-art of history—an external part that is grasped in 
common, and an internal part that inspires (because it can only be grasped by) the few—
Ibn Khaldun seems intent to affect a view of this fine-art that has true common appeal. 
But this is only a partial answer, because Ibn Khaldun’s concluding statement regarding 
the relationship between history and wisdom—and, by implication, regarding the type of 
inner rewards promised—is not quite clear. 
Having indicated what intellectual activities are involved in the bātin of history, 
Ibn Khaldun concludes that history is thus “a venerable root in wisdom and it deserves, 
and is worthy, of being counted among its sciences” (I.2: 18-19). But, considering the 
rhyme-prose, it is not immediately obvious whether this statement should be read to mean 
(1) history is “in wisdom a venerable root” (as l ‘arīq fī al-hikma); or (2) history is “a 
root, in wisdom, venerable” (asl, fī al-hikma, ‘arīq). The difference between these two 
readings is substantial. On the one hand, to affirm, as in the first reading, that history in 
wisdom is “a venerable root,” is to suggest that it is one of wisdom’s most essential roots. 
What is “venerable” in this case is that which makes wisdom possible. Accordingly, to 
consider history as part of the “sciences” of wisdom, means that it is one of the sciences 
that contributes to the attainment of wisdom. On the other hand, to affirm, as in the 
second reading, that history is a root “in wisdom, venerable” is to suggest that it (i.e., 
history) is well-placed or well-rooted in wisdom. What is “venerable” in this case is the 
root (the bāt in of history) which is nourished by wisdom. Accordingly, to consider 
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history as part of the “sciences” of wisdom means that it is one of the sciences that have 
their origin in wisdom.  
There is evidence to suggest that this ambiguity in Ibn Khaldun’s concluding 
statement is by design, not by accident. For behind the two ways in which history can be 
considered “venerable,” we discover two opinions at once captured in Ibn Khaldun’s 
concluding statement: first, an opinion which sees in the ‘awareness’ or ‘cognizance’ (al-
ma‘rifa) of history an essential component of wisdom; second, an opinion which affirms 
the worthiness of employing, in the study of history, the tools of wisdom—e.g., 
theoretical reflection (naz ar), verification (tahqīq), and the explanation-of-causes (ta‘līl). 
The first opinion is shared by those who see in the general conception of the “affair of 
the created,” brought “down to us” by the particular historical reports, a wisdom that is 
venerable. Though it is not immediately obvious who shares the second opinion, it is 
clear that the statement of this opinion is designed to provoke the attention of those who 
are not impressed by history’s near universal appeal, i.e., those “learned” individuals (al-
‘ulamā’) who—as I have indicated in Chapter One—agree with Aristotle that “poetry is 
more philosophical than history.” As we will soon have occasion to see, the entirety of 
the preface is designed as a movement away from the first opinion toward the articulation 
of the argument of the second opinion. 
 
I. ii. The Argument for Examining History  
What value could the “learned” individual obtain from subjecting history to 
philosophical inquiry? An answer to this question is offered in outline in the second 
paragraph of this introductory part of the preface (I.2-3: 19-10). In exploring this answer, 
 76
 
we need to begin with the overall argument that contextualizes it. Like the first, this 
paragraph begins with some observations regarding the fine-art of history, but more 
precisely regarding those men who concern themselves with the pursuit of historical 
studies. The whole discussion can be divided into three sections. In the first, Ibn Khaldun 
lists three qualitatively different types of history ‘scholars’—pioneers, innovators, and 
imitators—whose works, apparently, chart the high and low points of the fine-art of 
history (I.2-3: 19-5). In the second, he explains the reasons for, and the implication of, the 
corruption of the pioneering historians’ records (I.3: 5-8). And, in the third, he seems to 
suggest a way to recover the genuine historical record (I.3: 9-10). Ibn Khaldun observes:2 
The most outstanding of historians in Islam comprehended and compiled the 
reports of the days; they wrote them down in pages of notebooks and safeguarded 
them; intruders mixed these reports with insertions of falsehood, which they 
fancied and innovated, and with adornments of weak narratives, which they 
fabricated and established [as true]; these footsteps were tracked and followed by 
many who came after them; and they brought down to us these reports as they 
had heard it; they did not take note of, or care for, the reasons of events and 
conditions; and they did not reject or refute the foolish accounts. For verification 
is seldom done; the side of scrutiny is, in general, a dreary one; error and fancy 
are close companions3 to reports; imitation, for the descendants-of-Adam, is 
venerable and highborn; intrusion on the fine-arts is long and wide; and the 
pasture of ignorance, among which mankind (al-ānām) dwells, is noxious. And 
the truth, its authority, is not resistible; and reflection’s flame overwhelms the 
wickedness of falsehood.4 And the transmitter [of reports] is someone who 
merely carries and transports; [while] insightfulness critically-captures, upon 
inspection, that which is sound; and science discloses and polishes for it the 
correct pages [of history]. (I.2-3: 19-10) 
 
In this passage Ibn Khaldun makes clear that Muslim historiography, far from being a 
source of wisdom, has fallen victim to malicious intruders (mutataffilūn) and mindless 
                                                 
2 The punctuation of this quotation will follow the rhyme of the sentences. I use a semicolon to punctuate 
sentences sharing the same rhyme. A period is used to separate sentences with different rhyme. 
3 This literally means “error and fancy are kinsmen to reports and companions” (wa al-ghalatu wa al-
wahmu nasībun li-al-akhbāri wa khalīl). 
4 This literal translation of these two sentences is admittedly awkward. A less literal translation could read 
as follows: “and the authority of truth is irresistible; and the flame of reflection overwhelms the wickedness 




transmitters of reports. At certain times, most likely early in Islamic history,5 the “most-
outstanding of historians in Islam” (fuhūl al-mu’arikhūn fī al-islām)6 were able to 
‘comprehend’ (istaw‘abū), ‘collect’ (jama‘ū), and ‘write-down’ (sattarū) the “reports of 
the [early] days” (akhbār al-ayyām; I.2: 20; cf. with I.2: 12). Their apparent objective 
was to ‘safeguard’ (awda‘ūha) the memory of these occurrences for future generations. 
Despite their best efforts, their genuine reports were soon tampered with by certain 
intruders.7 These intruders were apparently endowed with rich imaginations that not only 
played tricks of ‘fancy’ on their minds (wahamū), but also enabled them to ‘innovate’ 
(abda‘ū), ‘adorn’ (zakhrafū), and ‘fabricate’ (laffaqū) the early record, and hence 
establish (wada‘ūhā) their embellished reports as true.8 These corrupted reports were 
given legitimacy by a third group of ‘scholars’ who concerned themselves with the 
“reports of the days,” namely, by those “many” (al-kathīr) gullible transmitters who 
“brought down to us these reports as they had heard it” (addūhā ilayynā kamā sami‘ūhā; 
I.3: 3, cf. with I.2: 14-15). 
                                                 
5 Though it is not clear from this passage who these “most-outstanding historians in Islam” are Ibn 
Khaldun’s next discussion will make it obvious that these historians are not the leading scholars who are 
credited, through their large compilations of historical information—vs. the ‘booklet-sized’ compilations of 
the fuhūl—with the establishment of this discipline (cf. I.3: 11-16, and 18-19). If the “most outstanding of 
the historians in Islam” are not the ones who are credited with establishing the historical tradition, then they 
might quite possibly be those individuals who reported—perhaps as eyewitnesses or perhaps through 
contact with eyewitnesses—on events that later shaped the Muslims’ view of their past and informed their 
worldview. 
6 The word fuhūl (sing. fahl) means “manly,” or more accurately “virile” or “potent.” It is a word 
commonly associated with the most outstanding of Arab poets (fuhūl al-shu‘arā’), usually in reference to 
the preeminent poets of the pre-Islamic era, but it can also refer to some early post-Islamic poets. 
7 Though no explicit reason is given for the intruders’ malfeasance, partisan motivations might have played 
a part considering the earlier remark that history is a source of competition among “kings and lords” (I.2: 
11; cf. I.57: 10-15) 
8 Ibn Khaldun here contrasts the original historians “safeguarding” (awda‘ūhā) historical reports with the 
intruders’ establishing (wada‘ūhā) the fabricated version of these reports as true. The word wada‘ūhā, 
which I have translated “they established,” shares the same verb root as the word mawdū‘. The latter word 
denotes, among other things, ‘convention,’ the term Ibn Khaldun uses to distinguish traditional sciences 
(i.e., al-‘ulūm al-naqliyya al-wad‘iyya, “the conventional sciences of transmission”; II.385: 9-10) from the 
philosophical sciences (i.e., al-‘ulūm al-hakīma al-falsafiyya, “the wise sciences of philosophy”; II.385: 5). 
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Ibn Khaldun provides next, in six short sentences, three main reasons that 
supposedly explain how it became possible that the genuine historical record was lost.9 
The first and most obvious reason has to do with the scholarly ineptitude of the 
transmitters, who do little verification (tahqīq) of reports. This reason is paired with the 
observation that the path of “scrutiny” (al-tanqīh) is not only difficult, but also “dreary” 
(kalīl; I.3: 5-6). The second reason has to do with the nature of historical reporting which 
always includes, according to Ibn Khaldun, elements of “error and fancy” (I.3: 6; cf. I.2: 
12-13). This reason is paired with the human habit of imitation (taqlīd) which people 
embrace as “venerable and highborn” (‘arīqun wa salīl; cf. I.56-57: 13-2). The third 
reason has to do with the fact that the fine-art of history, like all fine-arts, is widely 
exposed to the destructive works of unqualified individuals who involve themselves with 
its work. This final reason is paired with what Ibn Khaldun observes as the noxious 
environment created by “the pasture of ignorance among which mankind dwells” (I.3: 7-
8). 
On its surface, the argument in this paragraph appears to be most concerned with 
those readers who are well disposed toward the study of history. This is not surprising, 
considering that Ibn Khaldun is calling for this discipline’s reform and that he is 
challenging the authority of its salient scholarly symbols, namely, the transmitters of 
reports. Since readers already partial to the study of history are protective regarding the 
treatment of their fine-art, Ibn Khaldun’s initial argument for reform has to be made 
                                                 
9 The structure of these six short sentences is such that they can be better read as three longer pairs of 
combined sentences. Thus the re-punctuation of this argument, as well as a minor emendation of the text 
will produce the following: “verification is seldom done, [for] the side of scrutiny is, in general, a dreary 
one. Error and fancy are close companions to report, [for] imitation, to the descendants-of-Adam, is 
venerable and highborn. Intrusion on the fine-arts is long and wide, [for] the pasture of ignorance among 
which mankind dwell, is noxious” (I.3: 5-8). 
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palatable to them. Before outlining and explaining the present crisis in this discipline, Ibn 
Khaldun begins, respectfully enough, with affirming the supposed glorious past of this 
art, a past which belongs to the “most outstanding of historians in Islam.” Reforming the 
fine-art of history is not presented here as an innovation, but rather as a long overdue 
return to the “correct pages” of history. For traditionalists who are by nature antagonistic 
to innovations, Ibn Khaldun informs them that the status quo of this discipline is itself 
nothing more than an earlier innovation, albeit a long standing one, which covers over the 
genuine historical record. Continuing with the status quo or embracing reform is 
presented as a choice between the way of the mindless transmitters—whose ultimate 
sources are the intruders on this fine-art—or the way of the old outstanding historians, 
who relied on their own independent judgment when they “comprehended” and 
“collected” the reports of the days. The right choice should be clear, Ibn Khaldun 
suggests, for the truth has an awe-inspiring power, and reflection (or theoretical 
reflection, naz ar) overwhelms any falsehood no matter how ‘innovative’ and ‘fanciful’ it 
might be. In this passage, Ibn Khaldun leaves unchallenged the opinion of those who 
might view history as a source of wisdom, and instead argues, apparently for the sake of 
this fine-art, to scrutinize the historical record using the probing tools of wisdom. 
Considering this type of partisan audience, Ibn Khaldun’s call for reforming the fine-art 
of history is presented in a rhetorically sound way.  
And yet, as rhetorically effective as this discussion might be for one group of 
readers—i.e., those who are already well disposed toward the study of history—it does 
not appear to be as effective for another group of readers, namely, those who are 
skeptical of the value of historical studies. For beside the fact that Ibn Khaldun does not 
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address the value of such study, he undermines the “well-established” sources for 
historical knowledge. The well-established sources are those of the anonymous intruders 
and the “many” mindless transmitters who “brought down to us these reports” (I.3: 3). If 
it is true that “error and fancy are close companions to reports” (I.3: 6), then this could be 
grounds for suspecting even the works of the equally anonymous “most outstanding of 
historians in Islam” (I.2: 19).10 But if Ibn Khaldun does not openly acknowledge the 
value of studying history, he does provide hints as to the consequences of neglecting this 
study.  
As noted, Ibn Khaldun lists several reasons that ostensibly explain why the 
‘established’ historical record is ridden with errors and fancy. While some of these 
reasons point to problems peculiar to the fine-art of history—like the scholarly 
incompetence of the transmitters of reports—other reasons point to problems which 
history shares with all the fine-arts. Of this latter kind of problem, the most serious, it 
seems, is the fine-arts’ vulnerability to wide-spread tampering by determined intruders. 
Ibn Khaldun couples this problem with what he describes as the “pasture of ignorance 
among which mankind dwells” (I.3: 7-8). It would seem from this coupling that the well-
being of the intellectual activities of the few—a manifestation of which would at least be 
the ability to protect their fine-arts from intruders—is somehow dependent on the relative 
intellectual health of the overall political community.11 But in order to demonstrate that 
this is indeed Ibn Khaldun’s view and assess its implication for the study of history, we 
need to answer first the following questions: What does Ibn Khaldun allude to when 
                                                 
10 That even eyewitnesses can even confuse or misjudge an event which they observe is a problem which 
Ibn Khaldun will raise and attempt to explain in both the introduction and the first book of Kitāb al-‘Ibar. 
11 The effects of bad scholarship in general, and historical scholarship in particular, on the health of the 




speaking of “the pasture”? Why is it called the “pasture of ignorance”? How does this 
pasture influence the practice of the fine-arts? 
A pasture, al-mar‘ā, is an open field or a grazing land that provides common 
sustenance for social beings. But whatever common sustenance Ibn Khaldun is alluding 
to here—considering his reference to truth vs. falsehood, reports vs. tales, correctness vs. 
error, and soundness vs. fancy—it has to do with what sustains the mind as opposed to 
the body. Accordingly, “the pasture” is an allusion to the source(s) of common 
knowledge or common sense. In view of the essential role that common sense plays in 
sustaining life in a society, Ibn Khaldun is doubtless harsh in characterizing whatever 
contributes to it as “the pasture of ignorance.”12 But common sense that is genuinely 
common is little more than the appearance (al-z āhir) of knowledge as opposed to true 
knowledge that requires (among other things) verification and scrutiny of the apparent 
truth. The general public, as a collective body, is moved by the imagination, as opposed 
to the strict dictates of logic, and as such is moved by poetry, rhetoric, and oratory. This 
is something to which Ibn Khaldun has alluded in the opening lines of his preface when 
he emphasized the “elegant speeches” (I.2: 12) used to ‘spice-up’ the surface reports of 
history, which makes effective their use in public entertainment and straightforward 
instruction. Moreover, Ibn Khaldun’s account of the original intruders gives the 
impression that their ‘creative imagination’ played no small part in making possible the 
establishment of the false historical record. What these intruders ‘innovated,’ ‘adorned,’ 
and ‘fabricated’ of reports must have made a greater impression on those “many,” who 
                                                 
12 Consider, for example, Aristotle’s argument that “it is peculiar to man as compared to the other animals 
that he alone has a perception of good and bad and just and unjust and other things [of that sort]; and 
partnership in these things is what makes a household and a city” (Aristotle’s Politics, Book I, 1253a15-19, 
The Politics, translated and with an introduction, Notes, and Glossary by Carnes Lord (Chicago and 
London: The university of Chicago Press, 1984)). 
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actively “tracked and followed” their “footsteps” (I.3:2-3) than the apparently 
unvarnished truth of the earlier “most outstanding of historians in Islam” (I.2-3: 19-1).  It 
is not difficult to see, therefore, why Ibn Khaldun characterizes the intellectual condition 
of the general public as a condition of ignorance (al-jahl) which is to say a condition that 
is permanently marked by the lack of genuine knowledge. 
  Ibn Khaldun’s argument suggests that the common condition of ignorance 
characterizing the intellectual state of the general public is not, in and of itself, what 
causes deterioration in the fine-arts. The lack of genuine knowledge, being the permanent 
condition of common sense, is something which we as human beings have to live with. It 
is, after all, the natural condition of that ethical and moral ‘knowledge’ which, for the 
sake of common living, needs to be grasped in common, and as such is not entirely 
unwholesome. However, when this condition of ignorance turns noxious (wabīl), the 
deterioration of the fine-arts commences. But what causes it to turn noxious and how 
does it impact the fine-arts?  
From what Ibn Khaldun has already discussed, we can surmise the following. The 
“learned” few, being seekers after wisdom (al-hikma), are the ones who hold the view 
that theoretical “reflection, verification, and the explanation-of-causes” are “venerable” 
and “worthy” (I.2: 17-19). By contrast, the general public—being unable to verify or to 
scrutinize “errors and fancy” masquerading as truth—embraces tradition, by means of 
imitation (taqlīd), as wisdom that has withstood the test of time: after all, “the 
descendants-of-Adam,” like all ‘good’ descendants, hold taqlīd as “venerable and 
highborn” (I.3: 6-7). So we end up here with two ‘visions’ of what is venerable (‘arīq): 
one vision, that of the many, embraces what is apparent (z āhir) to all, and the other 
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version, that of the few, unsatisfied with the many’s vision, seeks to discover what lies 
hidden (bātin) behind the apparent. These two visions need not be antagonistic as long as 
the activity of the few is seen as a deeper (‘amīq; I.2: 18) affirmation of what has already 
been established by common sense. But when, for whatever reason, this is no longer the 
case—e.g., when the activity of the few is suspected of challenging the common sense 
understanding of things—we can easily see how “the pasture of ignorance among which 
mankind dwells” turns toxic to the fine-arts. The most obvious symptom of the noxious 
environment generated by this pasture is the “long and wide” intrusion on the fine-arts by 
parasites (mutataffilūn) pandering to the public taste for ‘innovations and fancy’—to say 
nothing here of the harm done by those “many” who reinforce, through transmission, 
what falsehood has already been established. 
Following Ibn Khaldun’s argument, the fine-art of history’s share of corruptors is 
part of the problem associated with the larger intellectual environment that enables or 
emboldens the intruders on the fine-arts. History, however, is not only prone to this 
general problem, but also an important source or root of this problem, since history is an 
important and popular source of public knowledge or common sense. As the very first 
sentence of the preface emphasizes, history is one of those few fine-arts that “are in 
constant circulation among nations and generations” (I.2: 9-10). This popularity, as 
argued, is a function of history’s claim to accessible ‘knowledge’ of particular events of 
the past. What makes it a fundamental source for common sense, however, is its claim to 
a comprehensive ‘knowledge’ regarding the entire “affair of the created” (I.2: 14-15). A 
‘universal knowledge’ filled with “foolish accounts” (I.3: 4-5) that purports to explain 
change in human conditions as well as the rise and fall of dynasties and cultures (I.2: 15-
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16) is potentially a great rival to the genuine pursuit of wisdom, a pursuit characteristic of 
fine-arts that demands “precise reflection, verification, and explanations-of-causes for 
things that come-to-be and their principles,” and demands as well “deep knowledge of the 
how of events and their reasons” (I.2: 17-18). Here we begin to see why Ibn Khaldun is 
seeking to encourage the “learned” to pay attention to the study of history and to 
challenge the authority of those who ‘intrude’ on this fine-art; for those who intrude on 
the fine-art of history are, by virtue of their influence on the larger public, in a way 
intruders on all the fine-arts. So to take interest in what reports the general public 
consume is an important step towards caring about the well-being of one’s own 
intellectual activities. 
The issue of how deeply the “pasture of ignorance” can influence the activity of 
the few is beautifully illustrated by the two sentences that allude to the link between the 
power of truth (al-haqq) and reflection or theoretical reflection (al-nazar)—i.e., in the 
two sentences which were translated above as “the truth, its authority, is not resistible; 
and reflection’s flame overwhelms the wickedness of falsehood” (I.3: 8-9). There are two 
unique things about these complementary sentences. First, their rhyme-prose sets them 
apart from the preceding six sentences that explain the loss of the outstanding historians’ 
reports (I.3: 5-8); and it also sets them apart from the subsequent three sentences that 
apparently call for addressing this loss by distinguishing between the mere transmitter of 
reports and the genuine scholar (I.3: 9-10). Suspended by their unique rhyme in-between 
the framing of the problem and the suggested solution, these two sentences can be seen as 
partaking in both the problem and the solution. The above translation reflects their 
inclusion as part of the solution, by seemingly calling on scholars to join the rightful and 
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ultimately triumphant cause of the truth. But as we soon discover, this is not the only 
possible reading. Second, these sentences’ syntax allows for two (radically different) 
overall meanings, i.e., this syntax allows for an additional reading to the first one 
translated above.13 The first reading is produced under the assumption that Ibn Khaldun 
is speaking about truth’s authority—i.e., under the assumption that truth is the antecedent 
to the singular masculine possessive pronoun its (“hu”). This choice of antecedent 
determines the meter of the rhyme in both sentences, requiring us in turn to read the 
adjoining sentence as “reflection’s flame overwhelms the wickedness of falsehood.” 
However, if we assume that the singular masculine possessive pronoun refers instead to 
the aforementioned “pasture of ignorance”—which in turn changes the meter of the 
rhyme—then a second syntactically acceptable reading is: “and the truth does not resist 
its [i.e., the pasture of ignorance’s] authority; and reflection’s flame is overwhelmed by 
the wickedness of falsehood.”14 As we will see, the ambiguity in these two sentences is 
by design, for they echo the two views regarding the relationship between history and 
wisdom, which Ibn Khaldun presented at the end of the first paragraph of the preface: the 
                                                 
13 As a rule, Arabic manuscripts do not include the diacritical marks which would determine the intended 
conjugation of verbs. This rule is mostly unproblematic for learned speakers of Arabic, who can easily 
supply the intended marks based on the context of the sentences (cf. I.3: 14 and cf. III.255-56: 15-2). The 
two sentences under consideration, however, are clear exceptions to this rule. 
14 The following transliteration reflects the two possible readings of these sentences: wa al-haqqu lā 
yuqāwamu/yuqāwimu sultānahu/sultānuhu wa al-bātilu yuqdhafu/yadhifu bi-shihābi al-nazar 
shaytānahu/shaytānuhu. The conjugation of the verb to resist (yuqāwamu/yuqāwimu) depends on the 
choice we make in identifying the antecedent for the singular masculine pronoun hu (“it”) in the first 
sentence—i.e., in determining whether the “truth” or the “pasture of ignorance” is the subject that possesses 
“authority” (sultān). This in turn determines, in keeping with the meter of the rhyme-prose, the conjugation 
of the verb to overwhelm (yuqdhafu/yadhifu) in the second sentence. Finally, in determining the 




view which sees history as a source of wisdom and the view which demands subjecting 
history to the tools of wisdom, i.e., to scientific inquiry.15  
The first reading, as an echo of the view that history is a source of wisdom, puts 
little demand on reflection or theoretical reflection (al-nazar). History as a source of 
wisdom means that all we need in order to comprehend the universal “affair of the 
created” is to observe the particular “reports on days and dynasties, and on what came to 
pass in the early centuries” (I.2: 11-15). Of course, between the particular reports and 
universal judgment there are “elegant speeches,” “proverbs,” and entertaining stories (I.2: 
13-14) that mask the “falsehood” and the “weak narratives,” which are “fabricated and 
established” as true (I.3: 1-2).16 The second reading, as an echo of the demand that we 
                                                 
15 Now in making out the intended meaning of the syntactically ambiguous sentence, learned speakers of 
Arabic rely on their common sense regarding likely and unlikely readings. With respect to the two 
sentences under consideration, the first translation might appear as the most likely one. After all, common 
sense dictates that truth, not ignorance, is what possesses authority, and that reflection (or theoretical 
reflection) can overwhelm any falsehood however crafty in appearance. This primary impression is 
something that is reflected, as far as I am aware, in all readings and translations of these two sentences. But 
we have already seen that common sense—or rather its source(s)—far from being infallible, is prone to be 
noxious.  
16 The primary sense of the word sultān is power, authority, or “absolute dominion,” but it can also indicate 
an authoritative “proof, evidence, [or] argument” (see Lane, s.l.t). The literal meaning of the word nazar is 
to “perceive with the eyes, see, view, eye, regard” as well as to “watch, observe, notice” someone or 
something (see Hans Wehr, n.z .r). In philosophical discourse, this literal meaning of nazar is given the 
deeper sense of contemplation or theoretical reflection (an equivalent to the Greek term theôria). But 
whether nazar is used to capture the act of a spectator (who, in witnessing an event, identifies its 
particulars) or whether it is used to capture the more active engagement of a reflective person (who seeks, 
in the observed event, to identify its deeper meaning), nazar is almost always conceived of as an 
indispensable tool for discovering the truth; for besides the truth’s moral authority—to which all would 
eagerly profess—it can only be manifest to those who have eyes to see. And yet, the scope and measure to 
which one is willing to engage nazar as the path to the truth, is intimately related to one’s prior expectation 
regarding the extent and reach of the truth’s sultān (absolute dominion). It is with respect to these ‘prior 
expectations’ that we can locate the points of difference and agreements between the “learned and 
ignorant” with respect to what qualifies for both as the dominant truth. Though the many might not reject 
the notion of a hidden, or mysterious, aspect to the truth, they associate its fundamental aspect with that 
which is apparent. For a truth that compels all, is one that has to be accessible to all, the “learned” together 
with the “ignorant” (I.2: 11-12).The learned, as a result of their learning, tend to associate the dominant 
truth with that which lays beyond what is apparent. Ibn Khaldun, however, suggests throughout this 
introductory part of his preface that the difference between the “learned” and the “ignorant” is not as 
incommensurable as first might appear. For one thing, the learned, like the ignorant, is susceptible to 
embrace imitation (taqlīd). Of course the learned does not acknowledge taqlīd per se as “venerable and 
highborn” (I.3: 6-7), but, being part of the “descendants-of-Adam,” does hold certain things as worthy of 
honor because it has been long established, i.e., the learned too hold certain things as “venerable” (I.2: 18). 
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subject history to scientific inquiry, communicates what happens when such inquiry is 
not followed, namely, the truth falling under the dominion of the pasture of ignorance—a 
condition through which theoretical reflection becomes overwhelmed by the wickedness 
of falsehood (I.3: 9). 
The conclusion of Ibn Khaldun’s argument here, and with it the conclusion of the 
general introduction of the preface, presents two important points: (1) It reminds us of the 
weakness of the historical tradition—a tradition that is uncritically transmitted from one 
generation to another—and yet, (2) it also demands that we do not uncritically dismiss 
this tradition. In other words, Ibn Khaldun demands that we subject this tradition to the 
scholar’s “insightfulness” (al-basīra) and to scientific inquiry which guides scholarly 
insight. Having made this general point, Ibn Khaldun begins his preface anew. 
 
II. The New Beginning (I.3-5: 10-12) 
Ibn Khaldun marks the new beginning of his preface with the declarative article 
hādhā, “this,” meaning “having said this.” This new beginning is intended to prepare the 
reader for Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of his book’s contribution to the study of history. It 
does so by defining the problems with current practices of the fine-art of history and by 
noting the negative consequences of these practices. I divide this argument into four 
sections: (i) a list of leading scholars of history, along with a reminder of the religiously 
controversial aspect to the works of these scholars (I.3-4: 10-2); (ii) an outline of the two 
main types of historical scholarship, one general in character, the other particular (I.4: 2-
                                                                                                                                                 
This is most obvious in the case of those ‘learned’ scholars of history who brought down to us, through 
transmission, the fabricated reports of the intruders on the fine-art of history. This is less obvious, but no 
less harmful , in those learned scholars who reject the study of history because in the established tradition 
of the “sages” that study was neglected (cf. I.62: 10-13, I.63: 2-8). 
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10); (iii) a general discussion of bad types of historical scholarship and the consequences 
of such works (I.4-5: 10-6); iv) a brief mention of a type of ‘scholarship’ that is 
apparently so appalling it has nothing to do with the fine-art of history (I.5: 6-7). 
 
II. i. The Question of the Notable Scholars of History 
Unlike his general introduction, which is shrouded in abstraction, Ibn Khaldun 
begins the second part of his preface by providing concrete examples of the most notable 
scholars of history. He also singles out particular scholars as religiously controversial, 
and points out tangible ways of dealing with such controversy. Ibn Khaldun begins:  
People have recorded many [historical] reports; they collected the histories of the 
nations and the dynasties of the world, and wrote them down. Those who, by 
virtue of fame and considered headship (al-imāma al-mu‘tabara), replaced the 
records of their predecessors with their own later compilations, are few in 
number (they barely exceed the number of [one’s] fingers, or the marks of 
vowels); like Ibn Ishāq, al-T abarī, [Ibn] al-Kalbī, Muhammad Ibn ‘Umar al-
Wāqidī, Sayf Ibn ‘Umar al-Asadī, al-Mas‘ūdī, and others among the famous, 
those who are distinguished from the crowds. And though there is in the books of 
al-Mas‘ūdī and al-Wāqidī that which is discredited and objectionable—as is 
recognized when confirmed and is famed among the custodians [of religion] and 
the reliable [transmitters]—nonetheless, the totality has distinguished all of them 
in accepting their reports, in emulating17 their methods of composition, and in 
following their footsteps. And the clear-sighted critic is his own judge in 
falsifying or considering them with respect to what they include in their 
transmissions [of reports]. For culture has a nature, through its conditions reports 
can be related, and accounts and historical materials can be predicated. (I.3-4: 10-
2) 
 
After an apparent moment of hesitation on whether the number of the notable historians 
barely exceeds ten—i.e., the number of one’s fingers—or, lowering his estimation, barely 
exceeds the number three—the number of vowel-markers in the Arabic language—Ibn 
Khaldun finally settles on a list that consists of six names. This almost chronological 
                                                 
17 Literally, “tracking” (iqtifā’). 
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list18 covers about two hundred years of historical scholarship, beginning with 
Muh ammad Ibn Ishāq (d. 761) and ending with Abū Hasan al-Mas‘ūdī (d. 956). If ever 
there was an official list of “outstanding historians of Islam” (fuhūl al-mu’arikhūn fī al-
islām; I.2: 20), then the names which Ibn Khaldun includes here would be on this list. 
However, it is not immediately obvious if Ibn Khaldun does indeed think of these 
scholars as the original “outstanding historians of Islam.” According to his earlier 
description of the anonymous “outstanding historians,” he hinted that their records have 
been tampered with and that their authority has been superseded by others. Neither of 
these conditions applies to the works of the above-mentioned historians. Indeed, as Ibn 
Khaldun maintains here, a defining quality of the works of these notable historians is the 
fact that they were able to replace “the records of their predecessors with their own later 
compilations.” Accordingly, Ibn Khaldun makes clear that the authority of the notable 
historian has, by the acknowledgement of many, superseded the authority of those 
scholars who came before them. But if Ibn Khaldun does not unequivocally declare the 
above-mentioned historians “outstanding,” he also does not declare them “intruders on 
the fine-art.” This reserve that we observe in Ibn Khaldun’s judgment is for a very good 
reason: the works of these scholars are the only authoritative sources for historical 
knowledge regarding pre- and early Islamic history, i.e., they are the scholars that define 
this fine-art. Nonetheless, Ibn Khaldun makes it clear to his careful readers that these 
notable historians are not above reproach, and this despite their “fame and considered 
headship” (al-imāma al-mu‘tabara). 
                                                 
18 The correct chronological order would require that al-Tabarī (which is listed second) and al-Asadī (listed 
fifth) to exchange places.  
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Of the six scholars mentioned, Ibn Khaldun singles out two as being especially 
problematic: al-Mas‘ūdī and Muh ammad Ibn ‘Umar al-Wāqidī (d. 823). Without 
elaboration, Ibn Khaldun asserts that the books of these two scholars include discredited 
(mut ‘an) and objectionable (mughmaz) materials. To those who wish to discover the 
nature and implication of these suspect materials, Ibn Khaldun suggests one of two 
approaches. First, they can examine these books and discover for themselves what is 
discredited and objectionable in them, i.e., to cognize such things after they consider 
them (ma‘rūfun ‘inda al-ithbāt); or, second, they can consult the custodians of religion 
and those who are trustworthy regarding religious affairs, among whom these problems 
are well-known (mashhūrun bayna al-hafazati wa al-thiqāt). Of course, these two 
approaches will not necessarily lead to the same conclusion. On the one hand, consulting 
the trusted authorities reveals that, according to the most orthodox Sunni scholars, what is 
discredited and objectionable in the books of al-Mas‘ūdī and al-Wāqidī are subjects 
which touch upon religious matters.19 On the other hand, this might not be the same 
conclusion reached by someone who investigates these books for onself.20 
                                                 
19 According to Rosenthal, “Ibn Hajar is a good witness as to the partisan objections of theologians against 
the historians mentioned. Al-Mas‘ūdī’s works are out of circulation (tafihah), because he was a Shi‘ah and 
Mu‘tazilah, and the Spaniard Ibn Dihyah…thought very little of him…. Al-Wāqidī is often considered an 
untruthful transmitter of historical traditions and ignorant of pre-Islamic history. [Al-Shāfi‘ī] declared all 
his writing to be lies.” (Franz Rosenthal, The Muqaddimah; p.8). 
20 For example, Ibn Khaldun also finds things that are discredited and objectionable in the works of al-
Mas‘ūdī. (In comparison with other scholars mentioned in the list of distinguished historians, Ibn Khaldun 
offers little mention of the works of al-Wāqidī in the Muqaddima). However, with one notable exception 
(II.229; but cf. I.196 & I.319), all of Ibn Khaldun’s objections focus on whether or not certain accounts al-
Mas‘ūdī transmitted did in fact occur (I.11, 14, 58, 59, and 60). In other words, the religious controversy 
associated with the books of al-Mas‘ūdī almost never enters in Ibn Khaldun’s estimation of this historian’s 
work. Thus, in the main text of the Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldun follows his own advice here to the “insightful 
critic,” who has to be “his own judge as to what part of that which [these historians] transmit is false, and 
which part is worthy of consideration.” In contrast to the ‘trusted authorities,’ Ibn Khaldun does not simply 
reject the totality of a text because of what one might find in it of religiously discredited or objectionable 
arguments. And in contrast to the totality of historians, he does not simply accept all the reports that a 
historian might transmit simply because such a historian is famous. 
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 History, as Ibn Khaldun has already informed us (I.2: 11) and as he will 
occasionally remind us, is a highly politicized and religiously sensitive subject. Now, 
what is considered partisan according to one group of scholars belonging to a particular 
tradition in Islam is considered true by an opposing group of scholars and vice versa. 
Accordingly, none of the above-mentioned prominent historians is completely free from 
the accusation of being in some way partisan. Of course, it would not be prudent for Ibn 
Khaldun—a Mālikī scholar belonging to the Sunni tradition of Islam—to appear to be 
defending perceived Shi‘i historians (like al-Mas‘ūdī and al-Wāqidī), or to appear to be 
impugning the reputation of perceived Sunni historians (like al-Tabarī). Nonetheless, he 
indirectly suggests that things “discredited and objectionable” can also be found in the 
works of the other famous historians. As we will see next, this suggestion is better 
appreciated in the Arabic text than in the English translation.  
After singling out the problematic aspect of the works of al-Mas‘ūdī and al-
Wāqidī, Ibn Khaldun begins a new sentence with the conjunction ghayyra anna, 
“nonetheless.” This is proceeded by the plural form of the objective pronoun hum (them), 
rather than the dual form of the objective pronoun humā (both of them), the 
grammatically correct choice in Arabic had Ibn Khaldun meant to speak of only al-
Mas‘ūdī and al-Wāqidī. Admittedly, this transition is both sudden and awkward, but it 
does communicate in a subtle way Ibn Khaldun’s point. Without naming the four 
remaining, scholars Ibn Khaldun implies, in a way that would escape the mind of the 
careless reader, that despite the fact that these remaining scholars also have things 
“discredited and objectionable” in their books, the totality of historians follow their 
methods, along with the methods of al-Mas‘ūdī and al-Wāqidī.   
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 Ibn Khaldun ends this section of the preface by reminding us, once again, of the 
need to reject imitation (taqlīd) and to exercise independent judgment when examining 
the historical record. Like the conclusion of his general introduction, Ibn Khaldun 
cautions against the wholesale rejection of the historical tradition. However, whereas in 
the conclusion he spoke in the abstract of how science can guide the judgment of a 
scholar, in this section of the preface, Ibn Khaldun reveals the character of the science by 
suggesting that the scholar’s judgment should be anchored in certain knowledge of the 
nature of culture (‘umrān): “And the clear-sighted critic (al-nāqid al-bas īr) is his own 
judge with respect to what they falsify in their transmission [of reports] or with respect to 
what [in these reports] is worthy-of-consideration. For culture has nature, through its 
conditions reports can be related, and accounts and historical materials can be carried 
over” (I.3-4: 20-2). But rather than discuss the science which defines his Muqaddima, Ibn 
Khaldun focuses instead on what is worth examining in the historical tradition. This 
brings us to the second section of this part of the preface. 
 
II.ii. Exemplary Types of Historical Scholarship 
 After somewhat casually mentioning the importance of understanding the nature 
of culture for judging historical accounts, Ibn Khaldun turns back to the argument calling 
for the study of the most distinguished scholars of history. He continues: 
And, furthermore, most of the histories of these [scholars] are general (‘āmmat) 
in their undertakings and approaches; because the [first] two dynasties in the 
advent of Islam had general-management (‘umūm al-dawlatayyin) over 
boundaries and kingships; and because these [histories] dealt, [both] directly and 
indirectly, with far reaching ends. From among these [scholars] are the ones who 
grasped what came before the religion—of dynasties, nations, and common 
affairs—such as al-Mas‘ūdī and whoever followed his way. After them came the 
one[s] who turned from the absolute to the specific, and who held-back, with 
respect to generalization and encompassing [subjects], from that which is far 
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reaching. Thus one tied the loose ends of one’s eras, comprehended the reports of 
one’s borders and regions, and dealt only with the accounts of one’s dynasties 
and metropolises; as was done by Ibn H ayyān, the historian of Andalusia and of 
the Umayyad dynasty there; and was done by Ibn al-Raqīq, the historian of 
Ifrīqīya and of the dynasty that was in Kairouan. (I.4: 2-10) 
 
Here Ibn Khaldun presents two kinds of historical scholarship which he finds worthwhile 
to study and examine. The first kind provides general coverage of Islamic history—one 
dealing with the early history of Islam and of the development of its first two imperial 
dynasties, the Umayyad and the Abbasid—whereas the second provides coverage of the 
history of local dynasties and particular regions. And although “most of the histories of 
those” six scholars are examples of the first kind of historical scholarship, al-Mas‘ūdī’s 
work is its latest and best representative. Besides providing a general history of Islam, al-
Mas‘ūdī, according to Ibn Khaldun, “grasped” (aw‘aba) what came before Islam (qabla 
al-milla) “of dynasties, nations, and common affairs (al-amr al-‘amam).” As for the 
second type of historical scholarship, it is best represented by the works of historians, 
such as Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm Ibn al-Raqīq (d. 1028) and Abū Marawān Hayyān Ibn Hayyān 
(d. 1078).  
Although the historical works of Ibn al-Raqīq and Ibn H ayyān are qualitatively 
different from the works of al-Mas‘ūdī and “whoever followed his way,” Ibn Khaldun 
subtly suggests that the former type of historical works is not completely independent of 
the latter type. The way Ibn Khaldun depicts the works of Ibn al-Raqīq and Ibn Hayyān 
suggests that these two historians were fully aware, when they composed their accounts, 
of the works of the general historians. Ibn al-Raqīq and Ibn Hayyān, coming “after” 
scholars like al-Mas‘ūdī, understood well the general character of their predecessors’ 
histories, and grasped what needed to be done in order to tie the “loose ends of [their] 
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eras,” and to comprehend the “reports of [their] borders and regions” dealing “only with 
the accounts of [their] dynasties and metropolises.” The dependence of historical works 
regarding particular dynasties and regions on more general works of histories, like that of 
the al-Mas‘ūdī’s, is a point which Ibn Khaldun will make explicit in his introduction to 
the Muqaddima (I.50-51: 19-10). There he will define a proper historical work as that 
which deals with the “mentioning of specific [historical] reports that relate to a time-
period (‘asr) or a generation (jīl)” (I.50: 19-20). Ibn Khaldun will also insist there that 
such ‘particular histories’ have their foundation in the works of ‘general histories,’ such 
as that of al-Mas‘ūdī, who “became an imām to historians, to which they come back, and 
a foundation they use to verify much of their own reports” (I.51: 6-7).21 Through this 
description, which we will have occasion to revisit in the next chapter, we discover an 
important point that is of relevance to our discussion of the preface.  
According to Ibn Khaldun, a historian properly so called, is someone who writes 
the history of a particular time-period, a group of people, a city, and/or a dynasty. Those 
scholars who write general histories of “dynasties, nations, and common affairs,” (I.4: 4-
                                                 
21 To better understand how general histories form the bases for the writing of particular histories we need 
to reflect once again on the importance of the work of the six notable scholars of history that Ibn Khaldun 
mentioned in the beginning of this part of the preface. The collective work of these men equals about two 
hundred years of historical studies (ca. 761-ca. 956). Of course, each one of those six scholars had his own 
unique approach for recording history, and each differed from the rest with respect to his own partisan 
views or political sympathies, to say nothing here of each one’s degree of intellectual competence. What is 
noteworthy is that they all dealt with core subjects that are of paramount importance for Islamic 
historiography. Collectively, they provide an authoritative and comprehensive view of the early history of 
Islam. The centrality of this comprehensive account for writing the histories of later Islamic periods can be 
appreciated when considering the content of this early history: the life of the prophet Muhammad, the 
problem of political succession after his death, the political circumstances surrounding the reign of the four 
rightly-guided caliphs, the religious fallout from the first and second fitna, the rise and fall of the Umayyad 
dynasty, the emergence and decline of the Abbasid dynasty, the ascendancy of non-Arab rulers, and so 
forth. No account of the political and social history of later dynasties can be complete without reference 
(both chronological and logical) to how that history fits within the larger context of Islamic history; and no 
proper evaluation of the legitimacy and power of such dynasties can be done without referring back to the 
most legitimate or to the most powerful form of government in early Islamic history. Through their 
‘universal histories,’ and in their differing degrees of competence, these six scholars (among others) helped 
situate the writing of the local histories of later dynasties, regions, and groups of people. 
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5) are not historians in the full sense of the word. But the fact that such scholars are not 
defined as historians is not meant to diminish the invaluable contribution they make for 
the study of history. After all, the works of these scholars provide the general context that 
allows the properly named historian to write their particular accounts. This point, made in 
the introduction, regarding the proper work of the historian is already anticipated in the 
preface. The only scholars who are explicitly named and identified in the preface as 
historians are Ibn al-Raqīq and Ibn Hayyān. None of the six scholars, who “by virtue of 
fame and considered headship, replaced the records of their predecessors with their own 
later compilations” (I.3: 12-13), are explicitly referred to as historians. 
With the mention of the names of Ibn al-Raqīq and Ibn H ayyān, Ibn Khaldun 
concludes his discussion of the types of historical works that are worthy of examination. 
What remains is the discussion of the type of historical works that ought to be 
disregarded. This is the subject of the third section of the second part of the preface. 
  
II. iii. The Inferior Type of Historical Works and its Effects   
Ibn Khaldun begins his discussion of the inferior historians by making 
observations regarding their intellectual abilities: 
After these ones no one came except the imitator, one who is dull in nature and 
mind, or who embraced dullness—weaving on that same loom, and following 
that same example; and who is oblivious as to how the passing of days changes 
conditions and how it transforms the customs of nations and generations. Thus, 
[such] ones bring reports on dynasties, and tales of events in the first eras, as 
forms abstracted from their matter, blades without scabbard, and kinds of 
cognizance that altogether must be renounced due to ignorance of what in them is 
derivative and what is inherent. For these are occurrences, the roots of which are 
unknown; and they are species, the genera of which have not been considered, 
nor have their particulars been verified. They repeat, with respect to the subjects 
of these occurrences, the exact same circulated reports, in adherence (itibā‘an) to 
those of the ancients who concerned themselves with [the investigation of] these 
matters. They lack awareness of the affairs of the nascent generations, because of 
their inability to interpret their records (dīwānihā), and thus the explanation of 
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such affairs is a foreign matter in their texts. Then, if they set themselves to 
mention a dynasty, they would [certainly] arrange its reports well, being watchful 
to transmit them regardless of whether these are fanciful or truthful. [But] they 
would not set themselves to give [account] of its origin, and neither mention the 
reason which led to the unfurling of its banner and made apparent its signs, nor 
what caused it to stop at the limit it reached. Thus the reflective-person would be 
left still looking for the principles and ranks of [these] conditions; probing the 
reasons for their bearing upon each other or for their sequence; inquiring for the 
persuasive [explanation] regarding their divergence or harmony—as we shall 
mention all of this in the book’s introduction (muqaddimatu al-kitāb). (I.4-5: 10-
6) 
 
In discussing the inferior type of historiography, Ibn Khaldun speaks in abstraction: he 
provides no concrete examples of bad historians, a task that is left for the readers to 
determine for themselves. He informs us here that these so-called historians are men of 
inferior mental capacities who are either naturally dull, or too lazy not to be dull. They 
are, simply speaking, imitators who “weave on that same loom, and follow that same 
example.” But what loom (i.e., model) do they imitate and what example do they blindly 
follow? It is safe to assume that Ibn Khaldun is referring to the model and example set 
forth by the works of the six scholars he listed above. After all, Ibn Khaldun has already 
hinted at the importance of general histories for writing historical accounts of particular 
dynasties and regions. He also explicitly stated that when it comes to these six major 
figures of Islamic historiography, the “totality” (I.3: 18), which includes both good 
historians—such as Ibn al-Raqīq and Ibn Hayyān—and bad ones, “have distinguished all 
of them in accepting their reports, in emulating their methods of composition, and in 
following their footsteps” (I.3: 19). But it does not appear to matter for Ibn Khaldun 
which particular example these inferior historians follow—i.e., whether it is that of the 
exceptional al-Mas‘ūdī or the example of one of the other five scholars—for they (the 
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inferior historians) do not, in the first place, know how to apply these models and 
examples to the peculiar times and conditions of their subjects. 
 Now, in order to understand and properly evaluate the political conditions of a 
particular nation or generation in relation to early ones, the scholar needs to be aware of 
how “the passing of days changes conditions and how it transforms the customs of 
nations and generations” (I.5). This, according to Ibn Khaldun, is what is lacking in the 
research of the inferior historians. They uncritically accepted, repeated, and patterned 
their own studies on the earlier accounts of history, but they understood little of its 
content and they did not appreciate the uniqueness of the methods of the universal 
historians. Ibn Khaldun lists, as a direct result of this flaw, four major gaps in the 
understanding of the dull historians with respect to earlier history: (1) they had no 
knowledge of the roots of political events; (2) they did not realize the need for analyzing 
and classifying subjects under study; (3) they did not appreciate the importance of 
investigating the social conditions of nascent generations, i.e., those generations 
responsible for the founding of dynasties; and (4) they lack comprehension of how to 
explain the extent and power of dynasties once established. These gaps in knowledge, Ibn 
Khaldun maintains, are carried over when the dull historians attempt to give their own 
accounts of later dynasties. Having failed to properly understand and situate accounts of 
earlier histories, they showed similar thoughtlessness with respect to the reports of later 
dynasties. They would simply become ‘good’ transmitters of these reports “whether these 
are fanciful or truthful” (I.5). Moreover, having no knowledge of the roots of political 
events, and being unaware of the importance of studying nascent generations, they would 
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avoid dealing with the origin of such dynasties or give a logical account for their rise and 
decline. 
 Ibn Khaldun concludes his discussion of the dull historians with a remark on 
something else that is lost in their works, namely, its ability to satisfy the needs of the 
reflective-person. The Arabic word for the “reflective-person” is al-nāzir, which comes 
from the same verb-root as al-nazar, the word for theoretical reflection. What, then, are 
these needs that would move the theoretically inclined to examine the particular accounts 
of the historians? Ibn Khaldun maintains that these needs—which have an unmistakable 
political orientation—are concerned with finding out the principles (mabādi’) and their 
ranks (marātib) of certain conditions (ahwāl) that relate to the rise and fall of dynasties; 
with discovering the reasons (asbāb) under which these principles follow their logical 
sequence (tatābu‘), and the reasons under which they don’t follow such logical sequence 
(tazāhum); and with seeking persuasive explanations with respect to the way these 
principles complement or diverge from each other. But immediately after making this 
observation, he asks for his reader’s patience, declaring that “we shall mention all of this 
in the book’s introduction” (I.5). Nonetheless, as we will see shortly, raising this problem 
here in the preface is significant. 
 
II. iv. The Pseudo-Historians 
At this point, it would seem that Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of the good and bad in 
historical scholarship has been concluded. After all, he has already taken stock of the 
types of historical scholarship available, distinguished the superior type of history 
scholars from the inferior ones, and concluded that more on this subject will be discussed 
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later. He goes on, however, to introduce another type of historical studies that, according 
to him, has little to do with proper historical scholarship. Ibn Khaldun observes: 
Others then came with summations of excessive brevity. They went so far as to 
be satisfied with [recording] little else than kings’ names, severed from 
genealogies and [historical] reports, covered over, in dust letters, with the 
numbers of their days; as was done by Ibn Rashīq in [his] Mīzān al-‘Amal, and 
whoever else, from among the heedless, who followed his footsteps. None of 
their treatises are subject of consideration, and neither trust nor authority-of-
transmission is given to them; for they have abandoned what is useful, and they 
have breached the recognized approaches and customs of the historians. (I.5: 6-
12) 
 
Ibn Khaldun, in contrast with his previous discussion of the dull historians, provides here 
the name of an author (and the title of his book) to represent this peculiar type of inferior 
scholars. And yet his choice of a representative is strange. The author, Abū ‘Alī Hasan 
Ibn Rashīq (d. 1064 or 1071), is more celebrated as an able poet and as an outstanding 
literary critic, than he is as a historian.22 His principal work on literary criticism, al-
‘Umda, is highly praised by Ibn Khaldun himself, who describes it as an exceptional 
book (III.337: 13-15; cf. 293: 12). What is also strange about Ibn Khaldun’s discussion 
here is his insistence that this type of scholarship is so mediocre that no weight is given to 
it. But if such scholarship is discredited, why would Ibn Khaldun bother to consider it in 
the first place? One suspects that Ibn Khaldun intends to convey more in this presentation 
than simply a critique of a discredited type of scholarship. This suspicion is strengthened 
when reflecting on Ibn Khaldun’s explanation why the books of these historians are given 
no weight. He lists two reasons: first, these pseudo-historians “abandoned what is 
                                                 
22 According to Ch. Bouyahia, Ibn Rashīq “is regarded by all his biographers, both ancient and modern, as 
an historian. But nothing is less certain; the only historical work that they attribute to him with any 
precision, Mīzān al-‘Amal…in reality belongs to an Andalusian homonym of his, Abū ‘Alī al-Husayn Ibn 
‘Atīq Ibn al-Husayn Ibn Rashīq al-Taghlabī, d. after 674/1275…. The same must be true of the 
Commentary on the Muwatta’ which is attributed to him, the homonyms of this author in both East and 
West, with writings on various subjects.” (Ch. Bouyahia, “Ibn Rashīk” in The Encylopaedia of Islam, ed., 
P.J. Bearman, (Leiden: Brill Publishing, 1954) p. 904). 
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useful,” and second, they “breached the recognized approaches and customs of the 
historians” (I.5). Now, it is clear that supposed scholars of history who produce little 
more than chronological lists of political leaders are not worthy of the name historians. 
As such, neglect of books like Mīzān al-‘Amal is justified. Recall, however, that Ibn 
Khaldun is attempting to embark upon reforming the fine-art of history. And as with 
every process of reform, there is considerable risk in opposing those who speak for 
traditional authority. Ibn Khaldun is well aware of these risks. We have already seen 
three different instances in which he tries to delay such direct confrontation. First, when 
speaking of historians that are highly regarded, Ibn Khaldun names them and explicitly 
praises them, but hints, indirectly, that they are not above reproach. Second, before 
pointing out the unique approach to the study of history by al-Mas‘ūdī—a suspect 
individual in the eyes of religious authorities—Ibn Khaldun appears to affirm the 
orthodox view that al-Mas‘ūdī’s books have things “discredited and objectionable” (I.3: 
17). Not until close to the end of his introduction does Ibn Khaldun openly praise al-
Mas‘ūdī as an exceptional scholar. And, finally, when he harshly criticizes certain 
scholars of history as dull—a group that potentially includes every historian who came 
after Ibn al-Raqīq and Ibn Hayyān (cf. I.4: 10)—Ibn Khaldun is careful to provide no 
specific examples. By appearing here to lend his voice of support to established tradition, 
Ibn Khaldun avoids offending the sensibilities of those who might be influenced by 
religious authorities, at least until such time as he is able to make the case for his 
alternative approach to the study of history. It should not escape our attention, however, 
that the only time Ibn Khaldun praises unequivocally established methods and customs of 
the historians is when he contrasts these with a worthless type of scholarship. 
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 With this tongue-in-cheek praise of the “recognized approaches and customs of 
the historians,” Ibn Khaldun prepares the way for the final part of his preface, the part in 
which he outlines his own approach to the study of history and explain the purpose of his 
book. 
 
III. On Kitāb al-‘Ibar 
Finally concluding his evaluation of the fine-art of history, and arguing its current 
state of disrepair, Ibn Khaldun turns to the discussion of his book and its subject matter. 
This final part of the preface (I.5-8: 12-10) may be divided into four sections: (i) Ibn 
Khaldun’s broad description of the substance of his book (I.5-6: 12-9); (ii) the discussion 
of the book’s overall table of contents (I.6: 9-8); (iii) a general discussion of the subjects 
that will be treated systematically and the subjects that will be treated in a summary 
fashion (I.6-7: 18-14); and, (iv) the conclusion of the preface (I.7-8: 15-10).  
 
III. i. The Content and Purpose of the Book 
Ibn Khaldun begins his discussion of the character of Kitāb al-‘Ibar by describing 
what gave him the motivation to write this book: 
When I looked over the folks’ books, and sounded the recesses of yesterday and 
today, I awakened the creative eye from the habit of drowsiness and sleep, and by 
myself, though without resource, I aspired for the best possible way of 
composition. Thus I produced a book on history; in it, I unveiled conditions of 
nascent generations (al-ajyāl); each chapter I detailed with reports and [weighty] 
considerations; and I showed in it causes and reasons for the origins of dynasties 
and cultures. I based it on the [historical] reports of the two groups (al-jīlaiyn), 
who cultivated the Maghrib through the times,23 filling the flanks of its regions 
and metropolises; on [reports of] what they had of long- and short-lasting 
dynasties; and on [reports of] who they had of kings and allies. These two are the 
Arabs and the Berbers; for they are the two groups to which the Maghrib was 
recognized as their refuge, an abode for them lasting through the ages, so that it 
                                                 
23 Literally, “in these times” (fī hādhihi al-a‘sār). 
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is almost impossible to conceive that any other group [of people] lived there. 
Beyond [these two groups], from among the descendants of Adam, none is 
recognized as the people of the [Maghrib]. Thus I refined, in the best way, its 
inquiries, and I brought it very close to the understanding of the learned and the 
elite. In the division and organization of it, I followed a strange path, and from 
among the various ways, I invented for it a wondrous approach, and an 
innovative method and style. And in it I explained—from among the conditions 
of culture and city-formation, and of what essential accidents happen in human 
social organization—that which will entertain you with the causes and reasons of 
generated things, and makes you cognizant how through these [principles] the 
people of dynasties issue forth, so that you would tear your grip away from the 
[habit of] imitation (al-taqlīd), and would behold conditions of days and groups 
that were before your time and that will be after it. (I.5-6: 12-9) 
 
Following the manner of a theoretically-minded person, Ibn Khaldun provides here what 
could loosely be termed the four ‘causes’ or ‘explanatory principles’ for his book: the 
efficient, formal, material, and final ones. First, there is the efficient cause. The idea for 
his book, Ibn Khaldun informs us, came in part after he “looked-over” the books of the 
historians. The verb “looked-over” (tāla‘a) shares the same verb-root as the word 
“looking-for” (something or someone; tatallu‘), i.e., with the word Ibn Khaldun earlier 
used to describe the after-effect of reading the books of the dull historians. Recall that, 
after examining these books, the hypothetical reflective-person was left “still looking for 
the principles and their ranks” (I.5: 4) of conditions relating to the rise and fall of 
dynasties.24 By contrast, Ibn Khaldun not only “looked-over” the books of history, but he 
also made some kind of exploration of the difference between “the recesses of yesterday 
and today” (I.5: 12). In other words, he seems to have realized and accomplished 
something of which the dull historians, as he earlier informed us, had no awareness: “how 
the passing of days change conditions and how it transforms the customs of nations and 
generations” (I.4: 12-13). Ibn Khaldun maintains that through such reflections and 
explorations, he was able to rouse his creative-self out of its comfortable sleep. In 
                                                 
24 “fa yabqā al-nāziru mutatali‘un ba‘d” (I.5: 4). 
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describing the genesis of his work, he depicts an impressive act of ingenuity and 
intellectual independence. It seems that nothing of what he read and explored prepared 
him fully for what he was about to embark upon. Nonetheless, as a result of his awakened 
creativity, Ibn Khaldun was dedicated to explore uncharted territories and to compose 
something the like of which no one before him could imagine. 
 Ibn Khaldun describes next the form his composition took, namely, “a book on 
history” (I.5: 14). According to his description, this book seems to address all the 
shortfalls existing in the works of the dull historians. Whereas the books of these 
historians cannot explain the “affairs of nascent generations” (I.4: 18), Ibn Khaldun’s 
book “unveils conditions of nascent generations” (I.5: 14-15). While his predecessors’ 
reports consist of historical “occurrences, the roots of which are unknown, and… species 
[of knowledge], the genera of which have not been considered, nor have their particulars 
been verified” (I.4: 16-17), Ibn Khaldun details his book with carefully organized 
“reports and [weighty] considerations” (I.5: 15-16). Finally, whereas the dull historians 
avoid, when reporting on a particular dynasty, giving account “of its origin, and neither 
mention the reason which led to the unfurling of its banner and made apparent its signs” 
(I.5: 2-3), he provides “causes and reasons,” not only “for the beginning of dynasties,” 
but also for “cultures” (I.5: 16). 
The third point that Ibn Khaldun discusses in this section deals with the material 
upon which the book is based. This material consists of the historical reports regarding 
two groups of people, the Arabs and the Berbers. These two groups, according to his 
description, are native to northwest Africa, i.e., the Maghrib. The Arabic word which I 
have translated alternatively as ‘group’ and ‘generation’ is jīl. This word, as will become 
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evident in our examination of the Muqaddima, is a central term in Ibn Khaldun’s 
analysis. He uses it in at least three different ways: to differentiate among groups of 
people sharing common linguistic and ethnic identity (e.g., Arabs, Berbers, or Turks); to 
differentiate among the many “groups” or “generations” within a particular group of 
people (e.g., nomadic vs. settled Arabs); and as a term indicating a particular ‘generation’ 
within a family. The word jīl comes from the same verb-root as the word ajal, which 
signifies a thing’s “assigned, appointed, or specified, term or period.”25 In using this 
word as a general term that can be applied to various types of human ‘groupings,’ Ibn 
Khaldun emphasizes the temporal aspect of all forms of group identity.  
                                                
The usage of the word jīl, coupled with Ibn Khaldun’s description of what he 
finds unique about the peoples he studied, provide insight into which type of history 
scholars, those who write general histories or those who write particular histories, Ibn 
Khaldun wishes to be included. The fact that the Arabs and Berbers are both ‘natives’ to 
one and the same geographical region, i.e., the Maghrib, might suggest that Kitāb al-
‘Ibar should be included among works on particular histories. After all, by focusing on 
the Maghrib, Ibn Khaldun seems to share the objective of historians like Ibn Hayyān, 
“who turned from the absolute to the specific, and who held-back, with respect to 
generalization and encompassing [subjects], from that which is far-reaching,” and thus 
“comprehended the reports of [his own] borders and regions” (I.4: 6-7, cf. I.52: 14-18). 
However, this assumption has to be rejected when considering the fact that the Arabs and 
the Berbers constitute two distinct groups of people (jīl), and that each group in its turn 
consists of many sub-groups (ajyāl) separated by time, and informed by distinct social 
and political factors. Considering this fact, the study of the historical reports of one group 
 
25 Lane, ’-j-l  p.25. 
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of people is a massive undertaking. It means surveying an expansive material that covers 
many centuries and includes a variety of political, social, and religious conditions. Ibn 
Khaldun’s book seems to resemble more the work of al-Mas‘ūdī, who grasped the 
general conditions of religions, “dynasties, nations, and common affairs” (I.4: 5; cf. I.51-
52), than it does the work of Ibn Hayyān.  
Ibn Khaldun informs us that—through the form his composition took and the 
material upon which it is based—he accomplished something significant: “Thus I refined, 
in the best way, its inquiries, and I brought it very close to the understanding of the 
learned and the elite” (I.6: 2-3). The “it” which Ibn Khaldun uses here refers primarily to 
his book. However, since this book is a “book on history,” and not simply a history book, 
Ibn Khaldun is suggesting that he has, by implication, refined the “inquiries” of history. 
Recall that at the opening of his preface, Ibn Khaldun pointed to the crude nature of the 
“fine-art” of history, by claiming that it is a source of inspiration for the “vulgar and the 
dimwitted” (I.2: 10-11). This did not come as a surprise considering the fact, as he states 
it, that the “ignorant” had as much claim to understand history as the “learned” (I.2: 11-
12). Now that Ibn Khaldun—acting on his ‘aspiration’ to compose something better (I.5: 
13-14)—“produced a book on history,”26 this fine-art was brought “very close to the 
understanding of the learned and the elite” (I.6: 2-3). However, in order to achieve this 
great accomplishment, Ibn Khaldun informs us that he had to transform the traditional 
“path” (maslak), the familiar ways (manāhī), as well as the “method” (tarīqa) and “style” 
(uslūb) of historical studies (I.6: 3-4). 
In further describing his unique accomplishments, Ibn Khaldun briefly interrupts 
the flow of his formal style of writing. He does so by speaking directly to what seems to 
                                                 
26 Literally “generated a book on history” (ansha’atu fī al-tārīkhi kitāban; I.5: 14) 
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be a particular reader he has in mind. In addressing this reader, Ibn Khaldun states: “I 
have explained…that which will entertain you with the causes and reasons of what 
comes-to-be, and makes you cognizant how, through these [principles], the people of 
dynasties issue forth….” (I.6: 5-9). This is the first time in the preface where Ibn Khaldun 
abruptly switches to the second person singular pronoun, but it will not be the last, for Ibn 
Khaldun will frequently invite this reader in the Muqaddima to reflect (unzur), know 
(i’lam), understand (ifham), contemplate (ta’ammal), consider (i‘tabir), manage 
(tadabbar), or to cognize (i‘raf) an important subject or subjects of study. This personal 
tone, which Ibn Khaldun adopts selectively, suggests his addressee is more than simply 
the general “reader,”27 i.e., anyone who belongs to the class of the “learned and the elite.” 
But in the absence of any textual evidence to suggest that this addressee is a real 
historical personality, we are left with a third possibility: Ibn Khaldun is addressing a 
particular type of reader with whom he shares intellectual affinity. In other words, it is 
possible that Ibn Khaldun has in mind, not one, but two types of reader to whom he is 
addressing the book. The first type includes anyone who belongs to the “learned and the 
elite,” i.e., the educated class and those who are in positions of influence. The second 
type includes those individuals who are willing and able to engage Ibn Khaldun’s book 
on a deeper level.28  
                                                 
27 This is the way that Rosenthal understands the intention behind Ibn Khaldun’s abrupt usage of the 
second-person singular “you.” Accordingly he translates the aforementioned quote as: “In the work, I 
commented on civilization, on urbanization, and on the essential characteristics of human social 
organization, in a way that explains to the reader how and why things are as they are….” (Rosenthal, 
op.cit., 11). 
28 This possibility is not as problematic as might first appear. Ibn Khaldun’s own title seems to offer further 
support to this possibility. Recall that this title suggests a dual function for the book: it is first a Book of 
Allusions (Kitāb al-‘Ibar)—something which requires careful study, examination, and reflection—and, 
second, a Register of the Subject and Predicate—explicit, complete, and hence well argued and arranged 
statements. The latter case demands less with respect to the engagement with text than the first one.  
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For the first type of reader, Ibn Khaldun promises a new and improved fine-art of 
history; a kind of historical discipline that, supposedly, does not shy away from 
examining and giving account of the principles of conditions for the rise and fall of 
dynasties. For the second type of reader, Ibn Khaldun promises a grander reward: 
liberation from old ways of thinking and comprehension of the principles of change in 
human conditions. But this reward, apparently, can only be achieved through certain 
active engagement with the text; for Ibn Khaldun alludes to several steps that will have to 
be taken, by him and the reader, in order to acquire this reward. First, Ibn Khaldun will 
explain certain conditions that relate to culture and city-formation (or politics; 
tamaddun), as well as explain certain “essential accidents” that relate to human social 
organization. Second, such explanations, if understood by the reader, will impart learning 
that will bring joy (yumatti‘uka) and cognizance (yu‘arrifuka) with respect to the 
principles of change in general, and political order in particular. Third, the reader, 
through this learning and awareness, will slowly come to the realization of the extent of 
his attachment to old ways of thinking. It is only then that this reader will be able to 
liberate himself from habit of imitation (taqlīd) and, in the process, comprehend actual 
and potential conditions in human social organization. Note how Ibn Khaldun—who had 
to awaken his creativity out of its comfortable “habit of drowsiness and sleep” (I.5: 12-
13)—is not promising that such an act of liberation will be easy. The special reader might 
not be averse to think low of tradition and imitation. He could easily, for example, nod in 
agreement with Ibn Khaldun that “imitation, for the descendants-of-Adam, is venerable 
and high” (I.3: 6-7). But despite himself, as Ibn Khaldun suggests, he is not aware of the 
extent of his own attachment to what is venerable. Ibn Khaldun likens this attachment to 
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someone holding tight to an object believed to be of great value. The only way to 
convince such a person to let go is to show him by example the great joy that 
accompanies braving the hazards of the unfamiliar. This, it seems, is the deeper objective, 
the final end of Ibn Khaldun’s composition. 
 
III. ii. The Table of Contents 
Having described the idea for his book, the form it took, the material upon which 
it is based, and having alluded to the end to which it aims, Ibn Khaldun turns to a more 
schematic description of his book (I.6: 9-8). He informs us that this work consists of four 
parts, namely, “an introduction and three books” (I.6: 9). He lists the content of each part 
as follows: 
The Introduction, “On the Virtue of Knowing History, Verifying its Approaches, 
and Outlining the Errors of Historians.” 
The First Book, “On Culture, and mentioning what Essential Accidents Happen 
in it: of Kingship, Authority, Income, Livelihood, Arts, Sciences, and their 
Reasons and Causes Thereof.” 
The Second Book, “On the Reports of the Arabs, their Generations, and their 
Dynasties, from the Beginning of Creation, to this Time;” In [this Book] 
reference will be made to Some of [the Arab’s] contemporaries from among the 
famous nations and their dynasties, for example, the Nabataeans, the Syrians, the 
Persians, the Israelites, the Copts, the Greeks, the Turks, and the Rūm [i.e., 
Byzantines]. 
The Third Book, “On the Reports of the Berbers and of Zanāta who belong to 
them, and Mentioning their Origins and their Generations, and of what was for 
them in the Habitats of the Maghrib; In Particular of Kingships and Dynasties.” 
(I.6) 
 
Though not unconventional, this division of the “book on history” (I.5: 14) into “three 
books” (I.6: 9) is significant. Through this book-division, Ibn Khaldun indicates the 
possibility of treating each major part of his book as a distinct and complete subject. The 
history of the two groups who “cultivated the Maghrib” (I.5: 17), the Arabs and the 
Berbers, will be told in the second and third books. Through the titles of these two books, 
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we notice Ibn Khaldun’s intention to follow different patterns in discussing the reports of 
each group. Of these two peoples, the Arabs are presented as the ‘older’ group with 
vastly larger generations.29 Their story somehow starts with the beginning of creation and 
is more tied with the history of the other famous nations of the world than that of the 
more regionally isolated Berbers. But if the history of the Arabs will be given greater 
breadth than that of the Berbers, the history of the latter will be given more depth. As 
seen in the titles listed, Ibn Khaldun is going to speak, in the second book, about the 
Arabs, their generations, and their dynasties. In the third book, he is going to speak of the 
Berbers, one of their most dominant tribes, their generations, kingdoms, and dynasties, as 
well as their unique relation to the Maghrib. Though the history of the Maghrib, as Ibn 
Khaldun explicitly states, is not complete without the historical reports of the Arabs (I.5-
6: 17-2), it properly begins, he implicitly indicates, with the history of the Berbers (I.6: 
17-18; cf. I.51: 10-15). 
 Another interesting aspect of this division of the work has to do with the 
introduction and the first book. Out of the seven volumes that constitute the final product 
that is Kitāb al-‘Ibar, the contents of the introduction and the first book will take-up only 
one volume, namely, the first—which is later dubbed, by Ibn Khaldun, the Muqaddima 
(Introduction). The fact that both the original introduction and the first book constitute 
half of the plan of the work speaks to their conceptual importance for Kitāb al-‘Ibar. The 
content of each of these two parts, viewed in the context of what has been discussed in 
the preface, reveals their fundamental significance for Ibn Khaldun’s project. 
                                                 
29 As mentioned in the first chapter, Ibn Khaldun’s second book consists of four volumes (vols. II-V). By 
contrast the third book, which contains the reports of the Berbers, consists of two volumes (vols. VI-VII). It 
is also worth remembering that Ibn Khaldun’s claim to fame as a historian primarily derives from his 
treatment of the history of the Berbers in particular and al-Maghrib in general. 
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 The title of the first book indicates that Ibn Khaldun’s historical study of the 
Maghrib will be preceded by the examination of culture and certain “essential accidents” 
that happen in culture: kingship, authority, income, livelihood, arts, and sciences. 
According to Aristotelian logic an “essential accident” of a subject is that which does not 
define the subject but is an attribute of that subject alone.30 As such, Ibn Khaldun’s usage 
of this term is suggestive of the type of examination he will engage with: it is a 
philosophic (or theoretical) analysis that seeks to identify the logical connection between 
the nature of culture and the political, economic, and intellectual production that comes to 
be as a result of culture.31 The importance of understanding this logical connection before 
the study of history is something which Ibn Khaldun has already alluded to in the preface. 
For in explaining how it is within the ability of the clear-sighted critic to judge and 
evaluate the works of past historians, Ibn Khaldun notes that “culture has nature, through 
its conditions reports can be related, and accounts and historical materials can be 
predicated” (I.4: 1-2). 
 If we accept the assertion that the study of culture has to precede the study of 
history, then we need to reconsider an earlier part of Ibn Khaldun’s discussion in the 
preface, namely, the one which superimposes the objectives of the “reflective-person” 
against the reports provided in the books of the historians (I.5: 4-5). Broadly speaking, 
the reflective-person (al-nāzir), being theoretically oriented (from the word for theory, 
naz ar), is someone who, in studying the particulars of a certain subject of knowledge, 
seeks the general principles that governs these particulars. The books of the historians, as 
Ibn Khaldun informs us, by and large deal with the particular accounts of past dynasties 
                                                 
30 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I.10: 76b11-22. 
31 Following Aristotelian logic, what is accidental in culture is that which is extrinsic to the nature of 
culture; what is essential in the accidents of culture, is that which can only exist as a result of culture. 
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(I.2: 13; I.4: 3, 13; I.5: 1, 18; I.6: 7, 13, 15, 18), i.e., they provide us with accounts of the 
most dominant form of political rule in history. Therefore, the primary reason why a 
reflective-person would study the books of the historians is to find out the “principals and 
ranks” (I.5: 4) of the conditions that govern the rise and fall of dynasties. But the books 
of the historians, as Ibn Khaldun claims, fail to provide such information. The implied 
reason for this failure is the intellectual ineptitude of the authors of these books (I.4-5: 
10-3).32  However, the larger context of Ibn Khaldun’s prefatory discussion, along with 
the plan of his work, suggests a deeper problem: dynastic rule, like any other form of 
political rule in history, is an essential accident of culture. And if this is so, then one 
cannot be expected to find the principles governing an essential accident like dynastic 
rule, without first understanding the nature of the thing to which dynastic rule is an 
accident, i.e., without first understanding the nature of culture. Through the title of his 
first book, Ibn Khaldun suggests that he will address this problem before proceeding to 
give his own historical account. 
 I turn now to the title of the introduction. The first four Arabic words in this title 
are “fī fadl ‘ilm al-tārīkh,” which could be translated as “On the Virtue of Knowing 
History”—i.e., the way I chose to translated above—or  it could have the alternative 
translation, “On the Virtue of the Science of History.” Having gone through the 
discussion of the preface, and explained how Ibn Khaldun wishes to encourage subjecting 
history to scientific examination—rather than believing, as many do, that history is part 
                                                 
32 The ineptness of these historians can partly be explained by the fact they did not understand the nature of 
culture, and hence their reports lacked logical coherence. It is telling however, that Ibn Khaldun himself did 
not explicitly mention ignorance of the nature of culture as one of the reasons for the deficiency in the 
reports of these historians. 
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of wisdom—the reasons for my choice of translation is clear.33 Now for those readers 
who might not have been satisfied with Ibn Khaldun’s general argument regarding the 
need for the rational examination of history, he promises them a more substantial 
discussion in the introduction. The title of the introduction also promises those readers 
partial to the fine-art of history, who might not be convinced of the need to reform this 
fine-art, that he will provide a substantial discussion that will verify history’s 
“approaches” and outline “the errors of historians.” The fact that Ibn Khaldun’s argument 
for the virtue of knowing history will be presented against the background of “Verifying 
its Approaches and Outlining the Errors of Historians,” suggests his intention is not only 
to reform, but also to transform the understanding of historical inquiry. 
 
III. iii. The Scope and Limits of the Book 
 Before presenting the outline of his work, Ibn Khaldun informed us that his book 
will cover the historical reports of the Arabs and the Berbers, which are “the two groups 
who cultivated the Maghrib through the times” (I.5: 17). However, his outline shows that, 
in addition to the histories of the Arabs and the Berbers in the Maghrib, he is going to 
discuss the histories of other nations and dynasties that are neither Arab nor Berber. Ibn 
Khaldun’s next discussion explains, among other things, the reasons for this addition. He 
begins this explanation with what seems to be a digression: 
Then, when the journey to the East came to pass—in order to observe its 
illuminations, to fulfill the religious duty and custom in its places of 
                                                 
33 Although, as I argued in the first chapter, Ibn Khaldun has some interest in giving the impression that 
history can be science, the choice of knowing over science in translating ‘ilm is still justifiable. Since a 
careful examination of the Muqaddima reveals that Ibn Khaldun does not conceive of the “fine-art” of 
history as a science, the best translation of ‘ilm has to be the one that preserves the ambiguity in Ibn 
Khaldun’s usage of the term. “Knowing” is the best choice here since to “know something,” has a range of 




circumambulation and [sacred] visitation, and to behold its relics that are in its 
records and scriptures—I so gathered reports I lacked regarding the foreign kings 
in those localities, and the Turkish dynasties in regions they possessed. I joined 
these [new reports] to what I have already written down. I inserted it in the 
mention of those generations’ contemporaries, from among the areas’ nations and 
the kings of metropolises and districts who came from them. [In this] I followed 
the way of abridgment and summary, substituting the abstruse for that which can 
be easily obtained, and proceeding through general reasons to report on the 
particular. Thus, this [book] well comprehends34 the reports of the created, 
assuages difficulties in dispersed wise-maxims (al-h ikam), and gives causes and 
reasons for occurrences in dynasties, and has become a depository for wisdom 
and a receptacle for history. (I.6-7: 18-10)35 
 
Ibn Khaldun contrasts here two types of historical studies provided in his book: a 
relatively detailed history of the Arabs and the Berbers in the Maghrib, and an abridged 
history of the non-Arab/non-Berber nations and dynasties which ruled lands east of the 
Maghrib. He indirectly cautions the reader not to expect exhaustive historical accounts of 
Eastern nations, since his reports follow “the way of abridgment and summary, and 
[substitute] the abstruse for that which can be easily obtained” (I.7: 6-7). The way he 
treats the new material, which he discovered through his “journey to the East,” reinforces 
this cautionary note: since he never intended to give a comprehensive account of the East, 
he uses from the newly found material only the most elementary information to fill 
historical gaps in his account.  
But what is the purpose of these abridged histories? If we understand the term 
“general reasons” as a reference to the abridged histories of Eastern nations—which is, 
                                                 
34 The phrase “well comprehends” is a loose rendition of the more literal translation “comprehensively 
comprehend the reports of the created.” 
35 Ibn Khaldun’s passing reference to the “spiritual aspect” of his journey to the East provides a practical 
reminder of how “the passing of days changes conditions and how it transforms the customs of nations and 
generations” (I.4: 12-13). The East, which is the seat of the two holiest sights in Islam and is the origin of 
the two most powerful Arab dynasties (the Umayyad and the Abbasid) has long ceased to be under Arab 
control. The memory of those other “foreign kings” and “Turkish dynasties” who replaced the dynastic rule 
of the Arabs is far removed from the present—or at least from the present memory of the people of the 
Maghrib—that Ibn Khaldun had to go to great lengths, geographically speaking, in order to recover some 
of their historical accounts. This passing reference also communicates how, with the declining power of the 
Arabs in the East, the Maghrib has become a more isolated region.  
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loosely speaking, ‘world history’ minus the history of the Arabs and the Berbers36—and 
if we understand the term “particular” as a reference to the histories of the Arabs and the 
Berbers in the Maghrib, then we can answer the question as follows: the abridged 
histories of Eastern nations are supposed to provide the larger historical context (the 
general reasons) which would allow Ibn Khaldun to locate, chart, and report on the 
“particular” histories of the Arabs and the Berbers. By showing how the histories of 
Eastern nations fulfill a role in writing the histories of the Maghrib, Ibn Khaldun affirms 
in this passage the overall textual unity of his historiographic project. 
 However, after noting that his historical work is somewhat deficient with respect 
to the history of Eastern nations, Ibn Khaldun follows his statement with what appears to 
be a non-sequitur declaring “Thus this [book] well comprehends the reports of the 
created, assuages difficulties in dispersed wise-maxims, and gives causes and reasons for 
happenings in dynasties” (I.7: 8-9). The word istaw‘aba, for “comprehend,” is derived 
from the verb-root w-‘-b, which literally means “to take the whole.” To say of an object 
that it ‘comprehends’ (istaw‘abat) something means that that object “was large enough to 
contain the thing; it held the thing, or received it into its capacity.”37 How, then, would a 
work that disproportionately focuses on the histories of two groups of people (living in a 
relatively isolated region of the world) be said to comprehend “the reports of the 
created”? 
 An adequate answer to this question begins with considering the purpose of Ibn 
Khaldun’s history of the Maghrib. After all, it is this history that occupies the bulk of Ibn 
Khaldun’s historiographic project. Since Ibn Khaldun did not explicitly state a purpose 
                                                 
36 I use the expression “loosely speaking,” because Ibn Khaldun’s ‘world history,’ omits the history of two 
important nations, namely, the Indians and the Chinese. 
37 Lane, w-‘-b 
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for his history, we are compelled to look for clues as to this purpose in what he has 
already stated. In discussing the content of his book, and in outlining its plan, Ibn 
Khaldun shows his intention to write a general history of the Maghrib, i.e., not a 
particular history of a particular Arab/Berber generation or dynasty. In this, as I have 
already argued, Ibn Khaldun follows the pattern set in the general histories of “al-
Mas‘ūdī and whoever followed his way” (I.4: 2-5). In following this pattern, Ibn Khaldun 
seems to share something of his (al-Mas‘ūdī’s) objective. Part of al-Mas‘ūdī’s 
objection—as Ibn Khaldun hints in the preface (I.4: 2-10) and later makes explicit in the 
introduction (I.50-51: 18-7)—is practical in character, namely, to provide through his 
general history the historical context that is necessary to facilitate the growth of historical 
knowledge about the particular events of the past. At the very least, therefore, Ibn 
Khaldun intends his general history of the Maghrib to provide the necessary historical 
background allowing future historians of this region to write particular historical reports.  
We see here two parallel movements from the “general reasons” to the “report on 
the particular.” First, the procedure which Ibn Khaldun follows in his book by using the 
general history of Eastern nations and dynasties to report on the more particular histories 
of the Arabs and Berbers in the Maghrib; and, second, the general history of the Maghrib 
which Ibn Khaldun sets as the guide for future historians of this region to report on 
particular events. This parallelism suggests that the limitations which Ibn Khaldun 
exposes in the first relationship also applies to the second, i.e., that the general history of 
the Maghrib should be seen as an ‘abridgement’ or a ‘summary’ that functions as the 
“general reasons” facilitating the “report on the particular.” This should not come as a 
surprise, for by its very nature, a general historical account cannot say everything about 
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its subject, compelled as it is to follow “the way of abridgment and summary, substituting 
the abstruse for that which can be easily obtained” (I.7: 6-7).38 
 It is important to note here that, for scholars like al-Mas‘ūdī and Ibn Khaldun, the 
practical intention—i.e., the intention to make possible the writing of particular historical 
reports—is not the only objective that underlie their writing of general histories. In 
introducing the subject of the fine-art of history, Ibn Khaldun points at a theoretical 
concern that seems to inform his interest in history. The individual reports, which the 
surface of history presents—which serve as elegant sources for instruction and 
entertainment (I.2: 13-14)—collectively “bring down to us the affairs of the created: how 
their conditions have been altered, how through [these altered conditions] dynasties 
expanded, and how they cultivated the Earth until they were called for their departing 
journey and the coming forth of their moment of extinction” (I.2: 14-16). So when 
someone like al-Mas‘ūdī writes a general history of the world, he not only aims to assist 
future historians to write particular histories, but also seeks to paint a general picture of 
the “affairs of the created”: a theoretical picture that makes out of the diverse and 
continuously changing human conditions a comprehensible whole. It is through general 
accounts of history like these that one is able to form judgments on particular historical 
events. But Ibn Khaldun—while accepting the practical necessity of general histories as 
gateways for the pursuit of historical knowledge of particular events—appears to reject 
the notion that history, in and of itself, can serve as the medium for constructing a proper 
theory about history. We saw evidence for this view in Ibn Khaldun’s remark that the 
                                                 
38 This is a problem which al-Mas‘ūdī faced when he wrote his own general history (I.52-53: 14-3) and this 
is what Ibn Khaldun himself faced when he wrote his own general history (I.7: 2-4, I.52: 17-18). Of course, 
there is an obvious reason why Ibn Khaldun did not make explicit this point about the limitation of his 
general history of the Maghrib: to avoid compromising the authoritative character of his historical account 
in this prefatory discussion. 
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unsatisfactory works of many a historian can be traced back to their failure in 
understanding how “the passing of days change conditions and…transforms the customs 
of nations and generations” (I.4: 12-13). What Ibn Khaldun criticized here, was not these 
historians’ failure to properly chronicle their particular accounts. Rather, what he 
disparaged is their failure to appreciate the qualitative difference between, on the one 
hand, the conditions of events earlier described by the general historians, and, on the 
other, the conditions of the events that these historians concern themselves with 
recording. Later in his introduction, Ibn Khaldun will make this point even clearer by 
arguing, for example, how “obliviousness regarding the changing conditions of nations 
and generations—which is the consequence of the change in times and the passing of 
days—is a hidden [reason] for committing errors with respect to history. It is a strong 
ailment and deeply hidden; for it does not take place until long periods of time have 
passed, so that almost no individual, from among the created, is able to wise-up to it” 
(I.44: 7-11). It is not possible, according to Ibn Khaldun, to form a theoretical conception 
of history based on, or based mostly on, historical reports (whether these are general or 
particular). The reliance on (or the exclusive reliance on) historical reports to form a 
theoretical conception of history, means the eventual failure of this theory to withstand 
the test of time. It is safe to assume, therefore, that Ibn Khaldun’s general history is not 
intended to serve as a general theory of history. 
 We end up here with two important observations about Ibn Khaldun’s general 
history. First, despite its comparatively detailed picture of the histories of the Arabs and 
the Berbers in the Maghrib, this history is not intended to provide an exhaustive historical 
account. Second, despite its abridgment and summary (i.e., abstraction from actual 
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historical events) it is not intended to be a theoretical account of history. How can we 
then explain Ibn Khaldun’s claim that his book “well comprehends the reports of the 
created”? Or to put it differently, in what way does this book “take the whole” 
(yastaw‘ib) of the reports of the created? Ibn Khaldun clues us in on the answer in the 
conclusion of this passage; for after listing the accomplishments of his book, he declares 
that this composition has consequently become “a depository for wisdom and a receptacle 
for history” (I.7: 10). Here, Ibn Khaldun reminds us once again that despite the wide 
range of historical information that this book covers, it is not only concerned with history, 
but also concerned with wisdom.  
 Wisdom (al-hikma) is, of course, the object of philosophy and the antagonist of 
imitation (taqlīd). A declared objective of Ibn Khaldun’s book is to liberate his special 
readers from the habit of imitation, making it possible for them “to behold conditions of 
times and groups that were before [their] time and that will be after it” (I.6: 8-9). It 
almost goes without saying that to behold the conditions of past and future events is not 
the same thing as having a detailed knowledge of the facts regarding past events and/or 
the ability to predict future events. For one thing, since the “passing of days change 
conditions and…transforms the customs of nations and generations” (I.4: 12-13), then no 
amount of detailed knowledge of past events could allow one to predict the conditions of 
future events, let alone to predict events in the future. To behold (al-wuqūf) the 
conditions of past and future events, like the knowledge (al-‘ilm) of the origins (al-us ūl) 
of occurances (I.4: 16), the consideration (al-i‘tibār) of species in relation to its genera 
(I.4: 16), the search for the principles (al-mabādi’) and ranks (al-marātib) of conditions, 
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and the explanation of the essential accidents (al-‘awārid al-dhātiyya) of culture (I.6: 11), 
are all elements of philosophical inquiry as opposed to historical inquiry.  
Historical inquiry, as Ibn Khaldun conceives of it, is concerned with answers to 
what-questions: what happened in certain battles, in dynasties, and in nations (I.2: 12-13). 
But these answers, even if they were once given by trustworthy eyewitnesses (I.2-3: 19-
1), are heavily dependent on the reliability and competence of those who later transmitted 
them (I.3: 3-8), and are easily vulnerable to the manipulations of the capricious (I.3: 1-2). 
The instructive value of these answers, as Ibn Khaldun informs us, does not go far 
beyond the significance of the occasional proverbs (I.2: 13-14). For, in light of the fact 
that the “passing of days changes conditions…and transforms the customs of nations and 
generations,” what lessons can we possibly learn from answers that are time bound? 
Philosophical inquiry, in contrast, seeks answers to why-questions, i.e., it inquires after 
the causes, reasons, principles, and conditions for the event. In doing so, philosophical 
inquiry seeks what lies beneath the surface of reports to find answers that can be 
generalized and that can withstand the test of time. 
 It is not that Ibn Khaldun is indifferent to historical inquiry, or that he is not 
concerned with the truth of answers to what-questions. However, through his general 
history, Ibn Khaldun casts his historical net wide enough that he becomes less reliant on 
the truth of each reported event, on the trustworthiness of each eyewitness to an event, or 
on the competence of each transmitter of a report about an event. This is consistent with 
Ibn Khaldun’s advice to the reader on how to deal with those historians whose authority 
has been questioned on religious ground: “The clear-sighted critic is his own judge in 
falsifying or considering them with respect to what they include in their transmission [of 
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reports]. For culture has nature, through its conditions reports can be related, and 
accounts and historical materials can be predicated” (I.3-4: 20-2). This advice by Ibn 
Khaldun indicates that knowledge of the nature of culture can falsify a report or deem it 
worthy of rational consideration, but it does not necessarily prove the truth of the report. 
Of course, the ability to falsify a report means that there is some standard, the nature of 
culture, which would allow one to judge the likelihood of an event; and it is in discerning 
the likelihood of events that the insightful-critic is able to consider (i‘tibār) that which is 
valuable in an event. This is the method Ibn Khaldun followed, and this is the subject of 
his first book. And it is largely because of this first book, i.e., the Muqaddima, that Ibn 
Khaldun is able to claim that his Kitāb al-‘Ibar comprehends well—istaw‘aba, i.e., “to 
take the whole” or “receive it into its capacity”—“the reports of the created,” assuages 
difficulties “in dispersed wise-maxims,” and provides “causes and reasons for 
occurrences in dynasties.”39 
 Ibn Khaldun concludes this part of his discussion by reemphasizing the 
uniqueness of his composition. He likens his book to a siwān (depository) for wisdom 
and to a jirāb (receptacle) for history. Both the s iwān and the jirāb are types of containers 
whose respective forms are determined by their respective functions. The s iwān is a 
chest, a closet, a safe, or a depository in which an object of value is “preserved, kept, laid 
up, taken care of, or reserved.”40 The jirāb, on the other hand, is primarily “a bag or 
                                                 
39 There is a clear contrast between this passage coming near the conclusion of the preface (I.7) and the 
preface’s introduction (I.2). The contrast exposes some of the ways in which Ibn Khaldun’s procedure in 
his Kitāb al-‘Ibar differs from the hitherto practiced fine-art of history. If, as the beginning of the preface 
indicates, the fine-art of history “bring down to us the affairs of the created: how their conditions have been 
altered, how through [these altered conditions] dynasties expanded, and how they cultivated the earth until 
they were called for their departing-journey, and the coming forth of their moment of extinction” (I.2: 14-
16). Ibn Khaldun’s Kitāb al-‘Ibar, in contrast, “comprehends well the reports of the created, assuages 
difficulties in dispersed wise maxims, and gives causes and reasons for occurrences in dynasties.” 
40 Lane, s-w-n 
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receptacle for traveling-provisions and for goods and utensils.”41 In containing the 
provisions necessary for surviving long journeys, the jirāb is an indispensable tool for 
travelers. Now, the figurative association between traveling and historical research is the 
first image Ibn Khaldun makes in his preface, namely, when he likened the great time and 
effort spent in pursuing historical information to “caravans and [individual] travelers” 
(I.2: 10-11) seeking a faraway objective. He alludes to this figurative association in 
different parts of the preface, as when, for example, he likens the uncritical transmitter of 
reports to a porter whose defining role is that he “carries and transports” historical reports 
(I.3: 9); or when he described how knowledge of the nature of culture allows the 
historical tales and artifacts to be “carried over” (tuhmal; I.4: 1-2)42, i.e., to allow these 
tales and artifacts to be judged according to a firm standard. Of course, Ibn Khaldun took 
this association between traveling and historical research beyond abstract allusions, when 
he informed us how, during his spiritually motivated journey to the East, he was able to 
gather historical reports not available in his homeland in the West, i.e., the Maghrib. So it 
is in keeping with this theme of travel and history that Ibn Khaldun likens his own book 
to a contraption which—besides containing valuable historical reports—makes possible 
the continued pursuit of historical knowledge. Like the jirāb for travel, Ibn Khaldun sees 
his book as an indispensable practical tool for historical research. 
 The image of Ibn Khaldun’s book as a jirāb—a contraption often associated with 
transportation and travel, and which is supposed to contain common but necessary 
                                                 
41 Lane, j-r-b 
42 The word tuhmal, from the substantive h-m-l, literally means “to be carried,” is also a logical term that 
means “to be predicated.” In my discussion of the notable scholars of history (Part I, Section ii, in this 
chapter) I translated tuhmal according to its usage as a logical term. Had I translated it according to its 
common everyday usage, the sentence would read: “For culture has nature, through its conditions reports 
can be related, and accounts and historical materials can be carried over” (I.4: 1-2).  
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goods—is in sharp contrast to the book’s other image as a s iwān—a contraption often 
associated with long term storage and preservation, and which usually contains goods of 
rare value. The fact that Kitāb al-‘Ibar places history in a jirāb and wisdom in a s iwān 
speaks to how Ibn Khaldun intends by his book to place each subject (i.e., history and 
wisdom) within its proper context, so that wisdom would be protected from those who 
confuse it with historical knowledge.  
 
III. iv. The Conclusion 
 In concluding his preface, Ibn Khaldun provides a brief explanation for the title of 
his book,43 offers final remarks on the defining qualities of this book, and ends with a 
direct appeal to the scholarly community. He begins: 
And since it comprises the [historical] reports of the Arabs and the Berbers, both 
urban and tent-dwellers, making reference to the great dynasties that were 
contemporary with them, and eloquently-expressing, with narrations and 
allusions, the principles of conditions and their subsequent attributes, I called it 
Book of Allusions, and Register of the Subject and the Predicate, Regarding the 
Days of the Arabs, the Foreigners, and the Berbers, and those of their 
Contemporaries who Possessed the Greatest Authority. And I did not leave a 
thing with respect to the origins of generations and dynasties, the synchronism of 
the earliest nations, the reasons for the change and transformation in past 
centuries and [within] religions, or of what accidents happen in culture—[such 
as] a dynasty and a religion, a city and an encampment, glory and humiliation, 
abundance and scarcity, science and art, income and loss, revolving conditions 
that are prevalent, primitiveness and civilization, a matter-of-fact or [something] 
to be expected—until I comprehended its totality, and clarified its demonstratives 
and causes. Hence this book has become unique, with respect to what it contains 
of strange sciences and proximate veiled wise-maxims. After this, I am certain of 
my deficiency among the [distinguished] people of the times, confessing my 
powerlessness to continue with such affairs, wishing from people with 
benevolent hands and wide-spread cognizance (al-ma‘ārif al-mutasi‘at al-fadā’) 
to look (al-nazar) with a critical eye, a non-compliant one, and with resolution 
fix and recover whatever [errors] they find; for trade among the people of 
knowledge is rewarding, confession [of shortcomings] is a rescuer from blame, 
and brotherly goodwill is something hoped for. I ask God to make our deeds pure 
in His sight. He suffices me, and He is the best of protectors. (I.7-8: 10-9).  
 
                                                 
43 Since in chapter 2 I have already discussed the title in detail, my discussion of it here will be succinct.  
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 Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of the title—in which he indicates that this single composition 
is both a book and a register—coming right after his depiction of it as both a jirāb and a 
s iwān, reemphasizes what we have already discussed regarding the dual aspects to Kitāb 
al-‘Ibar. Here, however, Ibn Khaldun spells out a unity of purpose in both aspects, 
namely, to eloquently-express (ufsih), “with narrations (dhikrā) and allusions (‘ibar), the 
principles of conditions and whatever predicate subsequently comes.” But this supposed 
unity of purpose—taken at face value—is somewhat misleading, for it suggests that Kitāb 
al-‘Ibar says the same thing in two different modes. As I argued, this is a suggestion that 
Ibn Khaldun wishes to promote in order to encourage the rational examination of history. 
But this suggestion would be an accurate expression of Ibn Khaldun’s full intention if his 
only aim was the pursuit of historical knowledge for its own sake, i.e., if he was not 
concerned with the larger objective of protecting the pursuit of wisdom.  
 Having given an explanation for the choice of his title, Ibn Khaldun goes on to 
inform the reader, one last time, of what is truly unique about his book. This information, 
coming on the heels of explaining the title, indicates that this explanation is not yet 
adequate to capture the fullness of Ibn Khaldun’s intention. Besides the “narrations and 
allusions” regarding the “principles of conditions and whatever predicate subsequently 
comes, Ibn Khaldun adds four more items that his book comprehends as well as clarifies 
their demonstratives and causes: (1) the beginning of groups and dynasties; (2) the 
synchronism of the earliest nations; (3) the reasons for change and transformation 
through time and within religious communities; and, most importantly, (4) the accidents 
that happen in culture. These items—rationally comprehended, demonstrated, and 




have seen in the table of contents, are the subject of Ibn Khaldun’s first book, i.e., the 
Muqaddima. Accordingly, it is the Muqaddima, and not History that contains “strange 
sciences” and “proximate veiled wise-maxims.” What comes after the Muqaddima is the 
two books on the Arabs and the Berbers, and those of their “Contemporaries who 
Possessed the Greatest Authority. And it is in relation to his History that Ibn Khaldun is 
“certain of [his] deficiency,” and for which he asks “the people of knowledge and wide-
spread cognizance” to “fix and re-cover whatever [errors] they find.” With this veiled 
request Ibn Khaldun brings his preface to a conclusion. 
 
Chapter 4 
The Science of Culture and the Limitations of the Fine-Art of History 
 
In this chapter, I provide an analysis of Ibn Khaldun’s original introduction, 
which, as argued in Chapter One, contains the mother thought that gives structural unity 
to the rest of Kitāb al-‘Ibar. This chapter will be divided into four parts: In the first part, I 
present an outline of the original introduction. In the second part, I explore the ideas 
presented in Ibn Khaldun’s opening statement. In the third part, I discuss in detail three 
major historical reports Ibn Khaldun uses as examples of substandard scholarship. 
Finally, in the fourth part, I examine Ibn Khaldun’s concluding arguments. 
 
I. The Outline of the Original Introduction to Kitāb al-‘Ibar 
Ibn Khaldun’s original introduction consists of forty-seven pages. The general 
structure of this introduction seems to follow the three parts division set fourth its title: 
“On the Virtue of Knowing History, Verifying its Approaches1 and Outlining the Errors 
and Fancies that Befall the Historians, as well as Mentioning some of the Reasons for 
these [Errors and Fancies].” However, the conclusion to the original introduction adds a 
fourth part not mentioned in its title. That is, the outline of Ibn Khaldun’s introduction 
contains four parts, which can be outline as follows: 
  
                                                 
1 The word madhāhib, which I have translated here as “approaches,” is usually translated as “schools,” 
“methods,” or “doctrines.” As will become obvious in my analysis of the introduction, Ibn Khaldun does 
not provide here, or anywhere else in the Muqaddima, a systematic analysis of the historians “schools,” 
“methods,” or “doctrines.” What he provides instead is a general discussions of the political aims and 
objectives that historians supposedly pursue when they record historical events. The word “approach” thus 
seems to be the more applicable term regarding Ibn Khaldun’s treatment of the works of historians. 
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I. The Opening Statement: On the Virtue of Knowing History (I.8-9: 10-9) 
II. Verifying History’s Orientations and Outlining the Errors and Fancies 
that Befall the Historians (I.9-50: 10-18) 
A. On the enumeration of figures, wealth, and troops (I.9-18: 9-17): 
1. On the troops of the Israelites (I.9-13: 9-10) 
2. On the military campaigns of the Tubba, the ancient kings 
of Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula (I.13-16: 10-19) 
3. On the interpretation of Surat al-Fajr in the Quran (I.16-
18: 19-17) 
B. On narratives regarding moral and political conduct (I.18-29: 17-16) 
1. On al-Rashīd’s destruction of the Barmakids (I.18-26: 17-
12) 
2. On the relationship between al-Ma’mūn and Judge Yahyā 
Ibn Aktham (I.26-28: 12-12) 
3. On al-Ma’mūn’s marriage to Burān, the daughter of 
Hassan Ibn Sahal (I.28-29: 2-16) 
C. On stories regarding the lineage of significant political personalities 
(I.29-43: 16-4) 
1. On the lineage of the Ubaydid, the Shī‘a caliphs in al-
Qayrawān and Cairo (I.29-34: 16-10) 
2. On the lineage of the Idrisids (I.34-40: 10-16) 
3. On the vilification of Imām al-Mahdī, the founder of the 
Almohad dynasty (I.40-43: 7-4) 
III. Mentioning Some of the Reasons for the Errors and Fancies that Befall 
the Historians (I.43-50: 40-18) 
IV. Conclusion: A Definition of History, A statement regarding an Important 
Goal of Kitāb al-‘Ibar, and A Note to the Reader (I.50-55: 18-15) 
 
In this outline, we distinguish the four parts of Ibn Khaldun’s original introduction, while 
subdividing the lengthier parts into their separate discussion. The first part contains an 
opening statement regarding the importance of history as well as a discussion regarding 
the need to subject history to rational examination. Although this statement is brief 
(barely a page in length), it presents the first explicit argument regarding the political and 
moral significance of studying history, and, as such, I will give it careful scrutiny. The 
second part of the introduction contains Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of the errors of 
previous historians. It provides three groups of historical reports, each providing three 
examples of unsound historical reporting. My analysis of this second part of the 
introduction looks mainly at the first example in each of the three groups of reports that 
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set forth the moral and political theme(s) Ibn Khaldun wishes to feature in each of these 
groups. The third part of the introduction provides a discussion of a major error that both 
historians and those who read historical works fall into while making analogies between 
the past and the present, namely, the failure to appreciate how, with time, the conditions 
and customs of people change. As we will see in our examination of the third part, it is in 
order to address this problem that Ibn Khaldun develops the all-important science of 
culture. The fourth and final part contrasts two types of historical studies, one particular 
and the other general. The particular type of historical study is inspired by the technical 
understanding of history as reports about particular events occurring in a specific time 
and place; the general serves as some kind of a broad theoretical foundation underlying 
the historian’s work. 
 
II. The Opening Statement 
As noted in the outline above of Ibn Khaldun’s introduction, he begins with a 
brief discussion of the virtue of knowing history, proceeds with a much longer discussion 
that outlines errors committed by previous historians, and concludes with what appears to 
be a definition of his subject matter. In this way, Ibn Khaldun allows the reader to think 
through the practical limits of the fine-art of history before considering the limits 
imposed by his final technical definition.  
True to the opening of his title, “On the virtue of knowing history…,” Ibn 
Khaldun begins the opening statement to his introduction as follows: 
Know that the fine-art of history is a fine-art whose approach is dear, whose 
benefit is plentiful, and whose goal is noble; for it allows us to behold the 
conditions of those who passed—of nations with respect to their morals, of 
prophets with respect to their ways of life, and of kings with respect to their 
dynasties and politics—until the benefit of role-modeling in these (al-iqtidā’ fī 
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dhālik) is complete for the one who seeks it in religious and worldly conditions. 
Thus it requires2 numerous undertakings and various [types of] cognizance, as 
well as good reflection and steadfastness, which would lead their companion to 
the truth and would prevent him from slips and errors. For if nothing more than 
the transmission were considered in [historical] reports—[by] not judging the 
roots of custom, the foundations of politics, the nature of culture and the 
conditions in human social organization, and [by] not reasoning-by-analogy of 
what is hidden and remote in these [reports] with what is witnessed and at hand 
[for us]—then it is possible not to safeguard, with respect to these [reports], 
against stumbling, falling, and swaying from genuine truthfulness. Historians, 
commentators, and the imāms of transmission have often fallen into errors 
regarding narratives of [past] events because, with respect to these [narratives], 
they relied exclusively on the [validity of] transmission, regardless of quality—
they did not display them against their roots, make analogies with what is similar 
to them, or sound their depths with the gauge of wisdom, and [while] beholding 
the nature of generated things, and adjudicating reflection and insightfulness 
regarding the reports—thus they strayed and got lost in the wilderness of fancy 
and error. (I.8-9: 12-7) 
 
Ibn Khaldun begins his introduction by impressing upon his reader to “know” 
(i‘lam) something he assumes the reader either does not know or knows insufficiently, 
namely, the great moral and political value of history as a product of fine-art. According 
to him, this fine-art provides us with a unique opportunity to stop and behold (yuqifunā) 
the conditions (ahwāl) of past nations, prophets, and kings. This ability to reflect on past 
human actions, we are told, is a necessary final step for those individuals who wish to 
find the proper model for actions regarding religious and worldly affairs. The fact that 
Ibn Khaldun is careful to indicate that the historical report brings moral and political 
guidance to completion (hattā tatim fā’idat al-iqtidā’) is a good indication that the 
historical information it conveys is not the sufficient condition for the sought-after 
political and moral benefit. Besides historical reports, we need additional types of 
cognizance or knowledge (ma‘ārif mutanawwi‘a). But it is not immediately clear if these 
ma‘ārif are needed primarily for the investigation and authentication of the historical 
                                                 
2 The phrase “fa-huwa muhtāj ilā” can be translated as either “thus it requires,” or “thus he requires.” As I 
will argue shortly, these alternative translations lead to two different interpretations. 
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report, or if they are needed to draw out the contemporary moral and political 
significance—the ‘ibra or allusion—of the historical report. As I have noted in the 
translation above, the phrase “fa-huwa muhtāj ilā” can be translated as “thus it requires” 
or “thus he requires.” The first translation suggests that it is the fine-art of history which 
needs additional types of cognizance. And considering that the primary objective of this 
fine-art is to produce correct historical reports, it seems safe to assume that the primary 
need for these additional types of cognizance is to authenticate the truth of the report.  
The second translation, by contrast, suggests that it is the one who seeks “the 
benefit of role-modeling…in religious and worldly affairs” who needs the help of these 
types of cognizance, in addition to historical reports.3 According to this reading, the 
primary objective of these additional types of cognizance is to draw out the relevant 
moral and political lessons from of the historically contingent moral and political events. 
More importantly, however, this reading suggests that these additional types of 
cognizance are in effect the primary sources for moral and political conduct, and history 
is the additional “knowledge” needed by those individuals, and only those individuals, 
who seek to model themselves after noteworthy historical examples.4 
Of course, the ambiguity in the phrase “thus it requires” or “thus he requires” 
need not lead to choosing one reading and excluding the other—that either it is the fine-
art of history—and by implication it is the practitioner of this fine-art—who requires 
additional types of cognizance, or it is the one who seeks moral and political guidance in 
                                                 
3 This reading reaffirms an earlier argument made in the preface that historical “knowledge,” in and of 
itself, cannot serve as a proper model for moral and political action. 
4 It will become evident through the study of the “errors of the historians” that additional knowledge is 
needed for both the production—i.e., the verification and the recording—of the historical report as well as 
for its evaluation. It will also become clear that both processes will be informed by the politically salutary 
objectives that constitute the initial impetus for examining history—i.e., finding the proper models for 
moral and political conduct. 
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history who requires these types of cognizance. Indeed, Ibn Khaldun seems to 
communicate by this ambiguity a shared interest in these types of cognizance by both the 
practitioner and the student of history. Since there are those who, in studying history, 
seek moral and political guidance, the practitioner of the fine-art of history requires 
certain types of cognizance that would make it possible for him to address these moral 
and political needs. The explanation of this point is what the introduction is supposed to 
provide, and what Ibn Khaldun’s ambiguous readership is encouraged to “know.” 
But what are the types of cognizance Ibn Khaldun is referring to? By way of an 
answer, I shall consider first the relationship between the primary type of ‘knowledge’ 
that history provides and the kinds of knowledge that the other types of cognizance are 
supposed to provide.  
It is clear from Ibn Khaldun’s statement, that through the study of history we 
come to know the customs of different nations and the conditions of “kings with respect 
to their dynasties and politics” (I.8). The objective of this study is moral and political. It 
is also clear that, according to Ibn Khaldun, history is not enough to bring about sought-
after political and moral guidance. What is needed besides, or in addition to, the 
“knowledge” of history, are other types of cognizance that seek—beyond awareness of 
particular customs, polities, and dynasties—knowledge of the “roots of customs,” the 
“foundations of politics,” as well as the “nature of culture and human social organization” 
(I.8). Here we can grasp two sciences whose function it is to bring about such knowledge. 
The first is political science. This is an old and well-established discipline, whose 
purpose is to investigate, among other things, the “roots of customs” and the “foundations 
of politics.” The second is a new science, the science of culture, which, following Ibn 
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Khaldun’s argument in the preface, is the science that investigates the nature of “culture 
and the conditions of human social organization.” 
The fact that a new science is needed in order to draw out the political benefit of 
the study of history seems to suggest one of two possibilities. First, before Ibn Khaldun’s 
science of culture, attempts to seek political guidance from history were never safe from 
“stumbling, falling, and swaying from genuine truthfulness” (I.9). Second, there was a 
time when it was possible—through the assistance of political science alone—for 
individuals to seek guidance from history without the help of the science of culture, and 
now this is no longer the case. Put differently, the latter possibility suggests that the need 
for a science of culture is the consequence of new realities on account of which 
knowledge of political science alone cannot bring about the desired benefit of the study 
of history. Though it is not clear from Ibn Khaldun’s opening statement which of these 
two possibilities he is thinking of, the final parts of his introduction—as well as the 
beginning of Book One of Kitāb al-‘Ibar—suggests that he favors the second 
possibi
analogies between past events and present realities is an important byproduct of the study 
                                                
lity.5 
In addition to knowledge of the “roots of customs” and the “foundations of 
politics” belonging to the domain of political science, and the knowledge of the “nature 
of culture and human social organization” belonging to the domain of the science of 
culture, Ibn Khaldun adds the ability to reason by analogy (al-qiyās) as a third requisite 
element in bringing about the political benefit of studying history. If we compare this part 
of Ibn Khaldun’s opening statement in the introduction, with his description of the overall 
objective of Kitab al-‘Ibar in the preface, we discover that the ability to make correct 
 
5 This is a point that I will turn to in the third part of this chapter. 
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of culture. In the preface, Ibn Khaldun summed up the accomplishments of his major 
work as follows:  
I refined, in the best way, [this book’s] inquires, and I brought it very close to the 
understanding of the learned and the elite…. In it I explained—from among the 
conditions of culture and city-formation, and of what essential accidents happen 
in human social organization—that which will entertain you with the causes and 
reasons for the generated things, and makes you cognizant how through these 
[principles] the people of dynasties issue forth, so that you would tear your grip 
away from the [habit of] imitation, and would behold conditions of times and 
groups that were before your time and that will be after it. (I.6) 
 
The Kitāb al-‘Ibar, has, as I outlined in Chapter Three, two equally important 
components: the Muqaddima, with its treatment of the science of culture, and the Ta’rīkh, 
with its comprehensive coverage of the history of northwest Africa. The virtue of 
“knowing history,” as the opening statement in the introduction informs us, is associated 
with the fact that this subject allows us to “behold” (yuqifunā) the particular “conditions 
of those who passed.” One’s ability to “behold conditions of days and groups that were 
before [one’s] time and will be after it” requires much more than “knowing history.”  In 
order for one to rise above blind imitation of historical tradition and hence to engage this 
tradition critically, one needs universal knowledge that explains the “causes and reasons” 
for the particular events of the past and that can properly gauge its relevance to present 
and future actions. This universal knowledge, according to Ibn Khaldun, is the science of 
culture, which allows one to reason by analogy between “what is hidden and remote” in 
history and “what is witnessed and at hand” for us. 
Before we turn to the next part of Ibn Khaldun’s introduction—the part in which 
he skillfully navigates through the “wilderness of fancy and error”—it would help to re-
emphasize an earlier point with respect to his opening statement first. Ibn Khaldun’s 
argument regarding the need to subject history to rational examination does not fix a 
 133
 
precise goal for this need. As such, he leaves the limits of this rational examination 
undetermined. His opening statement allows us to give equal weight to two possible goals 
for this rational examination: (a) the verification of historical reports; or (b) bringing out 
the ‘ibra or allusion of these reports. One can argue that we cannot bring out the ‘ibra of 
a historical report without being certain of the accuracy of this report and, as such, Ibn 
Khaldun does not need to give explicit priority to one of these goals. However, we can 
also foresee occasions on which we need to give such priority. As Ibn Khaldun suggests, 
the ‘ibra is most useful from a political and moral view to the one who looks in history 
for role models to guide him in “worldly and religious” affairs.6 What makes history’s 
moral lessons effective is that they are supposedly based on real life examples of human 
conduct. But the moral and political lessons of the report—i.e., the reason why one reads 
history—and the truth of the report—i.e., the element which gives credibility to the moral 
lesson—are not always in harmony. In emphasizing the truth of a historical report, there 
are conceivably no limits to what can be questioned by the historian, no matter how 
sacred, moral, or politically salutary that report might be. But if the primary objective of 
the historian is to bring out the moral and political lessons that a historical report offers, 
then his examination of history will be circumscribed by what is conducive to such moral 
and political guidance. 
This problem of the balance between the moral lessons of historical reports and 
the truth of these reports is something Ibn Khaldun deals gracefully with in the next part 
of the introduction. On the surface, Ibn Khaldun presents the verification of historical 
reports as the first priority of the historian. However, closer scrutiny of this argument will 
                                                 
6 This is especially so if the ‘ibra is understood as a straightforward “moral lesson” and not as an “allusion” 
that requires careful study and evaluation. 
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reveal many instances where Ibn Khaldun is willing to bend facts for the sake of what is 
morally and politically salutary. This should not be taken to mean that Ibn Khaldun sees 
no political or moral value in the very act of verifying historical reports. Consistent with 
his argument, the verification of historical reports can itself be politically salutary insofar 
as a serious rational examination of past events is conducive to a serious rational 
examination of present realities.  
 
III. On the Errors and Fancies of Historians 
 Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of the errors and fancies of historians occupies the 
lion’s share of this part of Kitāb al-‘Ibar. The ostensible objective of this discussion is to 
encourage the verification of historical reports by means of rational reflection. In 
constructing his argument, Ibn Khaldun divides this part of the introduction into three 
sections.  
In the first section, Ibn Khaldun discusses historical reports that deal with 
quantifiable facts, such as historians’ “enumeration of figures, wealth, and troops” (I.9). 
He uses three main examples to illustrate his critique with respect to these kinds of 
reports. The first example scrutinizes reports regarding the number of Israelites at the 
time of their exodus out of Egypt to the promised land of Canaan. The second example 
deals with reports regarding the military campaigns of the Tubbas, the ancient kings of 
Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. The third and final example deals with reports 
regarding the existence of a hidden city, Iram, which is allude in the Quran. In addressing 
the errors of historians with respect to these reports, Ibn Khaldun appeals to knowledge 
of physical and political geography, to a basic understanding of demography and normal 
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population growth, to clear facts regarding military strategy and the requirements of 
warfare, and to common-sense expectations regarding the nature of war and peace among 
nations. Ibn Khaldun also applies such knowledge to anticipate what the historical record 
should have included had these reports by the historians been true, and he uses the 
absence of such additional records as further proof of the historians’ errors.  
Although in this section Ibn Khaldun shows himself to be concerned exclusively 
with the likelihood that certain historical events occurred as reported by historians, the 
subject matter of these reports indicates that his concern with the moral and political is 
not far beneath the surface. The first example of erroneous historical reports deals with 
biblical accounts pivotal to the Muslim view of the history of monotheism. The second 
example deals with reports regarding the military campaigns of ancient Arab kings, 
reports which reinforce the Arabs’ self-image of their past glory. The third example deals 
with historical reports regarding a mysterious city the existence or the absence of which 
carries implications regarding commonly accepted interpretations of the Quran. 
 The second section of Ibn Khaldun’s treatment of the errors of past historians 
discusses reports, which, according to him, impugn the moral character of some of the 
most distinguished Arab rulers. As in the previous section, Ibn Khaldun here uses three 
main examples to illustrate his point. However, all three examples, in addition to minor 
ones, revolve around the moral conduct of al-Rashīd and his son al-Ma’mūn, whose 
respective reigns as heads of the Abbasid dynasty, represent both the height of the 
political and cultural power of the Arabs and the beginning of their precipitous decline as 
an effective force on the world stage. In refuting these “interpolated narratives of the 
historians” (I.28), Ibn Khaldun presents counter reports that speak of the moral 
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uprightness and piety of the Abbasid rulers. And to substantiate his own counter reports, 
Ibn Khaldun appeals to common-sense arguments regarding the nature of imperial rule, 
the traditional customs and morals of the Abbasids, and the solid religious background of 
the Abbasids. 
 The third section of this part of the introduction discusses reports dealing with the 
lineage of founders of three different dynasties: ‘Ubyad Allah al-Mahdi, the reputed 
founder of the Fatimid dynasty, which, at the height of its power covered North Africa, 
Egypt, Syria, and al-Hijāz; Idrīs Ibn Abdallah (d. 791), the founder of the Idrisids dynasty 
in northwest Africa; and al-Mahdī Ibn Tumart (d. 1130), the founder of the Almohad 
dynasty. As in the previous section, Ibn Khaldun here extracts from the available 
historical record reports that challenge the accounts impugning the character and lineage 
of these three founders. And like the previous section, Ibn Khaldun appeals to a common-
sense understanding of the nature of political authority in order to give weight to the 
authenticity of his counter reports. 
 In the second and third section on the errors and fancies of the historians, we 
witness an increased interest on the part of Ibn Khaldun in questions regarding the moral 
conduct of rulers and major figures of history. The treatment of these questions are 
intended to make us aware of how and to what extent issues of moral conduct inform as 
well as distort our understanding of the nature of political order. In contrast with the first 
section, in which Ibn Khaldun deals with matters of physical reality, we clearly see in the 
last two sections the difficulty, if not the near impossibility, of achieving scientific 
certainty regarding issues of moral behavior. With respect to the “reality” of reports 
dealing with the moral conduct of historical individuals, the most we can hope for are 
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likely accounts. This, of course, does not stop Ibn Khaldun from issuing guidelines, 
informed by his understanding of the nature of culture and human social organization, 
through which these issues can be treated in such a way as to assist the student who seeks 
guidance in history, as well as to encourage a wider interest in rational examination of 
past and present political realities. 
 In what follows, I focus my analysis on the first example in each of the three 
sections that deal with the errors of the historians: the number of the Israelite troops at the 
time of their exodus (presented in the first section), the reasons for al-Rashīd’s 
destruction of the Barmakids (presented in the second section), and the lineage of ‘Ubyad 
Allah al-Mahdi (presented in the third section). 
 
III. A. On the Number of the Israelite Troops 
 At the conclusion of his opening statement, Ibn Khaldun warns against relying on 
traditional methods of historical scholarship to judge the truth of a report by verifying the 
soundness of its chain of transmission. Many distinguished historians and respected 
religious scholars, he tells us, have failed to “sound the depths” (wa la-sabarūhā) of 
historical reports “with the gauge of wisdom” (mi‘yār al-hikma), to behold “the nature of 
generated things” (al-wuqūf ‘alā tabā’i‘ al-kā’ināt), or to adjudicate the rational power of 
reflection (naz ar) and insightfulness (al-basīra). Hence, “they strayed and got lost in the 
wilderness of fancy and error.” 
 According to Ibn Khaldun, nothing illustrates this point more clearly than the 
historians’ “enumeration of figures, wealth, and troops when it is displayed in narratives, 
for this is the likely-place for lying and the implement of absurdity, and it must be 
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referred back to the roots [of custom] and displayed against the foundations [of politics]” 
(I.9: 7-9). The example Ibn Khaldun uses to frame this part of his discussion deals with 
the number of Israelites who were led by Moses out of Egypt: 
An instance of this [kind of hyperbole] is what al-Mas‘ūdī and many among the 
historians have transmitted regarding the soldiers of the Israelites. That Moses 
(peace be upon him) tallied these in the desert—after approving those capable of 
carrying arms, especially the ones who were twenty years and older—and so they 
were six hundred thousand or more. (I.9: 9-12). 
 
There are two interesting things about this example. First, the reports with which Ibn 
Khaldun begins his critique of traditional historical methods within Islam deals with 
accounts derived from another religious tradition, i.e., the Jewish tradition. But instead of 
critiquing the Jewish sources from which these reports are derived, Ibn Khaldun focuses 
on the Muslim historians—especially on al-Mas‘ūdī, according to him the most 
distinguished among these historians—who presumably transmitted these reports to the 
Muslim community uncritically. Second, the subject of these reports, i.e., the number of 
Israelites at the time of the Exodus seems too minor a point to justify a detailed critique 
of the work of historians. However, as we will soon discover, the rational examination of 
these seemingly innocuous reports leads to the question of divine intervention in human 
affairs, a fundamental question in Islamic theology. 
 Ibn Khaldun uses five main counter-arguments based on common sense to refute 
this account. These common sense arguments are intended to build a clear case for 
applying rational tools in the examination of history. They all point to branches of 
knowledge that will be utilized by the science of culture in order to develop a much more 
“systematic” approach to the study and recording of history—part of what Ibn Khaldun 
calls in his title the “verification of history’s approaches.” 
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 Ibn Khaldun’s first argument is built on what, according to him, “known customs 
(al-‘awā’id al-ma‘rūfa) and familiar conditions (al-ahwāl al-ma’lūfa) bear witness to” 
(I.9). These are the types of customs and conditions the knowledge of which any person 
in tune with present political realities could use to see the inflated character of accounts 
regarding “the realities” of past conditions. When speaking about the number of troops 
belonging to a particular nation in the past, the historian must realize that these numbers 
refer to actual human beings who need a support structure—such as land, animals to feed 
the troops, as well as workers to cloth and equip the army—that is proportionate to the 
size of the military. This alone should indicate that the number of the Israelite army has 
been inflated, for, according to Ibn Khaldun, neither Egypt nor Syria has the “capacity to 
contain such a number of soldiers” (I.9). If we observe the present “customs and familiar 
conditions,” Ibn Khaldun maintains, then we can understand how “each particular 
kingdom has a limited portion (his sa) of guardians, of which it has the capacity to contain 
as well as to support its functions, and beyond which it has difficulty maintaining” (I.9). 
 Continuing with his counter-arguments based on common sense, Ibn Khaldun 
presents a second point which deals with the practical possibility of such an army: “It is 
unlikely for marching or fighting to occur among armies that have such extreme numbers 
like this one, because the battleground is too narrow for them, extending, if they were in 
battle-formation, twice, thrice, or more beyond the range of sight” (I.9). And just in case 
his readers are skeptical about the soundness of this point, Ibn Khaldun asks a rhetorical 
question that aims to expose the logistical impossibility of making such an army fight as 
a unit: “How, then, would two [opposing] parties fight, or for one battle formation to 
overcome another, when one flank does not know what the other flank is doing?” (I.9). 
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Ibn Khaldun suggests that if his readers observe the present conditions of military 
warfare, then they will undoubtedly be able to confirm the soundness of his argument, 
affirming that “what was resembles what will be more than one drop of water resembles 
another” (I.9). It is important to keep in mind this point, because, fundamental to the 
science of culture, is the ability to distinguish between things that constantly change with 
time, and things that, for the most part, remain the same. What does not change with 
time, according to Ibn Khaldun, are the modes by which human beings deal with physical 
reality. What does change with time is moral and political reality. 
 Ibn Khaldun’s third counter-argument contrasts what al-Mas‘ūdī and other 
historians report about the size of the military force of the Israelites with what the 
available historical record says about the size of the military forces of other nations. He 
chooses for his point of comparison a relatively more recent nation than the Israelites, 
namely, the Sassanid Persians, with whose empire the Muslim historians were much 
more familiar. The Sassanid Persians controlled a larger territory, had greater power, and 
were much wealthier than the Israelites, but were never reported to have had such a large 
number of soldiers. As Ibn Khaldun reminds his readers, in the decisive battle between 
the Arabs and the Persians of al-Qādisiyya—the battle in which the Persian forces were 
soundly defeated, paving the way for the empire’s unraveling—the reported number of 
military forces and all their support structure ranged between sixty thousand and two 
hundred thousand. 
 The fourth counter-argument Ibn Khaldun presents as evidence of the inflated 
troop number of the Israelites calls attention to the purposes for which military power 
exists. The two main purposes for which a community requires military force—or a 
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“guardianship” (hāmiyya), as Ibn Khaldun calls it—is to protect itself from foreign 
enemies as well as to keep the peace within. The size of such a guardianship, as Ibn 
Khaldun has already maintained, must be proportionate to the size of the territory under 
the control of the community. The bigger the military force, the larger the territory that 
needs to sustain it. The bigger the military force, the greater the temptations to take over 
more territory. A military force of over six hundred thousand men has to engage in 
offensive war. As Ibn Khaldun states, “Had the Israelites reached that number, the range 
of their kingdom would have been wide and the extent of their dynasty great” (I.10; cf. 
II.65-66). Instead of a wide kingdom and a great dynasty, the Israelites spent forty years 
in the Sinai Desert (al-Tīh; I.9), during which time they did not engage in military 
campaigns (I.13: 5). And even when the Israelites were able much later to muster enough 
forces to acquire large territorial areas, these territories did not far exceed “the Jordan and 
Palestine in Syria, and Yathrib and Khaybar in al-H ijāz” (I.10). 
 The fifth and final counter-argument points out an internal contradiction in the 
historical record on which al-Mas‘ūdī based his account regarding the number of the 
Israelites. According to this record, there were three fathers between Moses and Jacob: 
“Moses son of Amram son of Kohath son of Levi son of Jacob, who is Isrā’īlu Allah” 
(I.10-11: 17-1). Ibn Khaldun maintains that al-Mas‘ūdī himself reported that the period of 
time between Moses and Israel was 220 years. When Israel, his sons, and his people 
joined Joseph in Egypt, their numbers were “seventy souls” (I.11). Ibn Khaldun insists 
that it is impossible for the Israelites to have exponentially increased in numbers from 70 
people to more than 600,000 male soldiers in 220 years.7 Ibn Khaldun raises another 
                                                 
7 Recall that the number 600,000 thousand refers only to the men of fighting age, i.e., this number does not 
include women, children, the sick, and the elderly. 
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doubt that the Israelites could have reached this number at the time of their most 
powerful king, King Solomon. According to the Torah, between Solomon and Israel (that 
is, Jacob) there are eleven generations, and, Ibn Khaldun insists, the “male lineage does 
not branch out to that number which they claimed in eleven generations. God knows they 
may extend to the hundreds and thousands, as for the number to extend beyond these 
[figures] to multiples of ten, it is unlikely” (I.11). 
 Judging by these five counter-arguments, we can safely conclude that Ibn 
Khaldun managed to expose, with a high degree of certainty, the unsoundness of the 
accounts regarding the number of the Israelites. But what else do we learn from this 
critique? There are at least three major points that Ibn Khaldun communicates in his 
discussion. First, Ibn Khaldun’s “common sense” arguments are not all that “common.” 
And this stands to reason, for if these arguments were “common,” then we would not 
need the science of culture, in addition to other sciences, in order to judge the soundness 
of historical reports.  
For example, it seems sensible to agree with Ibn Khaldun’s rhetorical assertion 
that “each particular kingdom has a limited portion of guardians. [A portion] which it has 
the capacity to contain as well as to support its functions, and beyond which it has 
difficulty maintaining” (I.9). But how can we measure these proportions? Why can Egypt 
or Syria not sustain hundreds of thousands of Israelites in addition to the indigenous 
populations in each country? About these and similar questions we need to know more 
about the geography, the nature of the soil, and the climate of these lands and to judge 
these facts against similar features in other lands, so that we can compare and contrast the 
environmental conditions through which human life flourishes or stagnates. 
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Understanding the necessary physical conditions for, and the limits of, human 
flourishing, or culture (‘umrān), will put us in a better position to judge the number of 
human beings that a land like Egypt or Syria can sustain. Such rational scrutiny is what 
the science of culture, as reflected in Ibn Khaldun’s discussion in the first chapter of his 
Muqaddima, is supposed to guide us to. This chapter contains six “prefatory discussions” 
(muqadimāt). In four of these prefatory discussion (i.e., the second, the third, the fourth, 
and fifth prefatory discussions) Ibn Khaldun provides a long summary of world 
geography and climate conditions,8 explores the possible effects of the environment on 
the moral and physical character of peoples,9 as well as how soil conditions affect the 
development of culture and how, in turn, this affects the physical and moral 
characteristics of peoples.10 
 The second major point that Ibn Khaldun communicates through his discussion of 
the number of Israelites has to do with the need to keep an eye firmly fixed on the present 
as we reflect on the past. This is a point that Ibn Khaldun will bring up again and again in 
his introduction. In the next section, for example, he will call for a comparison between 
past and present when critiquing historical reports on the reasons for al-Rashīd’s 
destruction of the Barmakids (I.19). When making these types of comparisons, we need 
to keep in mind the difference among historical “conditions” that do not change with 
time, historical “conditions” that constantly change, and even historical “conditions” that 
lie in-between. In the example about the Israelites, as well as the examples of the Tubba 
and the Surat al-Fajr (that is, Sura 89)—i.e., the other two examples that constitute the 
                                                 
8 This is discussed in the “prefatory discussion” (I.73-148: 6-11). 
9 This is discussed in the third “prefatory discussion” (I.148-155: 12-6), and the fourth “prefatory 
discussion” (I.155-157: 7-10) 
10 This is discussed in the “prefatory discussion” (I.157 -165: 11-3) 
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first section of the discussion of the errors and fancies of historians—Ibn Khaldun 
addresses physical and human conditions that do not change with time, including 
physical geography, climate zones, the limits of human growth and flourishing, and the 
nature of war and peace. By understanding these conditions as they exist in the present, 
we will be able to judge what was possible and what was impossible in historical reports 
dealing with “occurrences” governed by such conditions. With respect to this point, we 
see how the value of the rational comparison between past and present extends far 
beyond the ability to determine likely historical accounts—such as the number of the 
Israelites at the time of the Exodus—to encourage investigation of the physical realities 
that surround them. Near the conclusion of his discussion on the Israelites, Ibn Khaldun 
draws a comparison between reports on the wealth and power of contemporary kingdoms 
and wealthy individuals and reports about the wealth and power of historical kingdoms 
and wealthy individuals. Ibn Khaldun states: 
We find the totality of contemporary people, when elaborating on tales regarding 
the dynastic troops of their own or recent time, and exchanging reports about the 
Muslim and the Christian armies, or [when they] take to figuring out the tax 
revenues, the expenditures of the ruler (al-sultān), the expenses of the 
extravagant, and the goods of the very rich, [that they] exaggerate the count, 
exceed the limits of [recognized] customs, and succumb to the temptations of 
what is strange; and so, if the record keepers were to uncover the number of their 
troops, and [if] the conditions of the wealthy with respect to their goods and 
assets were to be disclosed, and [if] the customs of the extravagant with respect 
to their expenditures were brought forth, then you will not find a tenth of what 
they have numbered. This is not more than the soul’s passion for the strange, the 
tongue’s ease with the excessive and the obliviousness about what has been 
reviewed and criticized, so that one does not admonish himself for a mistake or a 
willful [action], nor bring himself back to investigation and search, and, there he 
gives himself free reign and allows his tongue to roam in the pasture of lies, and 
[thus] “he purchases idle talk in order to lead [others] astray from the path...”11 of 
truth. [May] you be spared such a losing bargain. (I.11-12: 20-12) 
 
                                                 
11 Quran, 31:6 
 145
 
The intention of this comparison is to indicate how contemporary reporters like to 
exaggerate the material conditions of their dynasties and wealthy individuals just as past 
reporters liked to exaggerate their own accounts. Ultimately, however, the skills we 
acquire to counter hyperbole in past accounts can be effectively used to counter 
hyperbole in the present, and thus encourage a much more rationally grounded view of 
the present. 
 This brings us to the third point that Ibn Khaldun raises in this critique of the 
reports of historians. When discussing the “virtue of knowing history,” Ibn Khaldun 
describes the “work” of history as follows: “It allows us to behold the conditions of those 
who passed—of nations with respect to their morals, of prophets with respect to their 
ways of life, and of kings with respect to their dynasties and politics—until the benefit of 
role-modeling in these is completed for the one who seeks it in religious and worldly 
conditions” (I.6). In other words, the study of history is morally and politically 
advantageous. But this moral and political advantage is not immediately obvious in the 
example of the number of the Israelites. From the second point, we see how the 
comparison between past and present can be politically advantageous in that it compels 
us to form more grounded views of physical and political reality. As we will see shortly, 
however, not all rational examinations of history can be characterized as politically 
advantageous or salutary. In those cases in which the investigation is not salutary, one 
must impose limits. And this is the point that Ibn Khaldun hints at in the conclusion of his 
treatment of the reports on the Israelites. 
 On the surface, the historical example with which Ibn Khaldun opens his 
discussion seems innocuous. It comes from a different religious tradition, and it deals 
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with what appears to be an insignificant issue, i.e., troop numbers. And yet the whole 
story of the Jewish exodus from Egypt is not only pivotal to the Jewish tradition, but also 
forms an important part of sacred Muslim history. It is one of those stories that the Quran 
uses as a lesson or ‘ibra for Muslims. It speaks of God’s grace and infinite power. The 
story as told in the Quran presupposes awareness of the story as told in the Torah. And 
though the Quran does not speak of the Israelite troops, let alone their numbers, to raise 
doubts about the soundness of some parts of the story as told in the Torah, compromises 
the reliability of the Torah as a supplementary source for the Quran. Add to this the fact 
that the story of the flight from Egypt depicts one miracle after another. If we accept the 
miraculous parts of this story, as a faithful Muslim is told to do, why should we subject 
any part of it to rational investigation and thus raise doubts about its veracity?  
Ibn Khaldun deals with this issue in a somewhat convoluted way, whereby his 
conclusion seems clear, but the arguments upon which this conclusion are based require 
analysis. Here is how Ibn Khaldun concludes his discussion of the reports on the 
Israelites: 
It is possible to say that what is customary (al-‘awā’id) precludes the growth of 
descendants to that number in [people] other than the Israelites, because this 
[growth] was a miracle, according to what was transmitted: that among what was 
revealed to the prophets, their forefathers—Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (Godly 
prayer be upon them)—is God multiplying their descendants so that they will be 
more numerous than the stars of the sky and the pebbles of the earth; and God 
has fulfilled this promise as a bounty to them and [so their increase is] a miracle 
that breaks custom. Thus what is customary does not oppose this [incident] and 
no one discredits it. And this is so even if someone opposes this [incident] by 
discrediting its report—that it was cited only in the Torah, which the Jews, as is 
recognized, have altered; for the statement (fa-al-qawl) regarding this alteration 
[of the Torah] is, according to the investigators, conjectured and is not manifest, 
because, as was mentioned by al-Burkhārī in his S ahīh , custom precludes 
religious peoples (ahl al-adyān) from intentionally doing such a thing to their 
divine books. Thus, this great growth of the Israelites would be a miracle, a 
breaking of custom; and [thus] custom—upon judgment of its indicators—




In this paragraph, Ibn Khaldun presents two opinions. The first opinion is that the 
extraordinary or supernatural growth of the Israelite population was a miraculous act, a 
fulfillment of an earlier promise God made to the forefathers of the Israelites, the 
prophets “Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.” In this case, we have to accept the Biblical 
account on faith. The second opinion is that the Jews altered the genuine text of the 
Torah. In this case, rejecting on rational grounds this Biblical account would be a 
justifiable act. Ibn Khaldun shows himself to be of the first opinion, i.e., he seems to 
accept, on the authority of the Biblical account, the extraordinary growth of the Israelite 
population as a miraculous act. He raises doubts regarding the opinion that the Jews have 
altered their sacred text, by pointing out the status of the second “statement” as a mere 
conjecture that has not been proven—that is not absolutely true. Furthermore, he implies 
that, according to the prophetic tradition in Islam, as reported in al-Bukhārī’s Sahīh, 
“custom precludes religious peoples from intentionally” altering “their divine books.”12 
But if this is indeed Ibn Khaldun’s position regarding the population growth of the 
Israelites, why did he raise the question in the first place? Why did he open his critique of 
the historians by dealing with a subject that can be explained away as a miracle, in which 
rational examination has no final authority? Based on the discussion above, as well as on 
evidence from other parts of the Muqaddima, we address these objections as follows. 
 Ibn Khaldun illustrates by means of his opening example the risks entailed in the 
rational investigation of history. The example he chooses for his investigation might 
seem harmless for someone who does not share in the religious tradition from which the 
example is taken, but it is very serious for those who faithfully partake in that tradition. 
                                                 
12 As Rosenthal indicates, it is not clear where in Bukhārī’s Sahīh this interpretation can be found. (Franz 
Rosenthal, The Muqaddimah; p. 21). 
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Moreover, Ibn Khaldun clearly shows how the rational critique of other religious 
traditions can have negative consequences on one’s own religious tradition if applying 
the same rational principles. Concern with the sanctity of religious beliefs and for the 
health of the political community, therefore, requires the acknowledgment of limits on 
the rational investigation of history. But, clearly, these limits must be balanced in such a 
way as not to impede the vibrancy of rational activity. Later, in the Muqaddima, Ibn 
Khaldun attempts to address this issue by establishing clear limits for the natural, the 
supernatural, and whatever gray area that might lie in-between these. Thus we find there 
discussions of geography, climate zones, the social structure of nomadic tribes and cities, 
the politics and economics of dynasties, as well as the crafts, arts, and sciences that 
flourish in civilizations. These are all subjects that follow rules and patterns that can be 
rationally identified and investigated. These kinds of rational subjects, the discussion of 
which occupy the lion’s share of the book, are presented in sharp contrast to “super-
natural” subjects, such as soothsaying, fortunetelling, astrology, numerology, and 
prophecy, covered in the same part of the book. Though the discussions of these latter 
subjects are given less space in the Muqaddima than their “rational” counterparts, they 
nonetheless provide balanced coverage of the totality of human reality. In the discussion 
of some of these subjects, Ibn Khaldun clearly rejects the rationale of some like astrology 
and numerology, asserts the truth of others like prophecy, and he keeps the veracity of 
others like soothsaying an open question. Here, in the introduction, Ibn Khaldun 
anticipates the later demarcation in the Muqaddima between the natural that is subject to 
rational investigation and the super-natural that is a matter of faith. By asserting the 
sanctity of the source for the reported number of Israelites, Ibn Khaldun concludes: 
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“Thus, this great growth of the Israelites would be a miracle, a breaking of custom; and 
[thus] custom remains—upon judgment of its indicators—a preclusion [to such growth] 
in others” (I.13). Miracles are supernatural. Nonetheless, we cannot fully appreciate their 
supernatural force unless we are fully aware of the force of nature. In this way, Ibn 
Khaldun’s rational discussion of the Biblical account ends up reinforcing the appreciation 
by men of faith of the miraculous aspect of this account, rather than compromising their 
faith. 
 Ibn Khaldun’s use of the word custom (‘awā’id) is highly significant. This term is 
favored by the theologians (al-mutakalimūn) over that of nature (tabī‘a), the central 
concept that makes philosophic investigation possible. Although Ibn Khaldun is not 
averse to discussing nature in other parts of the Muqaddima, he sometimes uses “custom” 
as though it were interchangeable with “nature.” This is clearly the way he is using this 
term here, since he defines a miracle as “the breaking of custom.” What is also significant 
here is the seamless parallel Ibn Khaldun makes between “the customary course of 
nature,” and “human custom.” The sanctity of one’s faith has a power over the individual 
that is comparable to the unalterable natural rules that govern human growth. 
 As I indicated earlier, Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of the number of Israelites at the 
time of the Exodus illustrates the main idea of the first section of his critique of past 
historians: reports that depend on what is and is not physically possible. The second 
report that Ibn Khaldun deals with in this section concerns the military campaigns of the 
Tubbas, the ancient kings of Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. The third deals with the 
existence of the mysterious city, Iram, to which the Quran alludes. In critiquing these 
reports, Ibn Khaldun uses almost the same type of reasoning as with the first example, 
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i.e., judging what is or is not possible according to nature. With each of these two 
examples, Ibn Khaldun anticipates or emphasizes a particular method or subject that he 
will treat later in the Muqaddima, as well as in the rest of Kitāb al-‘Ibar. For example, 
when critiquing the reports regarding the Tubbas, Ibn Khaldun focuses attention on the 
importance of studying geography (I.14-15: 16-10), something which he emphasizes in 
the first part of the Muqaddima, as well as awareness of the geopolitical realities of the 
times in which the Tubbas’ existed (I. 15: 10-13), which he discusses later in the Ta’rīkh. 
With respect to the reports regarding Iram, Ibn Khaldun emphasizes the need not only to 
question the logical possibility of a report, but also to anticipate what the historical record 
should show had these reports been true. 
 With the reports regarding Iram, Ibn Khaldun concludes the first section of his 
critique of the historians. He turns next to reports regarding the moral conduct of famous 
Arab rulers. 
 
III. B. Hārūn Al-Rashīd’s Destruction of the Barmakids 
 As noted, this section of the second part of the introduction provides three main 
examples of reports dealing with the moral character and moral conduct of famous rulers. 
The first example, which deals with the reasons for Hārūn al-Rashīd’s destruction of the 
Barmakids, not only frames the moral theme of this section, but also determines the 
subject matter of the other two examples, namely, the Abbasid dynasty at the apex of its 
power and the beginning of its precipitous decline. 
 Al-Rashīd’s destruction of the Barmakids is arguably one of the most sensational 
stories in Muslim history. The shroud of mystery surrounding the true facts of this story 
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seems to give the imagination of many a historian license to construct details as they see 
fit. The end result is always an account that includes the basic ingredients of a perennial 
melodrama: drinking parties, lust, intrigues, betrayal, illicit sex, and gratuitous violence. 
 We shall begin first with some of the details that historians, medieval as well as 
modern, seem to agree on. The Barmakids were Persian clients of the Abbasids, whose 
association goes back to the early manifestation of the Abbasids’ power. The first 
Barmakid of note was Khālid Ibn Barmak, a skilled administrator, secretary, and 
bureaucrat to the first Abbasid Caliph, Abū al-‘Abbās ‘Abd Allah al-Saffāh (reigned 749-
754). While the relationship between the Abbasids and the Barmakids had its ups and 
downs, it was clearly more than a simple master-servant relationship. It is reported, for 
example, that Khālid Ibn Barmak “had the honor of seeing his own daughter suckled by 
al-Saffāh’s wife whilst his own wife acted as foster-mother to his sovereign’s 
daughter.”13 Khālid’s son Yah yā was—in addition to other important administrative 
offices he undertook at different periods of his career—the “secretary tutor to Prince 
Hārūn [al-Rashīd],”14 The latter’s bond with Yahyā was so strong, according to Ibn 
Khaldun, that he (i.e., al-Rashīd) used to call him “father” (I.20: 16). One of Yah yā’s two 
sons, al-Fadl, was “the ‘foster-brother’ of Hārūn [al-Rashīd].”15 Al-Fadl was also the 
tutor for al-Rashīd’s son al-Amīn, while al-Fad l’s brother Ja‘far was the tutor of al-
Rashīd’s other son, al-Ma’mūn. 
After the mysterious death of his brother al-Hādī, the fourth Abbasid caliph, al-
Rashīd became the dynasty’s new ruler. As soon as he became caliph, al-Rashīd 
“hastened to summon Yah yā and entrusted him with the direction of affairs, investing 
                                                 
13 D. Sourdel, “Al-Barāmika,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954-) p. I: 1033a. 
14 Ibid., p. I: 1034a 
15 Ibid., p. I: 1033b 
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him, according to tradition, with a general delegation of authority…. Yahyā remained in 
office for seventeen years, from 170/786 to 187/803, this period being referred to by 
some authors as ‘the reign of the Barmakids (sultān Āl Barmak).”16 
Although historians disagree on the extent of the Barmakids’ power, evidence 
suggests that this family was indeed very influential. They staffed the dynasty’s highest 
offices and the governorships of important territories with family members, clients, and 
allies. During their period of control, the Abbasid dynasty witnessed its greatest surge of 
cultural growth and maturity. They were loved by many for their patronage of the 
sciences and arts as well as charitable works. And though they were apparently firm in 
their alliance with the Abbasids against the claim to power by the ‘Alid Shi‘a, there is 
evidence that they harbored sympathies and support for these claims. The Barmakids’ 
influence came to a sudden end when al-Rashīd ordered the killing of Ja‘far and the 
imprisonment of al-Fadl along with his father Yahyā. With one notable exception, the 
Barmakids’ property was confiscated, and the rest of their family, clients, and allies were 
either imprisoned or removed from positions of power.  
So what caused the sudden and violent destruction of the Barmakids? The attempt 
to give a coherent answer in the midst of few hard facts was the objective of many a 
sensationalist account. Let us turn to these stories and to Ibn Khaldun’s analysis of them. 
This is how Ibn Khaldun summarizes the accounts transmitted by historians 
regarding the destruction of the Barmakids: 
Among the interpolated (al-madkhūla) narratives of the historians is the one they 
all transmit about the reason for al-Rashīd’s destruction (nakba) of the 
Barmakids, which pertains to the story of his sister, al-‘Abbāsah, and his client, 
Ja‘far Ibn Yah yā Ibn Khālid: that out of al-Rashīd’s obsession with the presence 
of both when he is imbibing wine with them, he permitted them—as a safeguard 
                                                 
16 Ibid., I: 1034a 
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in their association in his company—to draw a marriage contract not to be 
consummated. And that al-‘Abbāsah, out of ardent love for Ja‘far, tricked him, 
when he was in a condition of drunkenness, into being alone with her, and so he 
had intercourse with her, and thus she became pregnant. All of this was conveyed 
to al-Rashīd who became enraged. (I.18-19: 17-4) 
 
Ibn Khaldun shows his displeasure with this sensationalist account by summarizing, as 
austerely as possible, its main elements, briefly pointing out details which he will 
immediately dispute. But in order to understand Ibn Khaldun’s critique better, we need to 
expand a little on the details of this story. According to historians, al-Rashīd used to 
enjoy drinking wine (khamr) and used to enjoy private drinking parties, in which his 
favorite companions were, apparently, his sister al-‘Abbāsah and his client, Ja‘far Ibn 
Yahyā. So according to these reports, al-Rashīd, who as head of the Muslim community 
is expected to uphold the Law, privately participated in an activity that runs contrary to 
the explicit text of the Law, i.e., the consumption of wine. The presence of al-‘Abbāsah in 
close company with the “stranger” Ja‘far might also be considered yet another infraction 
against the Law, which frowns upon private associations between men and women who 
are not close relatives. According to Islamic tradition, such an association is permissible 
if it was supervised by a close male relative to the female (mah ram), such as a father, a 
son, or a brother. This apparently was not enough for al-Rashīd, who decided to allow his 
sister to draw a marriage contract with his client Ja‘far. Again, considering the private 
nature of these drinking parties, the only obvious reason why al-Rashīd would make such 
a move is to guarantee that the Law is not infringed upon. As such, if the historical 
reports are to be believed, al-Rashīd was more than willing to break the Law with respect 
to drinking wine, and to exceed what is required by the Law to safeguard the 
permissibility of the company with which he enjoys breaking the Law.  
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 Ibn Khaldun’s brief summary of the reports regarding al-Rashīd’s destruction of 
the Barmakids points out how Ja‘far is presented by the historians as a sympathetic 
figure. Al-Rashīd desires his company on par with that of his sister. It is al-‘Abbāsah who 
falls in “ardent love” with him (li-shaghafihā min hubbih). Sober, Ja‘far apparently will 
not entertain consummating his marriage with al-‘Abbāsah. She had to devise a trick to 
be alone with him and to intoxicate him before she is able to satisfy her uncontrollable 
passion. Al-‘Abbāsah gets pregnant, her “secret affair” becomes known, and though 
Ja‘far did not do anything illicit—she is after all his lawful wife—al-Rashīd orders his 
execution and the destruction of his family. 
 Ibn Khaldun begins his refutation by pointing out how far “off the mark” this 
story is “from al-‘Abbāsah’s position with respect to her religiosity, her parentage, and 
her majesty.” Lest his readers forget, Ibn Khaldun reminds them of al-‘Abbāsah’s 
honorable family, “for she is the descendant of ‘Abd Allāh Ibn al-‘Abbās”—a first cousin 
of the prophet Muhammad—“separated from him by only four men, who, after him, were 
the nobles of the creed and the greats of the religion” (I.19: 6-7). And if this not enough 
of a reminder, Ibn Khaldun finds it necessary to spell out this pedigree in detail: “She is 
al-‘Abbāsah the daughter of Muh ammad al-Mahdī, the son of ‘Abd Allāh Abī Ja‘far al-
Mansūr, the son of Muh ammad al-Sajjād, the son of ‘Abd Allāh, the Quran interpreter, 
the son of al-‘Abbās, the uncle of the prophet (Godly prayer and peace be upon him)” 
(I.19: 7-10). According to Ibn Khaldun, it is impossible for a woman of such an 
honorable background to behave as disgracefully as the historians suggest. And again he 
reminds us:  
She is the daughter of a caliph, the sister of a caliph, surrounded by great kingly 
possessions and the prophetical caliphate. Whichever side she would turn her 
head, there she would find [the legacy of] the companionship of the Messenger 
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and his uncles, the imāmit of the religious community, the light of Revelation, 
and the descending place of the Angels. She is close to the nomadic Arab times, 
the simplicity of the creed, and far from the customs of luxury and the pastures of 
licentiousness. Where would chastity and modesty be sought then, if she herself 
lacked them? And where would sanctity and purity be found, if they did not exist 
in her house? (I.19: 10-15) 
 
But it is not only the deep religious background that would preclude al-‘Abbāsah from 
being associated with such a disreputable affair, but also her grand royal status, which 
would not allow her to mix her “Arab nobility with a client of the foreign type” (I.19: 16-
17). The same argument goes for al-Rashīd, as Ibn Khaldun insists: 
And how would al-Rashīd, consistent with his high merit and the greatness of his 
fathers, stomach being related in marriage to foreign clients. And if the 
contemplative person (al-muta’mil) reflected (nazara), with the reflection of the 
fair minded (nazar al-munsif), on this issue and made an analogy between al-
‘Abbāsah and a daughter of one of the greatest kings in his own time, he would 
then disdain, scorn, and persist in refuting as a lie such a [deed] with a mere 
client of her dynasty, and who is subject to the authority (sultān) of her own folk. 
[The case is more so considering] the incomparable stature of al-‘Abbāsah in 
relation to the rest of the people. (I.19-20: 19-5) 
 
Ibn Khaldun looks in the historical records for a more sober explanation of the 
execution of Ja‘far and the destruction of his family. He finds this explanation in the 
historical reports describing the political conditions of the Abbasid dynasty. These reports 
speak of the Barmakids’ control of the tax revenues, management of the bureaucracy, 
command of the military, and supervision of the royal chamber. In their presence, al-
Rashīd appeared no more than as a figurehead. As such, Ibn Khaldun concludes: 
What led to the catastrophic destruction of the Barmakids is their independent 
control of the dynasty and their concealment of tax revenues…. Thus they 
overpowered [al-Rashīd] and shared in his authority. In their presence he had no 
way to discharge the affairs of his kingly realm. And their influence became 
great, their renown widely spread, and they cultivated the ranks and offices of the 
dynasty with their own boys and patronage, blocking all others from the ministry, 
the secretariat, the military leadership, the chamberlain, and [whatever position 
concerns] the sword and the pen. It has been said that in al-Rashīd’s home there 
were twenty five chiefs, in between a military officer and a secretarial official, all 
children of Yah yā Ibn Khālid. They crowded, with respect to these positions, the 
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people of the dynasty from all sides, and they vigorously pushed them away. 
(I.20: 5-14) 
 
What is interesting here is that Ibn Khaldun, when speaking about the power of 
the Barmakids, does not openly entertain the possibility that the historical reports upon 
which he relies might contain exaggerations. It is as if to counter these accounts 
regarding al-‘Abbāsah and Ja‘far, which paint the Barmakids as victims of a ruthless 
tyrant, that Ibn Khaldun finds it necessary to give free reign to accounts painting the 
Barmakids as usurpers of power. And just as he repeatedly reminds us of al-‘Abbāsah’s 
and al-Rashīd’s royal lineage and their relation to the prophet’s family, Ibn Khaldun 
reminds us again and again of the Barmakids’ monopolization of the dynasty’s power: 
Thus, they had exclusive control of authority (al-sultān), their boldness became 
great, and their glory enlarged. Heads turned in their direction alone, necks 
bowed in submission to them, and hopes, beyond them, dashed. The gifts of 
kings and the splendid offerings of princes would come to them from the furthest 
reaches [of the land]. In order to flatter them and gain their favor, the tax 
revenues snuck into their treasuries. They gave generously to the [Alid] Shī‘a 
men and to the great among those related [to the prophet’s family], and they 
surrounded them with favors. They provided for the destitute, from among the 
houses of the nobles, and relieved the one who suffers. Their praise surpassed the 
praise of their own caliph. To those who came asking relief, they gave abundant 
rewards and privileges. They rested control over the villages and the hamlets 
[around] districts and metropolises in every royal territory, so that they grieved 
the inner circle, they incited the resentment of the elite, and they irritated the 
[legitimate] rulers (ahl al-wilāya). (I.20-21: 14-9) 
 
We see here Ibn Khaldun’s condemnation of the Barmakids for positioning themselves as 
the supreme authority of the lands, the controllers of the tax revenues, and the dispensers 
of the affairs of the dynasty. But we also see that such a condemnation is not 
unequivocal. The Barmakids did indeed grab power away from the Abbasids, the 
legitimate rulers of the dynasty, but, according to Ibn Khaldun’s summary, they seem to 
have used this power well. After all, they provided for the destitute, relieved the sufferers, 
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and rewarded supplicants. And if they caused the resentment of the Abbasids, whose 
source of legitimacy came from being descendants of the Hashemite tribe of the prophet, 
the Barmakids showed themselves sympathetic to the supporters of a much closer branch 
of the prophet’s family, the Alid Shī‘ā. As we will see shortly, it is the sympathy toward 
the Alid, the Abbasid’s rivals, which finally pushed al-Rashīd to take drastic measures 
against the Barmakids. 
 Beyond the blame or praise of the Barmakids, Ibn Khaldun anticipates through 
this discussion an important theme which he will detail in the second, third, and fourth 
chapters of his Muqaddima: the origins and structure of dynastic power.17 Recall how in 
the preface, Ibn Khaldun argued that one of the major failings of the inferior historians is 
their inability to give an account of the “origin[s]” of dynasties, to explain the “reason[s] 
which led to the unfurling of [their] banner[s] and made apparent [their] signs, nor what 
caused [them] to stop at the limits [they] reached” (I.5: 2-3). This is a problem that Kitāb 
al-‘Ibar goes on to address by showing the “causes and reasons for the origins of 
dynasties and cultures” (I.5: 16). The discussion of the fall of the Barmakids shows us 
                                                 
17 The subject of the second chapter of the Muqaddima is “primitive culture (al-‘umrān al-badawī), savage 
nations and tribes (al-umam al-wahshiyya), and the accidental conditions that happen in these.” In this 
chapter Ibn Khaldun draws a preliminary distinction between primitive or nomadic groups (ajyāl al-badwū) 
and civilized or settled groups (ajyāl al-hadar). He then goes on to provide systematic analysis of 
primitive/nomadic groups, their material conditions, their moral character, and their familial structure. It is 
here that Ibn Khaldun introduces his famous concept of ‘asabiyya or group feeling, which informs the 
social structure of primitive/nomadic groups, and discusses its function in relation to advanced political 
associations.  
The subject of the third chapter of the Muqaddima is the “general dynasty (al-dawla al-‘āma), the 
kingship (al-mulk), the caliphate (al-khilāfa), the ranks of authority (al-marātib al-sultāniya) and the 
accidental conditions that happen in all of these.” In this chapter Ibn Khaldun discusses, among other 
relevant topics, different forms of government and governance in civilized/settled settings, the origins of 
dynastic and kingly authority, factors that contribute to the strengths and weaknesses of dynasties, the 
material conditions of dynasties, and the moral character of rulers and ruled.  
The subject of the fourth chapter of the Muqaddima is “towns (al-buldān), metropolises (amsār), 
and all [types of] cultivations (sā’ir al-‘umrān), as well as the accidental conditions that happen in these.” 
In this chapter Ibn Khaldun will explores the relationship between kingship and the city/metropolis. He will 
describe, among other relevant subjects, the political and material conditions that make cities possible, the 
conditions necessary for well-maintained cities, the difference between Muslim and non-Muslim cities, and 
the reasons for the decline of cities. 
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that not only historians, but also experienced politicians can, with grave consequences, 
fail to understand the fundamental realities of dynastic power. Ibn Khaldun’s summary of 
accounts regarding the Barmakids’ authority portrays a family that has become 
intoxicated with power. They might have been able to control the bureaucracy and to 
staff the ranks of the army, but they lacked the legitimacy and power base that are 
necessary for sustaining such high levels of control. As Ibn Khaldun reminds us on more 
than one occasion, the Barmakids were foreign clients of the Abbasids. The Abbasids’ 
power came not only from the fact that they belonged to the prophet’s tribe, but also from 
the fact that it is an Arab dynasty supported by powerful Arab tribes. Lacking a power 
base, the Barmakids were doomed to fail by the very fact that they could not protect 
themselves from the conspiracies and intrigues that the exercise of power inevitably 
engenders. Ibn Khaldun observes: 
And thus the way of competition and envy were uncovered for them. To their 
soft beds crawled the slanderous scorpions of the dynasty, to the extent that Banū 
Qah t abah, the maternal uncles of Ja’far, were some of the greatest slanderers 
against them. The envy that settled in their hearts against them was not softened 
by the kindness that comes with blood ties nor was it restrained by the dictates of 
family relations. (I.21: 7-11)  
 
The more power the Barmakids acquired, the bolder in wielding it they became. Their 
Alid sympathies became more apparent, which could not have sat well with the highest 
authority in the land, Sultan al-Rashīd. The Caliph found common cause with the 
increasing number of the Barmakids’ enemies. No matter how much good the Barmakids 
intended to do with their exercise of power, they failed to understand the fundamentals of 
political reality and thus they prepared the way for their own destruction. 
Simultaneous with this, was the outgrowth in their master of jealousy, and the 
frustration with, and the scorn of, confinement as well as the rest of the 
resentments that began with the Barmakids’ minor audacities and ended, through 
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their persistence in their ways, with major infringements. Like their story of 
Yah yā Ibn ‘Abd Allāh Ibn al-Hassan Ibn al-Hussian Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Abī T ālib, the 
brother of Muhammad al-Mahdī, nicknamed the ‘pure Soul’, who revolted 
against al-Mansūr [al-Rashīd’s grandfather]. This Yah yā is the one whom al-Fad l 
Ibn Yah yā, from the country of Daylam, brought back under an immunity from 
punishment written by al-Rashīd. According to al-T abarī, [al-Fad l] spent a 
million dirham [in this affair]. Al-Rashīd handed Yah yā to Ja‘far in order to 
detain him in his house and to keep an eye on him. And so Ja‘far imprisoned 
Yah yā for a period of time. Afterwards audaciousness led Ja‘far to release him 
and, high-handedly, to allow him to escape—out of concern, as he claimed, for 
the blood of the Prophet’s family, and in a display of audacity with respect to the 
judgment of the sultan. When this was secretly conveyed to al-Rashīd, he asked 
Ja‘far about Yah yā. Ja‘far, who quickly understood [what was behind this 
question] answered, “I released him.” Al-Rashīd showed him an approving face, 
and kept his resentment to himself. Thus Ja‘far paved the way against himself 
and against his people, so that their throne was toppled, their skies came crashing 
down on them, and the ground sank underneath them and their household, and 
their [glory] days became a precedent and an example to others. Whoever 
contemplates their reports, explores the ways of dynasties and their ways of life, 
would find this [conclusion] effectively verified and the reasons for it [clearly] 
laid out. (I.21-22: 11-10) 
 
It is clear that Ibn Khaldun has provided here a different account explaining the 
reasons for the downfall of the Barmakids and, in the course of this explanation, raises 
doubt regarding the sensationalist account about Ja‘far and al-‘Abbāsah described above. 
Considering the reports which describe Ja‘far’s bold use of the dynasty’s power, he is 
unlikely to have been a close drinking companion of al-Rashīd, let alone to have been his 
brother-in-law. Although the sensationalist story of Ja‘far and al-‘Abbāsah is the most 
popular among the accounts explaining the fall of the Barmakids (I.18: 17-18), Ibn 
Khaldun shows, by examining the totality of the historical record, how faulty this popular 
account is, and he advances a more likely interpretation for this event. But as he suggests 
at the conclusion of the above quotation, the examination of the totality of the historical 
record does not mean only the reading of this record. After all, those who read the reports 
of Ja‘far’s intoxication with wine before al-‘Abbāsah (I.19: 3-4), also read accounts that 
shows Ja‘far’s intoxication with power before al-Rashīd (I.22: 5). But readers are not 
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always able to judge how the one report contradicts the other. In order to effectively sift 
through the historical evidence, and to be able to distinguish likely from unlikely 
accounts pertaining to politically significant events, Ibn Khaldun suggests that scholars 
need general political knowledge informing their evaluation of historical evidence. This 
general political knowledge pertains to the “ways of dynasties” and “the ways of life” of 
those who constitute these dynasties, subjects which Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddima will 
discuss in detail. 
 Ibn Khaldun’s argument here seems to have reached its desired conclusion. He 
seemingly refutes the sensationalist account regarding Ja‘far and al-‘Abbāsah, presents a 
persuasive counter explanation regarding the downfall of the Barmakids, and by doing so, 
provides demonstration of another aspect to his rational examination of history. And yet, 
as the reader soon discovers, this does not mark the end of Ibn Khaldun’s treatment of al-
Rashīd’s moral conduct. Apparently unsatisfied with his earlier argument regarding the 
royal lineage and the impeccable religious background of the Abbasids, Ibn Khaldun 
decides to visit this subject again. He devotes the rest of this section of the introduction to 
historical reports that communicate the morality and piety of al-Rashīd and his ancestors 
and that refute other historical reports that impugn the moral character of al-Rashīd’s son, 
al-Ma’mūn. To a certain extent, this apparent digression by Ibn Khaldun seems 
reasonable. The strength of his “refutation” of the sensationalist story regarding Ja‘far 
and al-‘Abbāsah was based on the strength of other historical reports better explaining the 
downfall of the Barmakids. In other words, the contrary accounts that Ibn Khaldun favors 
provide a good explanation for the destruction of the Barmakids, but these same accounts 
cannot be effectively used to prove the moral and religious uprightness of the Abbasids. 
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Reflecting on the reasons for Ibn Khaldun’s defense of the Abbasids and on the manner 
of his defense reveals yet another aspect of the limits Ibn Khaldun imposes on the 
rational examination of history. 
 As indicated in Ibn Khaldun’s opening statement, a major reason for people’s 
interest in history is moral, namely, to find in the examples of previous nations and 
important models for proper moral conduct. For Arab and Muslim audiences, the Abbasid 
era—especially during the rule of al-Mansūr, al-Rashīd, and al-Ma’mūn—were one of 
most significant periods in Arab and Islamic history. As the formative period of Islam, 
viewed as the Golden Age of Islam by many among the faithful, the Abbasid era 
represents the height of Arab power, the last period during which the majority of Muslim 
lands were formally united under a central authority. This is the era when Muslims 
expanded widely in both the East and the West. With the translation of major intellectual 
works of ancient civilizations, and the conversion to Islam of many “foreign” peoples, 
Muslims became much more interested and aware of the world around them. Major 
works on philosophy, science, theology, linguistics, history, and literature, were written 
during this period, shaping the intellectual face of Islam and dominating the political-
theological debates within it for centuries to come. Ibn Khaldun alluded to the intellectual 
importance of this period in the course of his general description in the preface of the 
development of historiography in Islam. He indicated there how the Abbasid period, 
along with the Umayyad period that preceded it, shaped the form and content of Islamic 
historiography and how that in turn influenced the approach of future historians—an 
influence that was positive at first, as in the case of the critical methods of Ibn Hayyān 
and Ibn al-Raqīq, but then degenerated into the blind imitation of those who are “dull in 
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nature or who embraced dullness.” (I.4). To the importance of the theological, scientific, 
philosophic, and literary production of the Abbasid period, Ibn Khaldun devotes the bulk 
of the fifth and sixth parts of his Muqaddima, where he will discusses the origins and the 
development of arts and sciences in the course of Islamic history. So, contrary to his 
earlier claim, Ibn Khaldun is well aware that the Abbasid period, and especially the time 
of al-Rashīd and al-‘Abbāsah, was not that close to the “nomadic Arab times,” and the 
“simplicity of the creed” (sadhājit al-dīn; I.19).  
 It is not hard to see how the evaluation of this period and of its intellectual 
heritage can be greatly influenced, especially in the eyes of the general public, by the 
view of the moral conduct of the Abbasids, who were the highest political symbols of this 
period. Accounts that speak of the Abbasids’ love of drinking parties (I.19: 1; I.26: 13-
17; I.28: 11), or that insinuate that their highest judges were inclined toward pedophilia 
(I.27: 8-9) serve, in the minds of the public, as definitive proofs that the Abbasids were 
deep into the “customs of luxury and the pastures of licentiousness” (I.19: 13-14). As a 
corollary to this moral judgment, it is easy to dismiss much of the scientific, philosophic, 
and literary production of that period as the manifestation of dangerous innovations. But 
there is another equally important objective behind Ibn Khaldun’s defense of the 
Abbasids, an objective which has to do with individuals who, impressed by the affluence 
of these times, see in the sensationalist reports regarding the Abbasids’ moral conduct a 
justification for their own morally questionable behavior. History, in this respect, ceases 
to be a guide “in religious and worldly conditions” (I.8) and degenerates into an excuse 
for abominable actions. As Ibn Khaldun argues: 
The likenesses of these [sensationalist] tales are many, and, in the books of the 
historian, they are well known. Indulgence in prohibited pleasures and [the desire 
to] expose the shield of manliness, are what calls for the establishment of, and the 
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talk about, these [tales]. In what they [i.e., those who write these reports] do in 
obedience to their pleasures, they excuse through [the example of] notables (al-
qawm). Thus you see them often infatuated with reports similar to these; 
plucking them as they sift through the pages of [historical] registries. Had they 
identified with their [role] models’ other conditions—[with] the attributes of 
perfection that is suitable to, and famous about, them—that would have been 
better for them. (I.29: 3-10) 
 
Ibn Khaldun’s argument here comes as close as possible to a categorical declaration that 
the historical record regarding the moral conduct of all notable individuals—and not only 
those he is discussing in this section—must contain contradictory aspects. Strictly 
speaking, what Ibn Khaldun admonishes here is not the fact that there are reports that 
apparently impugn the character of notable individuals. Rather, he condemns the choice 
of selecting these disreputable reports over those that celebrate the moral “perfection” of 
these same individuals. As we will soon have occasion to judge, for Ibn Khaldun 
historians have a moral responsibility towards their readers, a responsibility requiring 
them to abandon “neutrality” when reporting about the moral character and conduct of 
distinguished individuals. However, as we will also see, Ibn Khaldun, as the originator of 
a new science wishes to portray to his “learned” (I.6) readers an accurate picture of the 
complex nature of human society and of the individuals who cultivate such a society. In 
order to better understand how Ibn Khaldun navigates between these two apparently 
contradictory objectives, we turn back to his treatment of the Abbasids’ moral character. 
 Not content with the general account that he gave at the beginning of this section 
regarding the nobility of the al-Rashīd’s family, Ibn Khaldun recounts reports speaking of 
the piety and moral stature of al-Rashīd, of his grandfather (Abū Ja‘far al-Mansūr), of his 
son (al-Ma’mūn), and even of his son’s closest friend and judge (Yahyā Ibn Aktham). He 
begins by addressing the accusations that al-Rashīd used to drink wine and to enjoy 
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drinking parities (I.23). Ibn Khaldun argues forcefully that this description runs contrary 
to the apparently more credible reports which speak of al-Rashīd’s fulfillment of his 
duties as caliph with respect to his guardianship of the creed and the dispensation of 
justice; of reports that speak of him keeping company with the learned and with saints; of 
his debates and communications with great religious figures; of his crying before 
sermons; of his excessive prayer every day; of the balance he maintained between his 
religious and military duties, so that he would engage in military campaigns in one year 
and perform the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca in another (I.23) 
 Having asserted al-Rashīd’s piety as a grown man, Ibn Khaldun moves on to 
argue how reports about this caliph’s carousing are in direct contradiction with his 
family’s legacy. As evidence, Ibn Khaldun brings up the example of Abū Ja‘far al-
Mansūr, al-Rashid’s grandfather who died when the latter was a “young boy” (innamā 
khalafahu ghulāman; I.23: 18), which, apparently, must have had an impact on the 
character of his grandson. According to Ibn Khaldun, al-Mansūr was well known for his 
deep knowledge and religiosity (I.24: 1). He was a close friend to the famous Muslim 
jurist, Imam Mālik Ibn Anas. As Ibn Khaldun reports,  
It is [al-Mansūr] who said to Mālik, when he advised him to compose the 
Muwat t a’, “O Abū ‘Abd Allāh, no one else has remained on the face of [this] 
Earth who is more learned than I and you. I am occupied by [the running of] the 
caliphate, and so you [have to] establish for the people a book by which they will 
benefit. Avoid in it the leniency of Ibn ‘Abbās as well as the strictness of Ibn 
‘Umar, and make it very accessible to the people (wat t i’hu li-al-nās tawtt i’a).” 
Mālik [later] said: “By God, on that day he taught me the [art of] composition. (I. 
24: 2-6)  
 
Beyond his knowledge and piety, and despite the fact that he was the head of a very 
powerful and wealthy dynasty, al-Mansūr was apparently an ascetic in daily life. Ibn 
Khaldun recalls an account in which al-Rashīd’s father, al-Mahdī, finds al-Mans ūr 
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supervising tailors who were patching the clothes of his children, because he did not want 
to spend public funds on his own family (I.24: 6-12). 
 And if intimate accounts of the integrity of al-Rashīd’s immediate family are not 
enough to dispel the accusation that he frequented drinking parties, Ibn Khaldun argues 
how these accusations run contrary to the caliph’s Bedouin Arab heritage and customs, to 
which “simple times” al-Rashīd was close in age. According to Ibn Khaldun, Arab 
nobility even before Islam avoided drinking wine, which they considered a reprehensible 
act (I.24: 15-19). 
 In addition to historical reports that speak to al-Rashīd’s character, the character 
of his forefathers and of his Arab heritage—and thus that directly call into question those 
reports that speak of al-Rashīd’s carousing—Ibn Khaldun presents a variety of reports, 
through the examination of which one can indirectly deduce al-Rashīd’s aversion to 
drinking wine. He begins with an account detailing how a non-Muslim physician to al-
Rashīd takes home without permission a dish that was prepared for his master. The 
reason for this apparently brazen act of theft is the fact that this food would have spoiled 
if it was not treated by wine, a liquid that the physician knew al-Rashīd would not 
consume (I.25: 10-14). Another report describes how al-Rashīd ordered the imprisonment 
of Abū al-Nawās—famous for his poems celebrating the hedonistic lifestyle of hard 
drinking, fornication, and homosexuality—when the poet’s excessive drinking of wine 
“was brought to his [i.e., al-Rashīd’s] attention” (I.25: 14-15). And as a parallel to his 
earlier defense, in which he addressed first al-Rashīd’s own character and then referred 
back to the uprightness of his parentage and the customs of his Arab ancestors, Ibn 
Khaldun concludes with reports speaking of his Arab background. With respect to these 
 166
 
reports, Ibn Khaldun describes how historians such as al-Tabarī and al-Mas‘ūdī were in 
agreement that when earlier Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs would ride in public, they 
adorned their weapons and horses with simple silver jewelry. He concludes that just as 
these earlier caliphs, which include al-Rashīd, were modest in their dress, then they must 
have been moderate in their drinking. Ibn Khaldun takes this opportunity to point out to 
his readers that the question of how the primitive/nomadic origins of a dynasty influence 
its later development will be addressed in detail in the first book of Kitāb al-‘Ibar, i.e., 
the Muqaddima. 
 Ibn Khaldun continues his valiant defense of the moral character of the Abbasids 
in the second and third examples of what he describes as the “interpolated narratives of 
the historians” (I.18: 17-18). In the second example, he discusses reports that claim that 
the caliph al-Ma’mūn and his judge, Ibn Aktham, were drinking companions (I.26: 12-
17). And within this context, Ibn Khaldun takes the opportunity to refute accounts 
suggesting that Ibn Aktham was a lover of boys (I.27: 8-11). In the third example, Ibn 
Khaldun discusses yet more historical reports that speak of al-Ma’mūn’s love of drinking 
and of his walking the nights in Baghdad looking for some kind of wanton adventure 
(I.28: 2-13). In refuting these accounts, Ibn Khaldun follows the same method he used 
with respect to the reports regarding Ja‘far and al-‘Abbāsah, namely, countering these 
sensationalist accounts with others that speak of al-Ma’mūn and Ibn Aktham’s piety and 
moral probity. These morally-infused counter-narratives are given weight and credibility 
over the sensationalist accounts by what Ibn Khaldun deems the likely behavior and 
suitable companions of a ruling family like the Abbasids. 
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 As I argued earlier, Ibn Khaldun aims at two potentially contradictory objectives. 
The first objective is to direct historians, through scientific-like arguments, to promote 
what is politically salutary for the community at large. This goal includes, among other 
things, emphasizing positive moral characteristics of historically significant figures and 
dynasties. The second is to encourage the rational examination of the predominant 
opinions of the political community by means of reflection on history. This goal requires, 
among other things, recognition of the human subjects under study, be that subject a 
ruler, an administrator, or a man of knowledge. This means recognition of the fact that all 
(or almost all) human beings contain within themselves contradictions, so that the same 
individual who performs acts judged highly or praise-worthy is capable of performing at 
the same time acts judged to be inferior or blame-worthy. 
 The detailed picture that I have provided of Ibn Khaldun’s defense regarding the 
moral character of the Abbasids will help us better understand the intricate way in which 
he navigates between these two objectives. If we follow Ibn Khaldun’s own advice, by 
looking not only at what the historical report wishes to communicate explicitly, but also 
reflecting on what we can deduce from it implicitly, we discover the following: with 
respect to almost every argument that Ibn Khaldun advances in defense of al-Rashīd, al-
‘Abbāsah, al-Ma’mūn, or Ibn Aktham, he provides details—whether in the immediate 
defense itself or later on in the introduction—that raise questions regarding the strength 
of each of these defensive arguments.18 As we will see shortly, these questions, in and of 
themselves, do not suggest the truth of the accusations against the Abbasids, but rather 
                                                 
18 It is because of the deliberate questions which Ibn Khaldun provides with respect to his defense, that I 
did not attempt to provide a comparison between his version of historical events and the sources, declared 
or not, from which Ibn Khaldun provides his evidence. Moreover, I declined to provide addition 
information regarding the reports Ibn Khaldun discussed beyond what is generally known by his immediate 
Arab audiences, as for example my note regarding the hedonistic character of Abī al-Nawās’ poetry. 
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they reflect the uncertainty of answers regarding the moral conduct of historical figures 
and point toward a more nuanced treatment of morality in the Muqaddima. 
 We shall begin first with Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of reports regarding the 
accusation of the Abbasids’ illicit drinking of wine. What is interesting about this 
discussion is that Ibn Khaldun, while arguing the sobriety of the Abbasids, brings out the 
open not only the accusation that al-Rashīd, al-‘Abbāsah, and their client Ja‘far 
participated in drinking parties, but he also mentions reports that bring up the same 
accusation against al-Ma’mūn, al-Ma’mūn’s wife Burān (I.28-29: 2-3), and al-Ma’mūn’s 
friend and judge Ibn Aktham. One begins to wonder whether Ibn Khaldun is protesting 
too much. Moreover, in the midst of his spirited refutation of these “baseless accounts”—
in which he goes back as far as pre-Islamic times (al-jāhiliyya; I.24) to argue that 
drinking wine was considered contrary to the customs of Arab nobility—Ibn Khaldun 
informs us that it was customary for the Abbasids to drink a type of alcoholic beverage 
called date wine (nabīdh al-tamr; I.25). He insists, however, that this type of drink was 
allowed by the ‘Iraqī religious school (‘alā madhhab ahl al-‘irāq), since it is apparently 
much less potent than pure wine (al-khamr al-sāfī; I.25-26). 
 Ibn Khaldun refers us to reports that speak of al-Rashīd’s fulfillment of his duties 
as caliph, of his guardianship of the creed, of his dispensation of justice, and of his 
extreme piety, reports which contradict the description of him as a night reveler. And yet, 
in the very reports in which he describes the power of the Barmakids, Ibn Khaldun 
alludes to great civil strife during al-Rashīd’s reign, which is hardly the outcome of 
effective political leadership (I.21: 2-4; I.21-22: 15-3). In the next part of the 
introduction, in which Ibn Khaldun deals with three founders of dynasties—two of which 
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were rivals to the Abbasids—we see evidence that the cracks in the central authority of 
the Abbasids were clearly visible during the reign of al-Rashīd. As Ibn Khaldun argues, 
al-Rashīd was too weak to stop the political decline of his dynasty and at times he relied 
on deceit and conspiracy in order to get rid of his enemies (I.35-36: 16-14).  
 Of course, one can argue that al-Rashīd’s effectiveness as a ruler bears little on 
the judgment of his moral character. He could have been a weak caliph, but remained 
upright with respect to his piety and the fulfillment of his religious duties. And yet, here 
again, Ibn Khaldun’s account of al-Rashīd’s piety and moral probity is problematic. 
There are first the reports that speak of al-Rashīd’s excessive daily prayer as well as his 
habit of fighting one year and performing the pilgrimage to Mecca in another. Such 
reports seem akin to the ones in which reporters “exaggerate the count, exceed the limits 
of [recognized] customs, and succumb to the temptations of what is strange” (I.11: 4-5)—
i.e., to those categories of historical reports that Ibn Khaldun criticized in the previous 
section. Moreover, these acts of excessive piety seem contrary to some aspects of al-
Rashīd’s character as reported by Ibn Khaldun himself.  For example, al-Rashīd 
apparently had many spies and was easily given to the “slanderous scorpions of the 
dynasty” (I.21: 8-9; I.22-23: 14-2). Ibn Khaldun informs us that al-Rashīd had a famous 
court jester, Ibn Abī Maryam, who used to entertain him “at night” (I.23: 11-12). This 
seems strange considering that al-Rashīd was supposedly an early riser, who always 
performed the dawn prayer (I.23: 9), and it appears to be at odds with the supposedly 
simple lifestyle of the Abbasids (I.23-24: 16-14). But what is most telling in this report is 
the episode between al-Rashīd and Ibn Abī Maryam, which Ibn Khaldun provides as 
evidence of al-Rashīd’s piety. He reports that, while al-Rashīd was performing his prayer, 
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Ibn Abī Maryam heard him recite the following verse from the Quran, “What is wrong 
with me that I don’t worship the one who created me?” (Q 36: 22). Ibn Abī Maryam 
quickly responds, “By God, I don’t know what is,” at which comment al-Rashīd “could 
not help but laugh,” before turning “angrily” toward the jester and declaring: “O Ibn Abī 
Maryam, [you dare to make fun] with respect to prayer also! Beware! Beware! 
Everything is open to you except the Quran and the creed” (I.23: 11-16). This episode is 
interesting for two reasons. First, there is the familiarity of the jester with his king—a 
familiarity that the supposedly pious al-Rashīd has clearly encouraged—which made it 
possible for Ibn Abī Maryam to interrupt al-Rashīd in his public prayer. Second, there is 
al-Rashīd’s sudden laughter with respect to a verse that speaks of a sincere quest for the 
true object of one’s worship. This immediate impulse to laughter seems to confirm the 
truth behind the jester’s jibe, i.e., al-Rashīd is not sincere in his own worship. Is the joke 
funny because it is true? 
 A universally recognized indicator of the uprightness of a man’s moral character 
has to do with how kindly he treats his own family and kin. Ibn Khaldun, for example, 
bemoans how the “envy that settled in [the] hearts” of the Barmakids’ own kin, Banū 
Qaht tabah, “was not softened by the kindness that comes with blood ties nor was it 
restrained by the dictates of family relations” (I.21: 10-11). And yet, despite his 
acknowledgment of this moral standard, Ibn Khaldun casually, in this and the next 
section, communicates to us the persecution by the Abbasids of their own family and kin 
(I.20-21; I.21-22; I.30-31; I.35-36). It was the Barmakids who “gave generously to the 
[Alid] Shī‘a men and to the great among those related [to the prophet’s family], and they 
surrounded them with favors” (I.21: 2-4). It was a Barmakid, Ja‘far Ibn Yahyā, who 
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showed “concern…for the blood of the prophet’s family” (I.22: 3). Whether or not this 
claim was a sincere expression of concern, one thing is clear we are not told that the 
pious and morally upright al-Rashīd expressed such concern. 
 Of course, almost all of the arguments that Ibn Khaldun advances in defense of 
the Abbasids are presented in the form of positive historical reports. The main purpose of 
these reports is to “expose” what the negative historical accounts contain of “errors and 
fancies” (I.8: 11). In giving weight to the positive history, Ibn Khaldun advances an 
argument showing the inconsistency between, on the one hand, the Abbasids alleged 
hedonistic lifestyle, and, on the other, the Abbasids closeness in age to their ancestors 
primitive/nomadic times, i.e., the times in which their ancestors lived in simple piety and 
“far from the customs of luxury and the pastures of licentiousness” (I.19: 13-14). This is 
the closest that Ibn Khaldun comes in this section of the introduction to a “scientific” or 
“demonstrative” argument. He uses different forms of this argument to support the 
positive reports regarding al-Abbāsah (I.19: 12-19), al-Rashīd (I.19-20: 19-1; I.23: 16-18; 
I.24: 14-19; and I.25-26: 19-3), and al-Ma’mūn (I.28-29: 13-3). Now, as Ibn Khaldun 
himself points out (I.26: 11-12), this argument, which looks at how the origins of a 
dynasty influence its later development, is treated in full in the main text of the 
Muqaddima. A brief comparison between this argument as it appears in the main text of 
the Muqaddima with Ibn Khaldun’s defense of the Abbasids in the introduction allows us 
to see how he balances his two aforementioned objectives: to encourage reflection on 
political life by means of a rational examination of history and, at the same time, to 
preserve and emphasize the politically salutary aspects of history. 
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 In the third part of his Muqaddima, entitled “On the general dynasty, kingship, the 
caliphate, the ranks of authority, and the accidental conditions that happen in all of 
these,” (I.278) Ibn Khaldun provides, among other related themes, a treatment of the 
moral character of royal authority. A quick look at the titles of the chapters in which this 
theme is introduced, i.e., Sub-Chapters 10-12, gives us an idea of the type of conclusions 
reached by Ibn Khaldun through his rational study of human culture. 
Section 10: “That it is in the nature of kingship to claim all the glory, to penetrate 
deeply into luxury, and to favor calmness and tranquility” (I.299-301) 
 
Section 11: “That if the nature of kingship became firmly established by claming 
all the glory and by the occurrence of luxury and calmness, then the dynasty 
would have approached senility.” (I.302-305) 
 
Section 12: “That dynasties, like individual [human beings], have natural ages” 
(I.305-309) 
 
In these chapters, Ibn Khaldun traces the natural aims, progress, and decline that a 
dynasty experiences after it is founded. However, he makes clear, as he does in other 
chapters, that one cannot understand the natural course of growth and decline a dynasty 
follows, without first understanding the origins out of which the dynasty came forth. In 
other words, we cannot understand why and how it is in the nature of the dynasty to claim 
all the glory for itself, unless we understand first the communal power which makes the 
ascendancy of this dynasty possible. This communal power is called “group feeling,” 
(asabiyya), which moves the related but distinct nomadic tribes to come together as one 
united group in pursuit of a single aim, which is kingship and glory (al-majd; I.252-254: 
16-9, but cf. I.273-276: 3-5). However, as is the nature of politics (e.g., I.71-72: 11-7 and 
I.252: 11-15), only the most powerful branch of the ‘asabiyya-linked tribes can form the 
dynasty, and only one individual can become its sole leader, i.e., to claim the glory all for 
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himself as king (I.235-236: 1-11, I.239-240: 12-10, I.252-253: 15-3, I.264: 9-13, and 299-
300: 8-16). And so, the most powerful factor that made the formation of the dynasty 
possible, group feeling (‘asabiyya), begins to lose its potency after the formation of the 
dynasty. According to Ibn Khaldun, the decline in the power of group feeling goes 
through several stages before it finally ceases to be effective in supporting the dynasty 
(I.305-309: 18-6, I.314-317: 14-8). Of course, it is not only the kingship’s natural 
aspiration to claim all the glory for itself that leads to the ultimate demise of group 
feeling. As Ibn Khaldun argues, there are other important factors, such as the 
transformation of the founding generation from a primitive/nomadic setting to a 
civilized/settled setting. As the years go by, and as the founding group becomes, with 
each new generation, more at home in its new environment, a change in the moral 
character and the dynamics of the group begins to settle in. The group feeling, which was 
originally austere and warlike at the time of the founding of the dynasty, naturally 
becomes, with every passing generation, preoccupied with luxury, calmness, and 
tranquility (I.309-313: 8-7). So, according to Ibn Khaldun’s treatment of the “natural 
ages” of dynasties (I.305-309) and his treatment of the different stages in a dynasty’s 
development (I.314-317), each succeeding generation after the foundation of the dynasty 
loses touch with certain aspects of the way of life of the generation that preceded it. 
Change in the way of life continues from one generation to another until it reaches a stage 
where a later generation has little in common with respect to the way of life of the 
founding generation. According to Ibn Khaldun’s formulation, this stage is usually 
reached by the fourth generation. 
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Now, by juxtaposing this brief summary of the development of dynasties on the 
one hand, with Ibn Khaldun’s defense of the Abbasids in the introduction on the other, 
we can make the following observations. It is clear from Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of the 
Abbasids—especially when this discussion is accompanied by the most elementary 
knowledge of the history of this dynasty—that by the time of al-Rashīd, al-‘Abbāsah, and 
al-Ma’mūn, the dynasty was far from being close to its nomadic ancestors’ simple and 
austere way of life. When Ibn Khaldun discusses the noble lineage of al-‘Abbāsah, for 
example, he recalls that “only four fathers” separated her from ‘Abd Allāh Ibn al-‘Abbās, 
the prophet’s first cousin. And although “four fathers” might not at first seem to be a long 
period, it means that al-‘Abbāsah and her brother al-Rashīd were five generations 
removed from the way of life of the earliest Muslims. What is more, al-Rashīd and al-
Ma’mūn were part of the third- and fourth-generation Abbasids. According to Ibn 
Khaldun’s general scheme of the growth and decline of dynasties, then, these individuals 
were not only far from the simple times of the founders of the dynasty, but also were 
deep in luxury, calmness, and tranquility. The mention of the famous poet Abū al-Nawās 
in the introduction, who is notorious for his hedonistic poems, is a subtle clue as to the 
type of social environment that was encouraged during the reign of al-Rashīd and later 
his descendants. And if Abū al-Nawās was indeed imprisoned by al-Rashīd when, as it 
was reported, his “excessive drinking” came to the latter’s “attention” (I.25), Ibn Khaldun 
shows us later in the Muqaddima that al-Ma’mūn was rather a fan of his poetry (I.311). 
However, if this is not enough evidence to show Ibn Khaldun’s awareness of how 
much removed al-Rashīd and al-Ma’mūn were from the nomadic ways of life he provides 
us with definitive proof later on in the Muqaddima. In the context of discussing the extent 
 175
 
of a dynasty’s “transformation” from its primitive/nomadic stage to a “civilized” (al-
hadārah) stage, Ibn Khaldun reports a lavish event in the history of the Abbasid dynasty: 
the wedding party of al-Ma’mūn and Būrān Bint al-Hasan Ibn Sahl. Based on the 
authority of several sources, such as al-Tabarī, al-Mas‘ūdī, and “other historians,” Ibn 
Khaldun recounts an event of incredible proportions. He describes, for example, 
extraordinary sums of money that al-Hasan gave as gifts to al-Ma’mūn’s retinue; of al-
Ma’mūn’s precious wedding gift to Būrān of a thousand ruby stones; of festivities 
brightened by amber candles, each one weighing one hundred mann (i.e., each one 
weighing over two hundred and sixty pounds); of a path prepared for the bride to walk on 
covered by a carpet woven with gold threads and decked with pearls and sapphires; of a 
massive feast; of the wood needed to prepare the feast that required one hundred and 
forty mules to be loaded three times a day for a whole year (all of that wood was 
consumed that same night); and of preparing thirty thousand boats to transport the guests 
to the wedding place (I.310-311: 13-18). Of course, most, if not all, of these reports about 
al-Ma’mūn’s extravagance contain much exaggeration, on the same order as those 
exaggerations contained in reports describing the Abbasids’ piety and excessive austerity 
(e.g., I.23: 7-15, I.24: 6-12, I.25-26: 19-10, and I.28: 13-17). Considering the context of 
both types of exaggerated reports, we are tempted to conclude the following: those 
reports which apply hyperbole in describing the Abbasids’ ostentatious use of power and 
wealth are more likely closer to the truth than those reports that apply hyperbole when 
describing the asceticism of the Abbasids; for the first type of reports contains 
overstatements of what is in accordance with the “ways of dynasties,” whereas the second 
type of reports contains overstatements that seem to run contrary to the “ways of 
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dynasties.” It is clear, however, that Ibn Khaldun is willing to use both types of reports to 
support or prove his point. It is also clear that—once the student is familiar with the 
totality of Ibn Khaldun’s method of investigation and the different objectives that inform 
this investigation—the overstatements in both types of reports can easily be corrected or 
glossed over. 
Before turning to the third section of Ibn Khaldun’s critique of the “errors and 
fancies” of historians, it is necessary to make two points to conclude the current section. 
First, by comparing the discussion in the original introduction with parallel discussions in 
the main text of the Muqaddima, it is now apparent how Ibn Khaldun addresses two 
different audiences at the same time. To those who read history in order to find models 
that would guide them in “religious and worldly” affairs, Ibn Khaldun addresses their 
needs by presenting proper models free from morally negative characterizations. These 
models representing key figures in Muslim history are dressed in purely pious, just, and 
austere garb. But to those who carefully follow Ibn Khaldun’s arguments to their ultimate 
conclusions, he offers new ways by which they can engage the past and at the same time 
enrich their understanding of present political realities.  
Second, in this section, Ibn Khaldun introduces different techniques by which he 
“exposes” errors committed by previous historians. One technique is to counter 
“negative” historical reports with “positive” ones. Concomitant with this technique is to 
provide a “rational” argument that would give weight to the counter reports. Another 
technique is to examine reports, which on the surface do not seem to bear on the 
historical question under discussion, but, through a process of reasoning one can deduce 
relevant facts regarding the question at hand. This, for example, was the purpose of Ibn 
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Khaldun’s presentation of the story of al-Rashīd and his physician with respect to the 
former consumption of wine (I.23). We have seen in the discussion of this section how, 
by applying the same technique to the historical reports which Ibn Khaldun presents 
approvingly—and while paying attention to the way and the context in which he presents 
such reports—we are better able to conclude when such reports are intended for their 
politically salutary effects, and when they are intended as statements of Ibn Khaldun’s 
personal opinion. This analysis proves valuable both in the next section of the 
Introduction, as well as in the text of the Muqaddima.  
  
III. C. On the Lineage of the Ubaydid 
Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of historical reports contesting the Alid lineage asserted 
by the Ubaydid—the founders of the Ismā‘īli Fatimid dynasty—is the first (I.29-34: 16-
10) of three discussions that share a common theme, namely, disputes regarding claims of 
political legitimacy by founders of new dynasties. The second discussion deals with 
historical reports contesting the Alid lineage of Idrīs Ibn ‘Abdallah, the founder of the 
Idrisid dynasty in the Maghrib (I.34-40: 10-16). The third and final discussion deals with 
historical reports impugning the honor of al-Mahdī Ibn Tūmart, the founder of the 
Almohad dynasty in the Maghrib and southern Spain (I.40-43: 7-4).  
In addition to the theme of political legitimacy, the three discussions in this 
section share a common geographic and ethnic focus. They all deal with dynasties whose 
power base originated in northwest Africa and whose fervent allies were fierce Berber 
tribes (see for example, I.33: 6-9, I.34-35: 15-11, and I.42: 8-16). In these discussions, 
Ibn Khaldun demonstrates the importance of the historical studies of this region and its 
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inhabitants for a comprehensive understanding of Muslim history (cf. I.52-53). Moreover, 
the historical reports in this section communicate the weakening and eventual collapse of 
the Abbasid dynasty. As such, these reports depict the shift in political power from the 
central authority of Arab dynasties, which once controlled most of the Muslim world, to 
the more diffused power of regional, mostly non-Arab dynasties. In this context, Ibn 
Khaldun traces the effects of the power shift on historical scholarship and points to the 
effects of political conflicts on intellectual and scholarly development. 
The techniques which Ibn Khaldun uses to expose the historians’ errors with 
respect to the political legitimacy of specific founders of dynasties are similar to those he 
used to expose the historians’ errors with respect to the moral conduct of specific 
Abbasid rulers. As in the previous section, Ibn Khaldun starts by providing, from the 
available historical record, accounts that counter the negative reports by the historians. 
He then proceeds to give a rational argument that would substantiate his counter reports 
(see for example, I.30-32: 6-3 and I.31-32: 8-4; as well as I.34-35: 15-9 and I.35: 9-11). 
Accordingly, my analysis here will not focus on these techniques, but rather will focus on 
Ibn Khaldun’s purpose in raising the theme of this section and will explore the reasons 
behind his explicit conclusions with respect to this theme. 
 
I now turn to Ibn Khaldun’s first discussion in this section. As noted, the Ubaydid 
are the founders of the Fatimid dynasty, for which they are better known today as the 
Fatimids (al-fātimiyūn). At the height of their power, the Ubaydid controlled the 
Maghrib, Egypt, Syria, and al-Hijāz and presented a clear and present military danger for 
the Abbasids in ‘Irāq (I.33: 8-18). The founder of the dynasty was ‘Ubayd Allāh al-
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Mahdī, who supposedly was a descendant of Imam Ismā‘īl Ibn Ja‘far al-Sādiq, the 
seventh Imam according to Ismā‘īli Shī‘a. According to what is reported, Imam Ismā‘īl is 
a descendant of the prophet Muhammad’s cousin, ‘Alī Ibn Abī Tālib, and the prophet’s 
daughter, Fātimah. In claiming this lineage the Ubaydid dynasty acquired the designation 
of Fatimid. Now this genealogy was, as it is still today, highly disputed by partisan 
historians. As at the outset of all previous discussions in his introduction, Ibn Khaldun 
leaves no doubt at the beginning of this one which side of the “dispute” he is on:  
And from among the baseless reports (al-akhbār al-wāhiya) are those ones 
concerning the Ubaydid…through which many historians go to lengths to  deny 
their [i.e., the Ubaydid’s] relation to the People of the House (ahl al-bayt)—
Godly prayer be upon them—and in discrediting their lineage with respect to the 
Imam Ismā‘īl Ibn Ja‘far al-Sādiq (I.29-30: 16-1).  
 
Of course, in previous discussions, Ibn Khaldun delays explaining the reasons behind the 
“baseless reports” until he proves the very fact that these reports are indeed baseless. 
Here, however, Ibn Khaldun makes the intentions behind these reports his first concern:  
In this, [the historians] rely on accounts invented for the sake of the downtrodden 
(al-mustad‘afīn) of the Abbasid caliphs, in order to cajole them by defaming their 
rivals and to display artful ways of gloating over their enemies (I.30: 1-3). 
 
Ibn Khaldun uses almost the same rhetorical device in his refutation of the reports 
regarding the lineage of the Idrisids (I.35: 9-12, I.38-39: 11-15), and again in his 
refutation of reports regarding the integrity of al-Mahdī Ibn Tūmart (I.40-41: 13-5). By so 
constructing his argument, Ibn Khaldun emphasizes the political intentions behind these 
historical reports. This political emphasis is in sharp contrast to the first section, in which 
the historians’ tendency for hyperbole is explained by the “soul’s passion for what is 
strange, the tongue’s ease with the excessive, and obliviousness about what has been 
reviewed and criticized” (I.12: 8-9). In the second section, the historians’ fondness for 
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sensationalist accounts is explained as their “indulgence in prohibited pleasures and 
[desire to] expose the shield of manliness” (I.29: 5). 
Yet, the most intriguing aspect of this section is the unsatisfactory way in which 
Ibn Khaldun addresses its central question, namely, what the rational argument is by 
which we can verify the truthfulness of the claims made by the founders of these 
dynasties. Although Ibn Khaldun provides “evidence” in support of these claims, his 
fundamental argument can be boiled down to the following: the claims of these founders 
are true because their supporters believed them to be true and acted forcefully in 
accordance with this belief. 
We see this clearly in the case of Ibn Khaldun’s treatment of the Ubaydids. After 
describing the persecution that ‘Ubayd Allāh al-Mahdī, his son Abū al-Qāsim, and their 
supporters all suffered under the Abbasids and their clients, and after expressing the great 
power that the Ubaydid achieved despite this persecution, so that they controlled at the 
height of their power the Maghrib, Egypt, Syria, and al-Hijāz, Ibn Khaldun rhetorically 
asks, “And how would all of this happen to someone whose lineage was suspect, and who 
is vulnerable to falsification with respect to his claims?” (I.31: 8-9). And just in case 
these accomplishments should escape the attention of his readers, Ibn Khaldun 
emphasizes the longevity of this dynasty as well as the religiously significant territories 
that were under their control: 
Their dynasty has lasted for about two hundred and seventy years. They 
possessed the place where Abraham (peace be upon him) had stood and 
worshipped, the homeland and the burial place of the Messenger [of God], the 
station of pilgrims, and the descending place for Angels. (I.31: 14-16)  
 
But it is the genuine belief of their supporters in the message of the Ubaydid—especially 
the “Kutāmiyyīes Barbars” (I.33: 8)—that constitute for Ibn Khaldun the definitive proof 
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that the Alid lineage claimed by the Ubaydid was true. After all, the belief in the truth of 
this message depends on the certainty that its messenger belongs to the family of the 
prophet. Without this certainty on the part of the followers, none of these great 
accomplishments by the Ubaydid would have been possible, and neither would it have 
been possible for the supporters to continue their advocacy long after the Ubaydid lost 
their territories and their material wealth. As Ibn Khaldun insists: 
All the while, their partisans were as constant as ever in obedience to them, in 
loving them, and in believing in [the authenticity of] their descent from Imām 
Ismā‘īl, the son of Ja‘far al-S ādiq. Their partisans—after the Ubaydid dynasty 
disappeared and its traces wiped out—repeatedly committed insurrections, 
calling on the names of the boys who are of Ubaydid stock, claiming their right 
to the caliphate, and going so far as to declare them appointed to the succession 
by the preceding Imāms. (I.31-32: 16-1) 
 
Ibn Khaldun uses the same argument—that the lineage of a dynasty is genuine 
because the followers believe it to be genuine—with respect to the Idrisid dynasty. The 
Idrisids, like the Ubaydids after them, also claimed Alid descent, i.e., that “Idrīs” is “the 
son of Idrīs Ibn ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Hasan Ibn al-Hasan Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Abī Tālib (peace be 
upon all of them)” (I.11-12). And as with his argument regarding the Ubaydids, Ibn 
Khaldun uses the loyalty the Berber tribes showed the Idrisids as the authenticity of the 
latter’s claims: 
The totality of the Berbers in the extreme Maghrib agreed to give the oath of 
loyalty to the younger Idrīs as his father’s successor. They willingly and eagerly 
gave him their obedience. They swore to die for him. For his sake they exposed 
themselves to mortal dangers in fighting his wars and raids. If they were to 
entertain within themselves such suspicions [regarding Idrīs’s descent], or if they 
heard such clamor from [anyone] even [if] a sworn enemy or a suspicious 
hypocrite, then at least some of them would have declined to give this support. 
No, by God, these [defaming] words were made up by none other than the 




It is clear here that the first two discussions in this section share the same logic, but what 
about the third discussion? 
At first look, Ibn Khaldun’s argument in defense of al-Mahdī Ibn Tūmart and the 
Almohad dynasty appears different than his argument in defense of the Ubaydids and the 
Idrisids. Unlike the previous two cases, Ibn Khaldun maintains that the founder of the 
Almohad dynasty never claimed Alid lineage (I.42: 3-4), or at least never publicly 
claimed it (cf. I.42: 12-16). Accordingly, we should conclude that the dispute regarding 
Ibn Tūmart’s alleged Alid lineage is not a real dispute, but a straw man argument made 
by malicious historians to further discredit the founder of the Almohad dynasty. 
However, Ibn Khaldun does not seem satisfied with this argument, for he quickly argues 
that if one were to establish the fact that Ibn Tūmart did indeed claim Alid lineage, then 
“no proof can be made to dispute this [lineage], because people are to be believed in the 
lineage [they proclaim]” (I.42: 4-5). In addressing this strange defense, we need to look 
first at the reason for Ibn Khaldun’s initial confidence that Ibn Tūmart never claimed Alid 
descent. The answer which Ibn Khaldun immediately provides is that Ibn Tūmart, a 
Berber native, never needed to claim such a descent in order to unify the al-Masmūdiya 
Berber tribes in their opposition to the established and corrupt Almoravid dynasty. The 
Hargha tribe, to which Ibn Tūmart belonged, constituted the most powerful Berber 
‘asabiya (group feeling) at the time, putting them in the position of leadership with 
respect to the other Berber tribes (I.42: 7-12). By virtue of his own Berber lineage, Ibn 
Tūmart had in place the military powerbase needed to challenge the established political 
order. He was able to mobilize this base through his powerful religious rhetoric that was 
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reinforced by means of his own personal example of piety, asceticism, and perseverance 
(I.41-42: 5-2). 
If we contrast the case of Ibn Tūmart with that of ‘Ubayd Allāh and Idrīs, we 
clearly see that Ibn Khaldun’s real concern lies not with verifying the historical question 
of whether particular people had Alid descent. Rather, he is much more concerned with 
focusing the attention of his readers on two essential elements through which founders of 
new dynasties are able to successfully challenge and replace old dynasties: the military 
powerbase needed to challenge the established order and the message that would allow 
for the mobilization of this base. What is at issue for Ibn Khaldun is not whether the 
claims to legitimacy upon which a new dynasty based itself were true, but rather the fact 
that people believed in, and were willing to fight and die for, the sake of these claims. As 
for ‘Ubayd Allāh and Idrīs—two Arab religious figures who were supported by Berber 
tribes—the basis of their legitimacy was taken to be their ascendancy from the family of 
the prophet, “for the claim to such a descent is a claim to great honor among nations and 
generations of all territories” (I.38: 13-14). With respect to Ibn Tūmart—a Berber 
religious leader from a powerful Berber tribe—the basis of his legitimacy was the clarity 
and purity of his message. As we have already seen, understanding the process of the rise 
and fall of dynasties, with all its complexity, is what occupies the attention of Ibn 
Khaldun’s Muqaddima. Disputes regarding particular historical details are nothing more 
than a distraction for him. What concern is it to us if the Ubaydid had a legitimate Alid 
lineage? What matters is that people believed in, and acted in accordance with, this 
belief, for here one is pointed toward fundamental political facts that are in need of 
careful study and analysis.  
 184
 
As Ibn Khaldun points toward elements that play an essential part in the forming 
of new dynasties, he also points toward signs that indicate the weakening of old dynasties 
and foretell their coming demise. The reports that Ibn Khaldun disputes in this section are 
all based, according to him, on accounts by sycophantic “scholars” who, in their disparate 
attempts to please their masters, have no regard for the truth. The ultimate fault for these 
accounts, however, lies with the masters themselves, the rulers of the dynasty who 
created, through their political weakness, the toxic intellectual environment. At the 
conclusion of his first discussion in this section, Ibn Khaldun maintains: 
The dynasty and [political] authority are the marketplace for the world. To it are 
brought the goods of sciences and arts. In it are sought wayward maxims, and 
toward it caravans of tales and [historical] reports are urged on. What is 
consumed in this market is consumed by all. Hence, when a dynasty transcends 
insolence, crookedness, fatuousness, and deceitfulness, as well as follows the 
straightforward path, not swaying from the intended course, then fine gold and 
pure silver is consumed in this market. [But] when a dynasty moves along with 
double dealings and resentments, as well as swarming with the brokers of 
inequity and falsehood, then the dross and the counterfeit is consumed [in this 
market]. And the clear sighted critic [is the one who] judges his own reflection, 
and [provides his own] scales for what he searches for and seeks after. (I.34: 2-
10) 
 
In this statement, Ibn Khaldun echoes what he has already alluded to in the preface, 
namely, that the health and welfare of the arts and sciences are intimately tied with the 
health and welfare of the larger political community that consumes these arts and 
sciences, and that the welfare of the larger political community is determined, in turn, by 
the health of the political authority which rules and guides the community. And as in the 
preface, Ibn Khaldun singles out history as one of the most sought after subjects in the 
community, and points out how the quality of historical studies serves as an important 
indicator of the health of the political community. Now, the relationship between the 
health of the political authority and the health of the arts and sciences in general and the 
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health of historical studies in particular confirms once again Ibn Khaldun’s larger 
political interest in reforming the fine-art of history. But as it is intimated in Ibn 
Khaldun’s discussion of the errors of the historians—and as becomes clearer, as we saw, 
in the main text of the Muqaddima—the health of the political authority inevitably passes 
through periods of health and sickness, parallel to the natural course of the rise and fall of 
dynasties. These periods of health and sickness are beyond the control of the serious 
scholar. The real question for the scholar is what is to be done when a period of political 
sickness prevails.  
A clue as to the answer given by Ibn Khaldun is at the conclusion of the above 
statement, where he maintains, somewhat cryptically, that “the clear sighted critic [is the 
one who] judges his own reflection, and [provides his own] scales for what he searches 
for and seeks after.” The terms “insightfulness” (al-basīra) and “clear-sighted critic” (al-
nāqid al-basīr) are two that Ibn Khaldun uses in the preface to communicate the sense of 
a critical thinker who has the ability to distinguish truth from falsehood. But, whenever 
Ibn Khaldun uses these terms, he is careful to indicate that the critical thinker needs some 
kind of assistance or a standard by which he can correctly form his judgment. And so, 
when Ibn Khaldun wishes to distinguish between the blind imitator and critical thinker, 
he argues that “the transmitter [of reports] is someone who merely carries and transports; 
[while] “insightfulness” (al-basīra) critically captures, upon inspection, that which is 
sound, and science discloses and polishes for it the correct pages [of history]” (I.3: 8-10). 
Insightfulness here requires the assistance of science. A few lines later, Ibn Khaldun 
gives us a hint as to the type of science needed for insightfulness to “critically 
capture…what is sound” in history. In discussing religiously problematic works by 
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prominent historians, Ibn Khaldun insists that “the clear-sighted critic (al-nāqid al-bas īr) 
is his own judge in falsifying or considering [these historians] with respect to what they 
include in their transmissions [of reports]” (I.3: 20). But how can the clear- sighted critic 
become his own judge? Answer: Through the science of culture. “For culture has nature, 
through its conditions reports can be related, and accounts and historical materials can be 
predicated” (I.3-4: 20-2). Since the science of culture is the subject of the whole 
Muqaddima, it is not a stretch to assume that Ibn Khaldun’s work is intended to be the 
guide for the serious scholar even in times of political sickness. After all, in speaking to 
his preferred readership, Ibn Khaldun maintains that, through the careful study of the 
science of culture, the reader “would be able to tear [his] grip away from the [habit of] 
imitation, and would behold the conditions of times and groups that were before [his] 
time and that will be after it” (I.6: 7-9). He also indicates that this book of his 
“comprehends well the reports of the created, assuages difficulties in dispersed wise-
maxims, and gives causes and reasons for occurrences in dynasties, and has become a 
depository of wisdom and a receptacle for history” (I.7: 8-10). 
In the discussion of the errors of the historians Ibn Khaldun shows ways through 
which his Kitāb al-‘Ibar as a whole serves as a receptacle of history. He also provides us 
with clues about how he planned his book, especially the Muqaddima, to serve as a 
depository of wisdom. He leaves the full explication of this final point to the next two 
parts of the introduction, to which we now turn. 
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IV. Conclusion of the Original Introduction 
Having shown his readers the types of errors historians commit with respect to 
quantifiable facts, morality, and political legitimacy, Ibn Khaldun, somewhat 
apologetically, says: 
We almost digressed from the goal of this book by going on regarding these 
errors, [but] the steadiness of many authoritative [persons] and attentive 
historians has fallen with respect to traditions and opinions similar to these  ones, 
which got hold of their thoughts, inculcating the totality [of historians], who are 
of weak reflection and are oblivious regarding analogical reasoning—and they in 
turn inculcated them in others, without search and without deliberation, and were 
incorporated into their records—so that the fine art of history became feeble and 
confounded, confusing the one reflecting on it, and it was deemed among the 
common fields. (I.43: 4-10) 
 
Ibn Khaldun indicates here near the conclusion of the introduction what he has already 
stated in the preface, that once upon a time the fine-art of history was in good repair, but 
then it declined. And as in the preface, Ibn Khaldun distinguishes between two general 
types of historians, the pioneers and the followers. He holds the followers responsible—
those whom he called in the preface “dull in nature and mind or those who embraced 
dullness” (I.4: 10-11)—for the decline of this fine-art, because of their inability to engage 
in analogical reasoning. However, unlike in the preface, Ibn Khaldun makes it explicit 
here that the roots of this decline lie in the pioneers themselves. For one thing, they were 
not good teachers of their followers, a point which he will address shortly. In addition, 
most of the errors which Ibn Khaldun deals with in the previous part—especially the 
errors he discusses in the first two sections of that part—were mistakes committed by the 
pioneers themselves. The names of the distinguished al-Tabarī and al-Mas‘ūdī were two 
of the most familiar names recalled in that context. Accordingly, the reform of the fine-
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art of history must go deeper than stated earlier, and has to include the works and 
methods of those who supposedly pioneered the fine-art of history.  
Ibn Khaldun begins such far-reaching reform of history by defining the task of the 
historian. A careful reading of his outline of the types of knowledge that a scholar 
requires in order to engage in historical studies suggests that Ibn Khaldun is attempting to 
re-define the traditional understanding of the role of the historian. Now, having discussed 
errors committed by accomplished as well as incompetent historians, Ibn Khaldun states: 
Therefore, the companion of this fine-art requires knowledge of the foundations 
of politics, the natures of beings, and the differences among nations, regions, and 
epochs with respect to the ways of life, morals, customs, sects, schools, as well as 
the rest of [these] conditions; to encompass what is present in these and to show 
the agreement in likeness between it and that which is absent, or to clarify what is 
different between them, and to explain the causes for the agreement and the 
difference in this; as well as to uphold the roots of dynasties, religions, the 
principles of their manifestation, the reasons for their occurrence, the motives for 
their coming to be, the conditions and reports of those who sustain them, so that 
he would comprehend the reasons for each occurrence and would behold the root 
of each report. Thereafter, he would display his own transmitted report against 
what he has of foundations and roots: if the report agrees with these and is 
consistent with their course, then it is sound; otherwise he should falsify it and 
dispense with it. For this [reason] alone, the ancients deemed the knowing of 
history formidable, until it was taken up (intihalahu) by al-T abarī and al-Bukhārī, 
and before them by Ibn Ishāq, as well as by those like them of the nation’s 
learned ones. Many were oblivious regarding this secret in it, and to intrude on it 
was deemed easy by the commoners and whoever is not firmly established in the 
types of cognizance, and hence the pasture was mixed with the heedless, the core 
with the shell, and the truthful with the lying—and to [the judgment of] God is 
the consequence of affairs. (I.43-44: 10-7) 
 
In this statement, Ibn Khaldun presents and, at the same time, conflates three important 
points. The first point deals with the type of knowledge needed by the practitioner, or as 
he puts it, the companion (sāhib) of the fine-art of history. The second point concerns 
what the ancients thought of this fine-art and lists the names of Muslim scholars who 
supposedly pioneered the study of history. The third and final point deals with subsequent 
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practitioners of this fine art. In order to better understand the nuance of Ibn Khaldun’s 
argument here, I shall treat each point separately. 
With respect to the first point, the list of the types of knowledge the historian 
needs is long and somewhat complicated. At the head of this list is knowledge of politics 
in particular and of “beings” (al-mawjūdāt) in general. These are the types of knowledge 
one acquires through an education in philosophy in both its theoretical and practical 
aspects. These traditional sciences are followed by some type of comprehensive 
knowledge of how ways of life, morals, customs, and religious beliefs and practices differ 
in relation to different nations, regions, and time periods. As we will see shortly, this is 
the type of knowledge at which the science of culture aims, i.e., it is a new type of 
knowledge through which Ibn Khaldun wishes to influence the education of the 
practitioner of history. With this background knowledge, the historian can compare and 
contrast existing moral, political, and religious conditions with past ones, as well as 
explain the reasons and causes for the similarities and differences among all of these 
conditions. As I have argued before, Ibn Khaldun makes the rational understanding of 
existing political reality—in all its physical, moral, and religious complexity—an 
essential condition for understanding history. But, as we will shortly have occasion to 
judge, this past-present comparison is not only intended for the sake of verifying 
historical reports, but also to encourage the rational examination of present political 
reality.  
As a prerequisite to the study of history, Ibn Khaldun moves from the most 
universal knowledge of political and physical phenomenon—i.e., the foundations of 
politics and the nature of beings—to knowledge of the particular—i.e., the various types 
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of physical, political, moral, and religious conditions present in the world—while 
indicating the ways in which these types of knowledge ought to be applied. Then, having 
moved from the general to the particular, Ibn Khaldun turns back to the general. He 
argues the need to examine the roots of dynasties and religions, to explain the principles 
through which these come to be, to point out the reasons and motives for their coming to 
be, and to understand the conditions of the people who “sustain” (al-qā’imīn) these 
dynasties and religions. It is only after this background knowledge that it becomes 
possible for the practitioner of history to look at historical reports and to judge them 
“against what he has of foundations and roots: if the report agrees with these and is 
consistent with their course, then it is sound; otherwise, he should falsify it and dispense 
with it” (I.43-44: 19-1). 
At this juncture, Ibn Khaldun turns to his second point. He argues that “for this 
[reason] alone”—i.e., that the verification of historical reports requires so much 
background knowledge—the “ancients deemed the knowing of history formidable” (I.44: 
1-2). There are two interesting things about this statement. First, it is not clear who these 
“ancients” (al-qudamā’) are. It could be a reference to the early Muslims, or it could be a 
reference to the ancient Greek philosophers. Second, the word istakbara, which I have 
translated above as “deemed…formidable,” has the alternative meaning of judging a 
thing to be beneath one’s dignity. Now if we render istakbara as deemed formidable, then 
the word “ancients” might indeed be a reference to the early Muslims, since later 
Muslims “took up” the fine–art of history. However, if we render istakbara as to judge 
something beneath one’s dignity, then the word “ancients” most likely refers to the 
ancient philosophers. The evidence that this is indeed the intended meaning by Ibn 
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Khaldun comes in his general introduction to the science of culture. After making the 
case for what is innovative about this science, Ibn Khaldun argues: 
If every intellected truth has a nature that is proper to investigate what accidents 
happen to it, then it becomes necessary, in considering each comprehensible and 
truth, that there be a certain science that is particular to it. But the sages, perhaps 
because they held in regard a concern for the fruits of such [investigations], and 
as you have seen, the fruit of this [science of culture]—through its questions are 
in themselves and with respect to their domains noble—is only concerned with 
[historical] reports and with the correction of [historical] reports, which is a weak 
fruit, and that is why they abandoned it. (I.63: 1-9). 
 
The sages or the philosophers (i.e., the ancients) did not formulate a science of culture, 
because they judged the importance of a science by the “fruits” it produces. The “fruits” 
of the science of culture are according to the sages weak, because they deemed the 
correction of historical reports to be of low value, something which is not worth their 
efforts. But Ibn Khaldun, having shown us in his original introduction how his science of 
culture is consistent with the well-established philosophical sciences, shows us here his 
willingness to depart from established opinions by the philosophers. History, according to 
Ibn Khaldun, plays an important part in shaping the political and moral opinion of the 
people, and as such the correction of historical reports plays an important part in 
correcting these opinions. And since the correction of historical reports requires rational 
engagement with present political reality, the science of culture can further the aims of 
the philosophical sciences without the stigma that attaches itself to philosophy during 
times of political decline.  
This brings us to Ibn Khaldun’s third point, in which he mentions those Muslim 
scholars who pioneered the study of history. It is obvious that these scholars did not think 
of history as beneath their dignity, and it is also obvious that they were not overwhelmed 
by the enormity of the intellectual work that goes into the study of history. The 
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introduction of the names Ibn Ishāq, al-Tabrī, and Bukhārī, three of the most respected 
scholars in the tradition of Muslim history, might suggest that these pioneers were up to 
the task that the ancients supposedly found formidable. But the fact that Ibn Khaldun 
omits the name of al-Mas‘ūdī, his favorite scholar of history, might be a clue that this 
point is not in accordance with Ibn Khaldun’s opinion. This clue is strengthened by the 
fact that Ibn Khaldun passes by these names without offering praise or blame. Moreover, 
he immediately proceeds to mention how “many were oblivious” about the type of 
intellectual work necessary for the study of history, so that many unworthy persons 
involved themselves in writing history. One would assume that, had the pioneers done 
their work correctly, the fine-art of history would have proven to be off limits to those 
who are “dull in nature and mind, or those who embraced dullness.”  As to where the 
work of al-Mas‘ūdī fits into the works of the historians, Ibn Khaldun will discuss this at 
the end of his introduction. 
Ibn Khaldun focuses his attention next on a “deeply hidden ailment” from which 
historians as well as those who read history suffer. He states the problem as follows: 
Among the hidden errors with respect to history is obliviousness regarding the 
change in the conditions of nations and generations as a consequence of change 
in time periods and the passing of days. It is a strong and deeply hidden ailment 
for it does not take place except after long periods of time have passed, so that 
almost no individual from among the created is able to wise up to it. And this is 
because the conditions of the world, as well as the customs and occupations of 
nations do not last according to the same manner and the same stable procedure. 
Rather, these [things] are different in accordance with the [passing of] days and 
time periods, and the movement from one condition to another. And as this 
happens to persons, periods, and metropolises, so it does to horizons, regions, 
time-periods, and dynasties. (I.44: 7-15) 
 
In his statement of this problem near the conclusion of the introduction, Ibn Khaldun 
presents to us the most important issue with which his Kitāb al-‘Ibar in general, and the 
 193
 
Muqaddima in particular, is supposed to address. But what is the significance of this 
problem? Ibn Khaldun reminds us of the considerable change that passed through the 
world since the time that recorded history spoke of the “old Persian nations, the Syrians, 
the Nabataens, The Tubbas, the Israelites, and the Copts” (I.44: 16-17). He directs our 
attention to how each of these nations “had their own particular conditions regarding 
dynasties, royal possessions, politics, arts, languages, and terminologies, as well as the 
rest of the ways they commune with their own kind” (I.44-45: 17-1). And if this is not 
enough to bring home the enormity of change that comes with the passing of time, Ibn 
Khaldun reminds us how these older nations were replaced by new ones, such as the 
“later Persians, the Byzantines, and the Arabs” (I.45: 1). With this, the old conditions 
changed, and “through them customs were transformed, either to what is akin and similar 
[to the old ones], or to what is different and incompatible [to them]” (I.45: 2-3). And then 
Islam, with its Mudar Arab dynasty, came to the forefront of history, and with it “all of 
these conditions were completely transformed” (I.45: 4-5) once again. As Ibn Khaldun 
has already indicated through his treatment of the historians’ errors, there were also 
important changes that occurred after the rise of Islam: “The dynasty of the Arabs and 
days [of renown] vanished...and with their disappearance, nations, conditions, and 
customs transformed, and their affairs were forgotten, passing into oblivion” (I.45: 6-10).  
Having outlined the extent to which the world in general and the Muslim world in 
particular has changed since the earliest of recorded times, Ibn Khaldun turns to explain 
this phenomenon. He maintains: 
The common reason for the transformation of conditions and customs is that the 
customs of every generation follows the customs of their own [political] 
authority, as is said in the wise proverbs, “The people are in accordance with the 
creed of their king” (al-nās ‘alā dīn al-malik). And the kinsfolk of the kingship 
and the [political] authority, if they captured the dynasty and the command, then 
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it is unavoidable that they incline to the customs of those whom they replaced, 
adopting much of these customs, and meanwhile they would not be oblivious 
regarding the customs of their own generation; and so some difference would 
occur between the customs of the first generation and the [new] customs of the 
dynasty. And if another dynasty comes after them, mixing their customs with its 
own, then the [resulting] customs would be somewhat different from the previous 
one, and much different from the first one. And progression in the degrees of 
difference [from one dynasty to another] would go on until it ends with complete 
disparity [between the customs of the last dynasty and the first one]. And so, as 
long as nations and generations continue to succeed one another in kingship and 
[political] authority, the difference among customs and conditions will continue 
to occur. (I.45-46: 10-2) 
 
In explaining the reasons for the continuous transformation of the conditions and customs 
of nations, Ibn Khaldun points to the political elements that constitute much of his 
historical analysis in the Muqaddima. But in order to understand what lies behind Ibn 
Khaldun’s concern with this problem, we need to address the next problem he raises in 
conjunction with the previous one. And by so doing, we will be able to judge finally that 
Ibn Khaldun’s science of culture is intended not only to inform the study of history, but 
also to instill in his careful readers the correct judgment of present political reality. Ibn 
Khaldun argues: 
Analogizing and [making] comparisons are a well-recognized nature in the 
human being, one that is not safe from error. Accompanied by negligence and 
error, it leads him away from his intention and it sways him from his aim; for 
someone might hear many of the reports regarding those who passed, and not be 
aware of the changes and transformations that have occurred in conditions, and 
so he would make them confirm, at the first instance, to what he recognizes, and 
to analogize them with what he has witnessed, and the difference between these 
two [i.e., the reports and what he has witnessed] might be great. Thus he falls 
into an abyss of errors. (I.46: 2-7) 
 
As we have seen in the course of our analysis of the preface and the introduction, Ibn 
Khaldun knows all too well how careless readers tend to understand a text through the 
limited scope of their own experiences. Having this expectation in mind, Ibn Khaldun is 
able to make arguments that seem at first consistent with traditional opinions. And yet a 
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careful reading should reveal that he is presenting a challenge to such opinions. This style 
of writing allows Ibn Khaldun to communicate his ideas to his careful readers, while at 
the same time to protect himself from attacks by those whose authority is based on 
tradition.  
Of course, this intention to communicate his true ideas to a preferred readership is 
not born out of the desire for self-gratification, but out of concern for the welfare of the 
larger community. With respect to religious and worldly affairs, the traditional opinions 
of the larger community are influenced by their view of the past. This view of the past, as 
Ibn Khaldun argues here, is colored by peoples’ experiences in the present. A vicious 
circle is thus formed: people seek to find in history guidance regarding their present 
political reality, but without knowledge of the conditions unique to this present reality, 
they tend to interpret (and thus distort) the past by reading what exists in the present into 
the past. Contrasting what is unique about the past is, then, the first step toward 
understanding what is unique about the present. This is the reason why Ibn Khaldun 
wishes to reform history. His departure from the philosopher’s attitude toward history, 
though a student of their methods and teachings, can itself be the result of the changes 
time has wrought to the customs and conditions of nations. History did not possess the 
great influence it had on public opinion as it did at the time Ibn Khaldun was writing. On 
the other hand, philosophy had apparently fallen out of favor in the time of Ibn Khaldun 
and was regarded with great suspicion. Since the pursuit of philosophy could not be done 
openly, Ibn Khaldun had to choose a different path that would allow the use of the 




At the conclusion of his introduction Ibn Khaldun positions his Kitāb al-‘Ibar as a 
crucial reference to future historians and as a safeguard for the fine-art of history. He 
does so by first making explicit what was implicit in his preface, namely, that there are 
two types of historical scholarship. The first is scholarship on particular histories, and the 
other is scholarship on general histories. As I have argued in chapter three, Ibn Khaldun’s 
Kitāb al-‘Ibar is much closer to the second type of historical scholarship than the first. 
Since Ibn Khaldun argues that “history is only the mentioning of specific reports relating 
to a time-period or a [particular] generation” (I.50: 19-20), then it is safe to assume that 
the first type of scholarship is what should properly be called by the name history. Now, 
the more specific the report, the more conducive it is for moral and political instruction, 
as well as for entertainment. But there are two problems with particular histories. The 
first, as Ibn Khaldun has illustrated in the introduction, is that their moral and political 
lessons are heavily dependent on the intellectual competence and honesty of the 
historians—who are, after all, fallible human beings easily swayed by prejudice, 
partisanship, and greed (cf. I.56-57: 13-15). The second problem has to do with what Ibn 
Khaldun has raised at the end of his conclusion, namely, the fact that the habits and 
customs of nations and generations change with the passing of time. Accordingly, the 
moral and political value of the historical lesson is inevitably time bound. 
As for the other type of historical scholarship, it is not clear by what name it 
should be called. Certainly Ibn Khaldun himself does not give it a specific designation. 
After stating what history properly so called is, he goes on to maintain:  
As for the mentioning of the general conditions of boundaries, generations, and 
time-periods, this is the foundation for the historian, upon which he builds most 




If history is indeed “only the mentioning of specific reports,” then these general histories 
cannot properly be called histories. And yet, as Ibn Khaldun indicates above, they 
provide an indispensable service to the historians. But rather than explain how and why 
this “foundation” guides the historians in their works, Ibn Khaldun gives us the example 
par excellence of such a foundation. 
People used to single it out by means of composition, as did al-Mas‘ūdī in his 
book Murūj al-Dhahab, in which he explained the conditions of nations and 
boundaries, both in the East and in the West, up to his own age, in the period of 
three hundred and thirty [942 AD]. He mentioned their sects and customs, 
described the different localities, mountains, seas, royal possessions, dynasties, 
and distinguished among the Arab and the non-Arab peoples. Thus he became an 
imam to the historians, to which they come back, and a root on which they verify 
much of their reports. Then after him came al-Bakrī, and so he did something 
similar, especially with respect to paths (al-masālik) and royal possessions—and 
excluding the rest of conditions because, in his age, neither much alteration nor 
great change occurred in nations and generations. 
 
Providing a chronological context through which the historian can temporally situate his 
particular subject is the most obvious way in which general histories can serve as a 
foundation for specific works in history. But, as Ibn Khaldun suggests through his 
example, a foundational work for history goes deeper than just a chronological survey. 
The work of al-Mas‘ūdī provides a comprehensive coverage of nations and national 
territories, of religious diversity and local customs, of world geography and regional 
topography, of kingships and dynasties, and, for the benefit of his immediate audience, 
the difference among Arab and non-Arab peoples. Accordingly, a work that can truly be 
described as “a foundations of the historians” is one that would provide the scholar of 
history with the larger context through which he can situate the national, territorial, 
political, and religious component to his specific subject of study. 
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 Ibn Khaldun informs us that Kitāb al-‘Ibar is modeled after the work of al-
Mas‘ūdī, and aims to update, so to speak, the latter’s Murūj al-Dhahab, as well as to 
address a deficiency in this work. The deficiency that Ibn Khaldun wishes to address has 
to do with the history of the Maghrib. For although al-Mas‘ūdī did an exceptional work in 
describing the Eastern regions of the world (I.53: 1), he “fell short in his details with 
respect to the conditions” (I.53: 3) of the Maghrib. As such, Ibn Khaldun declares that he 
will mention in his Kitāb al-‘Ibar “what [he] can regarding this western region” (I.52: 14-
15). As for the update, Ibn Khaldun informs us that al-Mas‘ūdī’s comprehensive work 
stops at the year 330H/942 AD. So much change and transformation happened in the 
world through the four centuries that has passed since Murūj al-Dhahab was composed. 
According to Ibn Khaldun: 
If the conditions [in the world] changed completely, then it would be as if the 
creation has radically changed and the world in its entirety has transformed, as if 
it is a new creation, a fresh growth, and a modern world. (I.52: 8-10) 
  
This age (i.e., 8th/14th century), therefore, requires one who would record the conditions, 
borders, generations, customs, and sects that has changed, and, in doing so, “to follow the 
path al-Mas‘ūdī made for his own time, so that he could become a root to be taken as a 
model by whomever of historians come after him” (I.52: 10-12).  
 We see here, then, how Ibn Khaldun explicitly positions his Kitāb al-‘Ibar as an 
important guide for future historians, something similar to the way Murūj al-Dhahab was 
to past historians. As such, Ibn Khaldun carefully presents himself not as an innovator, 
but as a disciple of an old master, who charted the path along which Ibn Khaldun follows. 
Ibn Khaldun’s conclusion of the introduction seems to contradict his teaching in the rest 
of the introduction as well as in the preface, where we see him, both explicitly and 
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implicitly, charting new territories of research and inquiry. This praise of al-Mas‘ūdī—
which must be viewed as excessive in light of what Ibn Khaldun is attempting to do—has 
to be tempered by the fact that, in many of the reports Ibn Khaldun criticizes as 
nonsensical, al-Mas‘ūdī is singled out as the one who reported them, or at least as one of 
the reporters (cf. I.9: 9-10, I.14: 1-2, I.58: 5-11, I.58: 12-16, I.59: 12-16, and I.59-60: 20-
10). 
 In order to solve this apparent contradiction we need to bear in mind that Ibn 
Khaldun’s Kitāb al-‘Ibar has two important parts, the Muqaddima and the History. In the 
Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldun formulates a new science whose subject is “mankind’s culture 
(al-‘umrān al-basharī) and human social organization (al-ijtimā‘ al-insānī),” and has its 
own questions which it seeks to address, namely, “the clarification of each aspect of the 
essential conditions of culture” (I.61: 17-18). In the History, Ibn Khaldun focuses “on the 
Maghrib, on the conditions of its generations and nations, on the mention of its royal 
possessions and dynasties over that of other regions—since [he is] unfamiliar with the 
conditions of the East and its nations, for the reports that are in circulation about it do not 
satisfy what [he] need[s] of it” (I.52: 15-18). So insofar as the History is concerned, Ibn 
Khaldun does indeed follow the path of al-Mas‘ūdī, but insofar as the Muqaddima and 
formulation of the science of culture is concerned, Ibn Khaldun provides a truly unique 
and innovative approach to the study of history. In the History Ibn Khaldun provides the 
historian of the future a comprehensive view of an important region in the Muslim world 
that was never given its due course of study. In the Muqaddima Ibn Khaldun address 
what al-Mas‘ūdī has apparently failed to do, namely, how the conditions of nations and 




essential and what is particular in human culture, one would be in a better position to 
understand what is constant and what is changing in the course of human history.     




 “What is the larger political-philosophic significance of Ibn Khaldun’s 
Muqaddima?” This was the question I asked myself when, a few years ago, I first 
encountered the Muqaddima. The question lingered and later guided the subject of my 
dissertation. In the initial stages I knew that to answer this question adequately I needed 
first to give an account of the larger idea that informs not only the subject of the 
Muqaddima, but also the subject of the History, i.e., the general idea that animates the 
two principal parts of Kitāb al-‘Ibar. 
The Muqaddima, of course, formulates the science of culture, while the History is 
concerned, almost exclusively, with addressing the gap that exists in the historical record 
regarding the peoples of the Maghrib. This led me to conclude that giving an account of 
the idea that animates Kitāb al-‘Ibar meant explaining Ibn Khaldun’s conception of the 
relationship between history and the science of culture. My initial belief was that this 
relationship was as straightforward as the original introduction, passages in the 
Muqaddima, and the whole structure of Kitāb al-‘Ibar seem to suggest, namely, that the 
science of culture develops the rational tools by which historians verify historical reports. 
All I needed, then, was to articulate this relationship clearly and afterwards proceed to 
examine the political questions that must arise with respect to Ibn Khaldun’s conception 
of this relationship. 
As I began a closer examination of the original introduction—in which the 
relationship between the science of culture and history is first articulated—in conjunction 
with the careful study of the Muqaddima and the scholarly literature on it, doubts arose to 
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trouble my initial assumptions with respect to the relationship between the science of 
culture and history. 
First, as I have argued in Chapter One, it was not clear to me how subjects that 
Ibn Khaldun investigates in the Muqaddima should guide scholars in their verification of 
historical reports. Add to this the fact that Ibn Khaldun’s own historical reporting in the 
History part of his Kitāb al-‘Ibar, fails to measure up to the standard of “scientific rigors” 
that he displays so prominently in the course of his investigation in the Muqaddima. 
Second, Muhsin Mahdi’s discussion of the philosophic foundation of the science 
of culture—in which he clearly shows that Ibn Khaldun did not attempt to break with the 
classical-medieval tradition of philosophy—focused my attention on the question of the 
extent to which Ibn Khaldun was a serious student of Muslim philosophers. Still, his 
apparent preoccupation with history and with the reform of the “fine-art” of history was 
very problematic. At the very least, it signaled an important departure from the 
philosophers’ teaching regarding the status of this subject—a departure that called for 
explanation.  
I could not find an answer to this question in the available scholarly literature. In 
Mahdi’s work, for example, the impressive philosophical background that he brings to 
bear on the understanding of the Muqaddima seems at time to drown out the voice of Ibn 
Khaldun. And yet this same voice, at least as it appears in various passages at different 
parts of the Muqaddima, tends all too often to rebuff Mahdi’s own arguments. 
Of course, the more I studied the Muqaddima, the more I noticed the possibility 
that Ibn Khaldun uses a variety of voices and of arguments in order to speak to different 
readers at different levels. For me this could explain why there is such disagreement 
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among Ibn Khaldun’s scholars regarding his intellectual orientation. Paying attention 
now to this tendency of Ibn Khaldun’s to speak in different ways so as to reach different 
audiences, I shifted the focus of my research. I searched first to discover out a clear 
standard by which to officiate among what appears to be Ibn Khaldun’s contradictory 
arguments and positions. This standard had clearly to come from Ibn Khaldun himself, 
and it had to be proven to be Ibn Khaldun’s own standard.  
The most logical place to find the standard, of course, is at the beginning of the 
book, i.e., the original introduction, for it is there that Ibn Khaldun has to make the case 
for reading his book. The standard, to be sure, comes from understanding the central idea 
which gives coherence to Kitāb al-‘Ibar. Thus, I found that I needed to examine more 
carefully the apparent relationship between the science of culture and history as it was 
presented in the original introduction. As part of this re-examination I needed to pay 
close attention to the manner in which Ibn Khaldun presents his arguments, then to 
examine and prove the possibility that Ibn Khaldun writes on multiple levels. The 
working out of this problem was to constitute the first part of my dissertation. The second 
part of this dissertation was to be concerned with showing how the central idea discussed 
in the original introduction unfolds in the rest of the Muqaddima. And this was to be 
pursued with the same meticulous treatment I show in the first part. As I began the first 
part of the dissertation, I realized that this idea could not possibly be accomplished in the 
time at my disposal. I thus had to postpone the second part for future studies. 
As such, this dissertation focuses on Ibn Khaldun’s style of writing, the substance 
of his ideas, and the relationship between his style and the substance of what he has to 
say. The order of the chapters illustrates my intellectual movement beginning from a 
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tentative or preliminary understanding of Ibn Khaldun’s writing style (Chapter 2), 
passing through a careful examination of the style of presentation and the substance of 
the teaching (Chapter 3), and culminating in an exploration of the implication of this 
teaching (chapter 4).  
 In Chapter Two, I illustrate how Ibn Khaldun expresses the general character of 
his Kitāb al-‘Ibar through its title, and detail how he presents himself to his reader 
through his public profession of faith in the invocation. Positing the reasonable 
assumption that adroit authors capture, through the titles, the substance of their 
arguments, I submitted the full title of Kitāb al-‘Ibar’s to rigorous analysis. Fortunately, 
the assumption yielded positive results and enabled me to show not only how the title 
speaks to the two parts of Kitāb al-‘Ibar, but also suggest the two ways in which readers 
can reasonably engage Ibn Khaldun’s book. This last point was demonstrated through the 
treatment of the word to which the totality of Ibn Khaldun’s title is reduced, i.e., ‘Ibar. 
This word which is conventionally understood as “instructive lessons” can also mean 
“allusions,” something from which a great benefit can be had, but only through careful 
study and analysis. And in my examination of the invocation in this chapter, I illustrate 
Ibn Khaldun’s thoughtfulness and subtlety as a writer. The purpose here is to provide the 
first clues of the care with which Ibn Khaldun makes his arguments, and consequently to 
make the case for the care the reader ought to invest in examining these arguments. 
In Chapter Three, I raised the question of whether Ibn Khaldun’s apparent 
objective for Kitāb al-‘Ibar is indeed an expression of this work’s true objective. I 
address this question by keeping close to Ibn Khaldun’s surface argument and by 
showing how, through this surface argument, Ibn Khaldun both covers and uncovers his 
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true objective, i.e., uncovers the central idea that informs and gives coherence to the 
totality of Kitāb al-‘Ibar. In the preface, as I have argued, Ibn Khaldun presents to the 
careful reader two points regarding history. First, that history, like poetry, serves as an 
important source of entertainment and of public instruction. Second, that left to its own 
devices the “fine-art” of history will cause great harm to the public in general, and to the 
learned in particular.  
With these two points, we begin to see the considerations that compelled Ibn 
Khaldun to depart from the philosophers with respect to the study of history. The reform 
of history, in turn, is based on an observation Ibn Khaldun makes in passing regarding the 
relationship between general and particular histories. The particular histories, which 
constitute the greatest part of historical scholarship, always proceed through a framework 
that is presented by the general histories. To reform the fine-art of history, therefore, Ibn 
Khaldun had to present his work in the form of general history.  
In Chapter Four, I focus more on the substance of Ibn Khaldun’s argument than I 
do its style. Through a careful analysis of the original introduction, I reveal the political 
aspects of the central objective of Kitāb al-‘Ibar and how it is presented and elaborated 
on in the introduction. His central objective is to encourage, through the study of history, 
the rational examination of political life in a politically salutary way. In his critique of 
reports regarding the size of the Israelites’ troops, Ibn Khaldun brings knowledge of 
politics, political geography, natural population growth, and military strategy to bear on 
these reports. He also shows us the necessary limits to any public discussion of the results 
reached through the rational examination of history: sacred opinions and reports 




call miracles into question—not even obliquely. In his critique of reports impugning the 
character of significant historical figures, such as the early Abbasid caliphs, Ibn Khaldun 
shows the negative consequences of these reports on moral instruction. Thus Ibn Khaldun 
shows his willingness to abandon scholarly objectivity in order to promote what defends 
the grounds for decent conduct—differently stated, what is politically salutary. However, 
in his excessive defense of the Abbasids, Ibn Khaldun provides room to reflect on the 
complex character of the problem of morality. And finally, in his critique of reports that 
contest the Alid lineage of the founders of certain dynasties, Ibn Khaldun shows the need 
to disengage historical studies from insoluble partisan conflicts.  
With these examples Ibn Khaldun brings his introduction to a conclusion, one in 
which he raises a final problem: whether the moral and political actions of the past cannot 
serve as proper guide for actions in the present due to the fact that, with the passing of 
time, the customs and conditions of people change. The solution to this problem is the 
embedded in science of culture. Unlike the general history of al-Mas‘ūdī, which benefited 
those historians who were closer to his time period, the combination of Ibn Khaldun’s 
particular introduction setting forth his science of culture and the historical exposition of 
his Kitāb al-‘Ibar is designed to provide the careful reader with the necessary tools to 
distinguish between what is essential and what is accidental in human culture. This, more 
than the truth about particular reports, is what brings forth the awareness necessary for 
guidance with respect to present “religious and worldly conditions” (I.8: 15), so that 
those who reflect might “tear [their] grip away from the [habit] of imitation and behold of 
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